In Re Edmunds
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Waites
ORDER RESOLVING OBJECTIONS OF TRUSTEE TO CONFIRMATION
JOHN E. WAITES, Bankruptcy Judge.
These matters come before the Court upon objections to plan confirmation filed by chapter 13 trustee William K. Stephenson, Jr. (“Trustee”). Pursuant to
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Trustee is the chapter 13 trustee for Charles Leslie Edmunds, Jr. and William Frederick Orris and Julia Pratt Orris (collectively referred to as the “Debtors”).
2. Debtors are each above the median income and filed for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, as revised by the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“Reform Act”). See Pub L. No. 109-8 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
3. Pursuant to
4. Trustee opposes confirmation of Debtors’ plans on grounds that Debtors are not committing their “projected disposable income” to their proposed plans and that Debtors’ plans were not proposed in good faith. Trustee’s primary argument is that Debtors are improperly deducting from their disposable income payments for certain secured debts that will be treated as unsecured debts in their proposed plans and that Form B22C, filed in each of these cases, does not accurately reflect Debtors’ actual expenses, reflected on Schedule J, and thus their available income for distribution to unsecured creditors.
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Debtors each contend that they are only required to pay to unsecured creditors the amount determined by
5. Debtors each reflect in their Form B22C that they have a minimum amount or no disposable income for payment to unsecured creditors. Trustee challenges Debtors’ expenses by disallowing certain expenses claimed on Debtors’ Forms B22C, which are neither applicable expenses allowed by the Means Test nor actual expenses with reference to Debtors’ Schedules J.
6. The adjustments to Debtors’ expenses proposed by Trustee would appear to result in projected disposable income sufficient to pay Debtors respective scheduled unsecured creditors in full.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
These objections require the Court to interpret
I. EXISTING AUTHORITY
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan . . .
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
“Disposable income,” for above median income debtors,
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is defined as a debtor’s “current monthly income,” also a defined term under § 101(10A),
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less amounts reasonably necessary “to be expended” as determined by
Some courts have found that plans which use a “disposable income” figure calculated by using Form B22C meet the
*641 A. Mechanical Application of the Means Test
Some courts have found that the statutory language used by Congress dictates that a debtor is only required to repay unsecured creditors the amount determined by Form B22C, without regard to the actual ability of the debtor to pay.
See In re Barr,
341 B.R. 181 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006);
In re Alexander,
344 B.R. 742 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006);
In re Guzman,
345 B.R. 640 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.2006). In each of these cases, the debtors were above median income and each had actual disposable income, according to their filed Schedules I and J, which they could have used for payment to unsecured creditors; however, the courts each found that the debtors satisfied
Within this approach, however, courts have differed on the acceptable methods of using the Means Test to calculate allowable expenses to be deducted from a debt- or’s income.
Compare In re Crittendon,
C/A No. 06-10322 C-13G, slip op., 2006 WL 2547102 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Sept.1, 2006) (clarifying
Barr
and finding expenses must be determined on^the effective date of the plan and therefore debtors could not deduct from income those payments that would not be made in the plan)
with In re Oliver,
C/A No. 06-30076RLD12, slip op., 2006 WL 2086691 (Bankr.D.Or. Jun.29, 2006). In
Oliver,
the court rejected the approach proposed by the Trustee and found that debtors are not required to add income back to their disposable income merely because the debtors were avoiding certain liens or were surrendering property in their plan and thus would not be paying the debts as secured debts over the term of the plan.
