In Re E.L., 90848 (10-2-2008)
{¶ 4} The state, on the other hand, argues that Am. Sub. S.B. No. 10 repeals the portions of
{¶ 5} "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to apply rules of statutory interpretation. * * * However, where a statute is found to be subject to various interpretations, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke rules of statutory construction in order to arrive at legislative intent." Cline v. Ohio Bur of Motor Vehicles (1991),
{¶ 6} The pertinent parts of S.B. No. 10 are as follows:1
"To amend section[ ] * * * 2151.23 * * * of the Revised Code to revise Ohio's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law and conform it to recently enacted requirements of federal law * * *, [and] to increase the penalties for certain violations * * * when the victim of any of those offenses is less than 13 years of age and the offense was committed with a sexual motivation * * *.
"SECTION 1. That section[ ] * * * 2151.23 * * * be amended * * * to read as follows: [The 135 pages of substantive details of sex offender law amendments have been omitted.]
"SECTION 2. That existing section[ ] * * * 2151.23 * * * of the Revised Code [is] hereby repealed.
"SECTION 3. The amendments to section[ ] * * * 2151.23 * * * of the Revised Code that are made by Sections 1 and 2 of this act * * * shall take effect on January 1, 2008 * * *. *5 "SECTION 4. Sections 1 to 3 of this act shall take effect on uly 1, 2007."
{¶ 7} See, also, State v. King, Miami App. No. 08-CA-02,
{¶ 8} Given the background of S.B. 10, and the context within which it must be read, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended to leave a six-month vacancy between repealing over 70 sections of the Revised Code and enacting the replacement amendments. Therefore, we turn to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Prem v. Cox (1983),
{¶ 9} An example illustrates the absurd result of appellant's argument. According to appellant's logic,
{¶ 10} The Third District Court of Appeals of Ohio recently addressed this issue in In the matter of Darian J. Smith, Allen App. No. 1-07-58,
{¶ 11} We respectfully decline to adopt the Third District's reasoning and instead hold that Section 4 of S.B. 10 creates ambiguity regarding the effective dates of the old versus the new laws. In conclusion, to avoid an unreasonable result, we must rely on legislative intent and read S.B. 10 to mean that the "repealed" and *7 "amended" portions of the numerous statutes affected registration, notification, etc., of classified sex offenders. The legislation had no intention to repeal or amend the substantive elements of offenses such as rape or kidnapping, or the court's authority to oversee the criminal justice system. The juvenile court's jurisdiction over delinquent minors remained uninterrupted, and appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} In the instant case, on November 20, 2007, the court held a hearing at which appellant was present. During the hearing, appellant was notified that the grounds on which his probation revocation was proposed were based on him not cooperating with the rules and expectations at Kokomo. In detail, he "is currently on behavior level 0 of 5. He is non-compliant and ignores staff re-direction. [He] refused to follow classroom rules and disrupts [by] walking out without permission. [He] does not engage in group therapy and chooses to read his personal material instead of assigned material. Kokomo is asking for [his] removal, in direct defiance of said Court-order." The court found that these allegations were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, appellant was represented by counsel at the proceeding.
{¶ 15} Appellant further argues that the May 31, 2007 order which placed him at Kokomo "did not specify what behavior [he] was to exhibit" while at the treatment center. Appellant's original DYS sentence was suspended and it was agreed upon that he would participate in a treatment program in lieu of being committed to a detention center. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that appellant's failure to be welcome at the treatment or rehabilitation facility could result in the reinstatement of his suspended sentence. See In re P.F., Lorain App. No. 07CA009099, 2007-Ohio- *9 4913 (noting that the delinquent's behavior at a residential treatment facility resulted in the court imposing his previously suspended commitment to DYS).
{¶ 16} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Currently, this issue is pending before the Ohio Supreme Court, which granted a discretionary appeal and accepted a certified conflict. See, e.g., In re *10 L.A.B.,
{¶ 20} Nonetheless, as the instant case concerns a probation revocation hearing, we follow Motley and Bennett, supra, and hold that our analysis of
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, J., and FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR.