67 A. 497 | Conn. | 1907
An attorney at law is an officer of court exercising a privilege or franchise to the enjoyment of which he has been admitted, not as a matter of right, but upon proof of fitness through evidence of his possession of satisfactory legal attainments and fair private character.Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor,
The action of the court in the exercise of this power is *148
judicial in its character, but the inquiry made is "in the nature of an investigation by the court into the conduct of one of its own officers, not the trial of an action or suit," and the order entered is but an exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction which it has over such officers. FairfieldCounty Bar v. Taylor,
In the absence of prescribed regulations the manner of the proceeding, so that it be without oppression or injustice, is for the court itself to determine. Fairfield CountyBar v. Taylor,
It has been questioned by high authority whether an appeal or writ of error would lie from disbarment orders.Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 364, 376; Ex parteRobinson, 19 Wall. (U.S.) 505, 513. In two cases this court has suggested a doubt upon this point and left the doubt unresolved. Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor,
This conclusion appears to us to be the only sound and safe one. The fact that the court exercises a large measure of discretion and is in a position to most intelligently exercise it, furnishes no obstacle to a review to ascertain not only whether a reasonable discretion was used, but also whether the proceedings were regular and fair. We not infrequently inquire to see whether there has been an abuse of judicial discretion. Selleck v. Head,
It does not follow, however, that the review which the court will make is one which will be permitted to take as wide a range, or assume the same character, as where the judicial action sought to be reviewed concerns the rights of parties as between themselves and into the determination of which the element of judicial discretion does not enter. On the contrary, there is every reason why, in a proceeding by which a court seeks to inform itself of the personal fitness of one of its own officers to continue in *150
that capacity, an appeal should not be entertained for the purpose of exacting from the court that compliance with technical rules, born of trial by jury, which are too often suffered to hedge about a trained trier of ordinary actions quite regardless of their purpose or spirit, or their substantial value under the existing conditions. Leonard v. Gillette,
The action of the court in the present case may, however, be brought to the test of stricter standards without disclosing error. The facts found left the court no alternative but to enter an order of permanent disbarment. This his counsel concede. Its action upon which error is predicated is confined to rulings upon the admission of testimony. The chief grounds of complaint, if we may judge from the prominence given to them in the brief of counsel, arise from the admission of a deposition and a transcript of testimony which it is said furnished the substantial basis for the most damaging of the facts found. The damaging character of the matters contained in these papers, their relevancy to the issue before the court, and their importance upon that issue, are alike apparent. They were not taken in the proceedings against the respondent, but during the progress of the case whose history furnished the material upon which he was presented for disbarment. It is therefore claimed that they embodied what was, as to him, only hearsay testimony, which ought not to have been received.
Murphy's deposition was clearly admissible. The State's *151
Attorney had shown that immediately after this witness in the Lathrop case had given the evidence in question and the respondent had been informed of its character, the respondent took the action recited in the finding to intimidate, overawe, and corrupt the witness into a retraction of the testimony he had given, in so far as it related to the respondent, or to change it upon further or cross-examination, or to sign a contradictory statement. This conduct, which of itself would have furnished sufficient cause for removal from the bar, entitled the court to know what the witness' statements were which called forth this conduct, and rendered the statements admissible as tending to show a consciousness of guilt. 1 Wigm. on Evidence, §§ 267, 277, 278; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 316; Green v. Woodbury,
The offer of the transcript of the testimony of the deceased Mrs. Delkescamp brought the court into touch with the so-called hearsay evidence rule, as that of Murphy's deposition did not. The logically probative value of the matters therein is beyond question. If its reception in the proceedings against the respondent was improper, it must, therefore, have been by reason of some rule of the kind which Wigmore has denominated "superadded and abnormal ones," which make the admissibility of declarations of third persons elsewhere made, although under oath, depend upon their satisfying certain tests, in addition to that of relevancy, which tests are conceived to be all-important, in order that the possible weaknesses of such declarations may be revealed and their real value indicated to the trier as fully as may be. Such a rule is the hearsay one, and the tests which have had the approval of experience, as applicable to the evidence of a deceased witness in another trial, are confrontation and the opportunity for cross-examination open to the party against whom it is offered; and cross-examination *152
implies confrontation. Wigm. on Evidence, §§ 10, 1360, 1362, 1365; Chapman v. Chapman,
The respondent, however, insists that the finding ought to be corrected, so that it should disclose that Mr. O'Neill did not represent him, that the cross-examination made by that attorney was in no way in his behalf, and that no opportunity was in fact given him to cross-examine *153 the witness. Were the correctness of this contention conceded and the desired corrections made, it would then appear that the respondent — present when the damaging disclosures were made, having advised with counsel as to his proper course of conduct in respect thereto, having obtained from the committee a statement of his willingness that he, the respondent, be heard, and fully aware of the gravity of the situation — took no steps to challenge the truth of the disclosure by asking the privilege of examination, and let them pass in silence and unnoticed. Such conduct, in the presence of the witness' assertions, made it competent for the court to know the whole situation, and to draw therefrom such inferences of guilt of the charges made by the witness as it reasonably might. Wigm. on Evidence, § 173.
The court refused to permit the respondent to ask a question of a witness designed to elicit testimony that Mrs. Delkescamp's reputation as respects morality was bad. In this there was no error. State v. Randolph,
Judge Burpee, counsel for the defendant in the Lathrop case and who, it was claimed, had been active in the present proceedings, was offered as a witness by respondent's counsel, and upon his direct examination was asked whether he had not kept in touch with Murphy since his deposition referred to was given, and paid him money to prevent the respondent's communication with him. These inquiries were claimed as tending to cast discredit upon said deposition. As it was not offered or received as of itself furnishing substantive evidence of the truth of Murphy's revelations therein, the credit to which the deponent was entitled was a matter of no importance. He had not been made to assume the position of a witness.
The respondent sought to show by a New York detective *154 that Murphy had been arrested with burglar's tools upon him, that his occupation had been that of a burglar, and that his moral character was bad, but was prevented. These rulings are sufficiently supported by the considerations just noted.
The respondent claims that the finding should be corrected in several important particulars, some of which have been noticed. Our examination of the evidence has failed to disclose that any material fact has been found without justification, either in direct evidence or reasonable inference from such evidence.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.