See In re Oliver,
2006 WL 2086691 at *3 (citing
In re Walker,
C/A No. 05-15010-WHD, slip op., 2006 WL 1314125 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. May 1, 2006)) (interpreted
B. Means Test is Presumptively Correct
In an effort to give meaning to the definition of “disposable income” and also recognize the economic reality that a debt- or’s current and future financial situation may be different from the income reflected in Form B22C, the court in Jass found that the Form B22C is a starting point to determine “projected disposable income.” See In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 415 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006). The debtors in Jass experienced a decrease in income just prior to the filing of their chapter 13 bankruptcy. The court found that there is a presumption in favor of using Form B22C to determine projected disposable income; however, the debtors could rebut the presumption upon showing that this amount does not correctly represent the debtors’ budget projected in the future. See id. at *642 416. In reaching this conclusion, the court allowed the debtors to rely upon Schedules I and J to demonstrate that their current financial situation was different than that reflected in their Form B22C. 7 The court noted that rebutting the presumption in favor of using Form B22C is the exception to the general rule of using this form to determine disposable income. See id. at 419. The court determined that this interpretation provided meaning to the word “projected” and produced a result consistent with the policy of providing debtors with a fresh start. See id. at 417-418.
C. Modified Means Test 8
The majority approach does not follow the strict interpretation of
II. STANDARD FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The plain meaning of an unambiguous statute governs, barring exceptional circumstances. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (finding there is a “strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.”); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 416 (4th Cir.2004). “Courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous.” Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Courts may resort to legislative history to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute. See U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). The legislative history of a *643 statute may also be considered when the application of a statute’s plain meaning produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters. See id.
III. INTERPRETATION OF “PROJECTED DISPOSABLE INCOME”
The determination of “projected disposable income,” used by
The Court disagrees with the mechanical application of the Means Test as set forth in
Oliver
and finds that the expense component of “projected disposable income” should be a reflection of Debtors’ applicable or actual projected expenses allowed by the Means Test.
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See Solomon,
67 F.3d at 1132 (the court must determine disposable income by determining what portion of income is disposable pursuant to statutory definition). Congress has mandated that courts allow debtors those categories of expenses recognized under the Means Test so long as those expenses are “reasonably necessary” and “to be expended.”
See
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the expense allowance provided by
IV. APPLICATION OF LAW TO DEBTORS’ CASES
A second category of allowed expenses are those “actual” expenses incurred by Debtors, which are designated as “Other Necessary Expenses.” Such expenses include certain tax expenses, health care costs, telecommunication costs, and mandatory payroll deductions.
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The Court also finds that these expenses must be reasonable.
See
Lastly, the Court must consider the treatment of Debtors’ secured debts.
V. INCOME
Though not central to the outcome of Trustee’s objections in these cases, the income component of “projected disposable income” is an issue raised by the parties in their joint stipulation of dispute and is also a critical issue in Reform Act cases in this District. 13 Following a *646 similar analysis, as stated above for expenses, the Court believes that the income component of projected disposable income is a forward-looking concept and the Court adopts the majority approach regarding income as set forth in Hardacre and De-monica and disagrees with the approach of Barr and Alexander, 14 See Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 722-723, Demonica, 345 B.R. at 900. See also, Grady, 343 B.R. at 752 (finding income should be considered at the time of confirmation); In re Risher, 344 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2006) (finding projected disposable income must be based on anticipated income); Fuller, 346 B.R. at 482-483 (finding that income component of projected disposable income should be made with reference to Schedule I); In re Foster, 2006 WL 2621080, *4 (Bankr.N.D. Ind. Sept. 11, 2006) (finding Form B22C is the starting point but does not necessarily determine projected disposable income).
The strict use of “current monthly income” to determine the amount to be paid in a plan to unsecured creditors ignores that Congress used the word “projected” to modify “disposable income” and ignores the language in
“Projected” is defined as “to calculate, estimate, or predict (something in the future) based upon present date ....” American Heritage College Dictionary 1094 (3d ed.1993). “To be received” indicates that Congress intended the courts to determine a debtor’s disposable income based upon that income that debtor will receive during the applicable commitment period and not solely based upon the debtor’s pre-petition income average. Congress intentionally used the phrase “projected disposable income,” a phrase not defined by the Bankruptcy Code but previously used by Congress in
For a debtor, whose income does not vary significantly between six months pre-petition and the petition date, there is very little impact on projected disposable income regardless of the use of the mechanical or modified Means Tests. However, if strictly using the mechanical test, a significant and sudden change in income during this period, not an uncommon event leading up to some bankruptcy filings, may produce results not intended by Congress. Two common examples are worth considering. Take for instance a debtor who was a highly paid executive for five months of the pre-petition period and has a sudden and severe loss of income due to a heart-attack or some other medical calamity, which leaves him unemployed and with little or no income. A strict mechanical approach to determine projected disposable income may require significant payments in a chapter 13 when in fact the debtor actually has little present ability to pay. In another example under the strict mechanical approach, a mill worker, who is laid off for most of the six month pre-petition period but reemployed near the time of bankruptcy, may be required to pay little or nothing to his unsecured creditors even though he has an actual ability to pay. Without examining actual income, the first debtor may not achieve relief, while the second debtor may achieve confirmation without paying creditors. These are not the results intended by Congress and therefore the Court finds Debtors’ actual incomes relevant in determining “projected disposable income.” See H.R.Rep. No. 109-31(1), at 5 (2005), U.S.Code Cong. & AdmimNews 2005, p. 88 (noting that the Reform Act is designed to deter abuse).
VI. GOOD FAITH
Trustee also opposed confirmation on grounds that Debtors did not propose their plans in good faith as required by
Some courts have found that a debtor who meets the best efforts test of
Determining whether a plan is proposed in good faith is based upon the totality of the circumstances.
See Deans v. O‘Donnell,
692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.1982). In
Deans,
the Fourth Circuit sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors to determine whether a plan has been proposed in good faith. Included in this list is a debt- or’s current financial situation and percentage of proposed repayment to unsecured creditors.
Deans,
692 F.2d at 972. These factors are relevant even if a debt- or’s plan satisfies
Nothing in the legislative history of § 102(h), of Pub.L. 108-9 (2005), clearly indicates that Congress intended to change the existing practice in this Circuit of considering a debtor’s actual financial situation at the time of filing or the percentage of proposed repayment as elements of good faith.
See Jass,
340 B.R. at 416-417
*649
(discussing the absence of clear legislative history). Courts should not presume that amendments to the Bankruptcy Code alter past bankruptcy practices absent a clear indication from Congress of such intent.
See id.
(citing
Cohen v. de la Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 221, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998)). The language of the statute and the available legislative history each indicate that Congress did not intend a wholesale departure from prior bankruptcy practice. As discussed herein, Congress did not clearly make “disposable income” and “projected disposable income” synonymous based upon the language used in
Consideration of a debtor’s current and projected financial situation in these cases also coincides with the Reform Act’s treatment of below median income debtors. These debtors are not required to determine expenses on Form B22C and thus they do not reach a “disposable income” figure under the form. Most courts have found a below median income debtor determines “projected disposable income” by using the debtor’s Schedules I and J.
See e.g., Kibbe,
342 B.R. at 415. If the Means Test were to eclipse the application of traditional elements of good faith for an above median income debtor, then below median income debtors arguably least able to pay would be subject to a different and, in many instances, a more difficult standard and may be required to pay more than those debtors more able to pay. This result was not intended by Congress. Above median income debtors, like the Orrises, may be able to show negative disposable income on Form B22C and thus, if the Means Test, as applied in
Oliver,
strictly controls, these debtors may pay nothing to unsecured creditors despite their actual ability to pay. However, below median income debtors, using Schedules I and J to determine their disposable income under
Since it appears from Debtors’ respective Schedules I and J that they have sufficient projected disposable income to pay a greater distribution to general unsecured creditors than proposed in their current plans and because Debtors’ present plans were therefore not proposed in good faith, Trustee’s objections are sustained. See Deans, 692 F.2d at 972.
CONCLUSION
In this Court’s view, the statutory construction of
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. To the extent any of the following Findings of Fact constitute Conclusions of Law, they are adopted as such, and to the extent any Conclusions of Law constitute Findings of Fact, they are also adopted as such.
. For example, the Orrises will either surrender or value their four vehicles in their plan; however, on Form B22C they deduct all contractually due payments on these vehicles from their disposable income. The Orrises also take a double deduction in their form for their rental payments. Edmunds takes a full deduction for property that he will surrender or value and seeks to claim an ownership expense for owning a second vehicle when in fact he is surrendering his second vehicle in his proposed plan. Certain of Edmunds’ actual expenses in his Form B22C are also not consistent with the same category of expenses disclosed in his Schedule J.
