27 N.Y.S. 145 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1894
Lead Opinion
By chapter 101 of the Laws of 1892 the East was incorporated, certainly with somewhat ■extraordinary powers. By this act it was organized with a capital •of $25,000,000, which it was authorized to increase or decrease at pleasure. It was also authorized to construct two bridges across the East river,—one between a point at or near Broadway, in the city of Brooklyn, across the East river, to a point or place between Delaney and Rivington streets and Columbia and Cannon streets, in the city of New York; and the other commencing at a point between the pier line of East river and Fulton street, in the city of Brooklyn, across the East river, to a point or place between Jackson and Scammel streets, in the city of New York. It was further provided that an approach to said first-mentioned bridge should be constructed and maintained from a point on said bridge at or about Cannon street; thence extending westerly over, through, and along private property, and across the intervening streets, to the Bowery; and thence across the Bowery to Spring street,—which extension might
The learned counsel for the petitioner seems to have a rather exalted idea of the functions and the dignity of the determination of the commissioners appointed in this proceeding. It is urged that the determination of the commissioners that the construction of the proposed road is a public necessity will not be reviewed by this court, except fraud or manifest error on their part be averred, which is not the case, and that the conclusions arrived at by them upon all matters of fact are the same as the verdict of a jury, as far as this court is concerned; and our attention is called to the
It is not at all necessary to discuss any of the constitutional questions which have been raised upon this application, because, as we understand it, the court of last resort has practically swept away all the limitations which have been attempted to be placed upon private and local enterprises affecting private interests. In Re Church, 92 N. Y. 1, it has been held that a law relating to particular persons or things as a class was general, while one relating to particular persons or things of a class was deemed local or private; and that an act which under no possible circumstances could apply to but a single county of the state, because it created a class consisting of. one, and did not refer by name to the individual composing this class of one, was not local, but general, and therefore constitutional. Under this decision, all that it is necessary to do to evade the constitutional provision is to use general language, qualified, however, by particular descriptions which can make it applicable only to the particular thing in respect to which there is an intent to legislate.
An objection has also been raised that the petitioner has not sufficient means or capital to complete the enterprise, or to compensate the property owners for the damage which will result in
It has been urged by the opponents of this application that it is impolitic for the city of New York to afford facilities to get beyond the boundaries of the- city. We do not think, however, that this position is well taken, because, by providing means whereby clerks and other persons employed in the city of New York may reach, within reasonable time, places where they can procure homes more cheaply than could be done within the city limits, provision is thereby made for the more economical transaction of business in the city of New York; and, by thus affording an opportunity to persons so employed within the city of New York to procure cheap and comfortable homes within a reasbnable distance, the business interests of the city are advanced, and the morals of those employed improved. It seems to us, therefore, that there is nothing in this objection.
There is another point which ought to cause the court to hesitate, before granting the power sought by these applicants, and that is
There is a further objection to the granting of the application at this time, which we deem important. It is a matter of common knowledge that a commission acting in pursuance of authority are, and for some time have been, engaged in an effort to solve the problem of rapid transit. The question submitted to them in the hope that a successful scheme of rapid transit would result is one of the greatest importance to this municipality. The benefits, if any, which would result to it from the building of a cross-town road such as is now proposed, would be incomparably less than the other, and for that reason the right of the applicant to take the public streets should not be granted, at least until the present attempt to obtain a rapid transit system lengthwise of the island, other than underground, shall be substantially abandoned, because the building of this road, or even the granting of the right to occupy the streets, might prove of serious embarrassment to the plans which may ultimately be formed. In short, the objections to the court, at the present time, giving its consent to the acquisition by the applicants of the privileges sought, are so numerous, and seem to us so obvious and so grave, that it is our plain duty to refuse to confirm the report of the commissioners.
PARKER, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) I am unable to concur in the result reached by the majority of the court. One of the principal grounds upon which the report of the commissioners is rejected is that the corporation" “has not sufficient means or capital to complete the enterprise.” The second section of chapter 101 of the Laws of 1892 (the statute under which the corporation is organized) fixed its capital stock at $25,000,000, divided into shares of $100 each; and it provides that the capital may at any time be increased or diminished by the board of directors, with the consent, in writing, of stockholders holding a majority of the shares then outstanding. Before these proceedings were begun, the capital stock was reduced to $2,000,000, all of which has been subscribed for at par, and 10 per cent, thereof paid in cash to the treasurer of the corpora
“Provided that the consent of the owners of one-half in value of the property bounded on, and the consent also of the local authorities having control of that portion of a street or highway upon which it is proposed to construct or operate such railway or railways be first obtained, or in case the consent of such property owners cannot be obtained, that the determination of three commissioners appointed by the general term of the supreme court in the district of the proposed construction, given after the hearing of all parties interested, and confirmed by the court, that such railway or railways ought to be constructed or operated, be taken in lieu of the consent of such property owners.”
Is the right which is vested in the property owners to refuse assent to the construction of a road simply for the protection of their own private interests, or is it for the purpose of protecting public interests as well? It will be observed that, in case the consent of one-half of the property owners cannot be obtained, the approval of three commissioners, confirmed by the general term, may be taken in lieu of their consent. Whether property owners may raise, and this court consider, objections of purely a public nature, or such as may affect the rights of existing street or elevated railroad corporations, or of such corporations yet to be organized, which in no way affect the private rights of the contesting property owners, cannot be profitably considered in a dissenting opinion, and especially in view of the fact that the question has not been discussed. I find no evidence which shows that the construction of this road will more seriously affect the rights of owners of property on its line than the construction of existing elevated railroads has affected such rights on many of the streets in this city, or that it will more seriously affect the rights of such owners than will the construction of elevated railroads in the future, if any are to be constructed. It seems to me that this judgment is a dangerous precedent, and substantially denies the right to construct new elevated roads.
Upon the question whether the proposed bridge and railway will be a great public benefit, I rely upon (1) the approval of the common council of this city; (2) the approval of the war department of the United States; (3) the unanimous approval of a strong commission appointed by this court, which has not contented itself with giving a perfunctory report, but has supported its decision by cogent reasons. Gentlemen of distinction, who have given great attention to the question of rapid transit, testified before the commission, among them the mayor of the city of Brooklyn and Ex-Mayor Hewitt, of this city. Mr. Hewitt testified:
“I think an elevated railway crossing the island in the general neighborhood specified there, and connected with the various existing lines of transportation, would be a very great advantage to the city of New York and to its inhabitants. I think a connection between the ferries and the existing lines of transportation—the elevated lines—would be very advantageous to the city. Q. By such a railway as is proposed? A. By such a railway as you have sketched on that map. Q. An elevated railway? A. Yes; I think*152 it would be still more advantageous i£ it connected with all o£ the ferries below Desbrosses street. I think the defect of it is that it does not go far enough.”
Other witnesses testified to the same effect; and it seems to me. that the evidence sustains and justifies the conclusion reached by the learned commissioners, and that their report should be confirmed.