74 N.W. 870 | N.D. | 1898
This is a disbarment proceeding, brought under section 434 of the Revised Codes. The District Court entered a judgment suspending the accused from practice as an attorney-at-law. This court, on appeal reversed the judgment of the District Court, and directed the court below to enter a judgment reversing its former judgment, and dismissing the proceeding. See In re Eaton, 4 N. D. 514, 62 N. W. Rep. 597. The record now before us discloses the following facts: In October, 1895, and pursuant to the direction of this court so to do, an order was made and entered in the District Court annulling said judgment of suspension, and dismissing the proceedings. This order is silent as to the costs of the proceeding. Later, and in January, 1896, the matter of the. costs was brought before the District Court, and was disposed of by an order as follows: “The order to show cause entered herein on the 30th day of December, A. D. 1895, citing the petitioners in the above entitled proceeding to show cause why the respondent, Robert A. Eaton, should not have his costs and disbursements herein adjusted in his favor and against the petitioners, J. B. Wineman and R. M. Carothers, having come on for hearing before the undersigned trial judge, all parties appearing personally, and the matter herein having been considered, it is now hereby ordered that the application of said respondent for such adjustment be, and the same is hereby, denied.” Thereafter, and in August, A. D. 1896, judgment was entered annulling the judgment of suspension, and dismissing the proceeding; but said judgment gave no costs or disbursements, and was wholly silent as to the costs and disbursements of the proceeding. From the last mentioned judgment, the respondent appeals to this court, and claims here that the court below erred in not giving him a judgment for his costs and disbursements, and this is the sole question involved on this appeal.
Appellant’s contention, briefly stated, is that a disbarment proceeding under the statute, being neither a civil nor a criminal action proper, is necessarily a “special proceeding,” citing Rev. Codes, §§ 5155-5160, and contends further, that, under various
We have decided to hold that neither costs nor disbursements-can be recovered in a proceeding of this character. It must be conceded, however, that, in a certain broad sense, the contention of the appellant that this proceeding is a “special proceeding” is correct. It is special, in that it is neither a civil action nor a criminal action, but is, on the contrary, a remedy in court, which is readily distinguishable from both, not only with respect to the objects sought in actions, but as well with respect to the procedure which governs in actions. For purposes of general classification, such as was attempted to be made by the code' makers in the sections thereof already cited, this proceeding is certainly a
The judgment will be affirmed, without costs in this court.