.Future references to the Bankruptcy Code shall be made by section number only.
. Traditionally, “projected disposable income” has been determined by using “a debt- or‘s present monthly income and expenditures and extending those amounts over the life of the plan.” See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1995) (citations omitted).
. The majority of courts have found that Schedules I and J may be used for below median income debtors to determine “projected disposable income.” See In re Dew, 344 B.R. 655 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2006); In re Schanuth, 342 B.R. 601 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2006) (using current monthly income less debtor‘s expenses on Schedule J); In re Kibbe, 342 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.N.H.2006).
.“Current Monthly Income” is defined as “the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor‘s spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 6-month . . .” preceding the petition date.
. Jass did not address whether a trustee or creditor could compel a debtor to pay more than the amount listed on Form B22C if the debtor‘s financial situation was better than that reflected in the form. Some commentators presume that the Jass court would allow such a result. See e.g., Kevin R. Anderson, Disposable Income vs. Projected Disposable Income: Identical Twins or Distant Reatives?, NACTT Quarterly, July-Sept.2006, at 16.
. Though this approach to expenses is the same approach that the Barr court adopted in Crittendon, the Court differentiates between the two camps as courts in this third camp have often interpreted the income component of “projected disposable income” as a forward looking concept. See Demonica, 345 B.R. at 900.
. This result is consistent with the legislative history for the reform Act. In the legislative history, Congress indicated four factors supporting bankruptcy reform. Included in this list was “the present bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives that allow and sometimes even encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse.” H.R.Rep. No. 109-31(1), at 5 (2005), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2005, pp. 88, 92. If the mechanical application of the Means Test controlled, without consideration of projected income and expenses, then there would be greater potential for “opportunistic personal filings.” A debtor could time his filing so as to coincide with certain financial life events, such as a return to work after a period of unemployment, in order to circumvent paying his unsecured creditors their actual disposable income. Such an outcome is not consistent with the intent of Congress in amending the Bankruptcy Code and reducing opportunistic personal filings and the purpose of the Reform Act of deterring abuse.
See id.
at 47 (stating “S. 256 is intended to improve the bankruptcy system by deterring abuse . . .”). Congress also expressed concern that some bankruptcy debtors, who are able to repay “a significant portion of their debts,” were not doing so under the old law.
See id.
at 5. The interpretation of “projected disposable income” set forth in
Oliver
appears to produce a result at odds with the intent of Congress in that it allows can-pay debtors to discharge their unsecured debts without devoting any income from their surplus funds to this class of creditors. The Court believes the interpretation reached in
McPherson, Renicker,
and this opinion is consistent with Congressional intent in that it maximizes the amount of a debtor’s available income for repayment to creditors and gives meaning to allowed categories of income and expenses set forth by
. Form B22C only indicates that it determines “monthly disposable income under
. One of the odd results produced by a strict mechanical application of the Means Test is a potential variation between current monthly income, a historic number, and mandatory payroll reductions, which is, pursuant to
. For example, Edmunds’ expenses for health care and health insurance, listed on his Form B22C, differed from the same category of expenses listed on his Schedule J. The Orrises also failed to present persuasive evidence that all of their telecommunication costs were actual, reasonable, and necessary.
.The Orrises’ Schedule I income is slightly less than their Form B22C income. Ed-munds’ Schedule I income is slightly more than his Form B22C income. In his memorandum in support of his objections, Trustee proposes to use Debtors’ Form B22C income after reducing it by non-reoccurring income, such as Debtors’ tax refunds.
. This approach and the approach in
lass
each recognize that “projected disposable income” is a forward looking concept based upon the plain language used in
.
. This interpretation of
. Due to the importance of consistency in rendering significant decisions under BAPC-PA, all bankruptcy judges in this District have reviewed and concur with the result of this opinion.