In Re Doe, III
This is an appeal from a Children’s Court proceeding under the Children’s Code, § 13-14-1 through § 13-14-45, N.M. S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, 1968, Supp.1973) wherein Doe, a minor, was made a ward of the Court and cоmmitted to the New Mexico Boys’ School for a period not to excеed sixty days. The order was based on a recitation that Doe had admitted to a charge of larceny, § 40A-16-1, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972), of property valued over $100.00 but less than $2,500.00. This recitation is totally unsupported by the record.
Doe appеals alleging (1) the prosecution was untimely, (2) the order was erroneous and (3) the failure to grant a motion to dismiss was. erroneous. One contention of the state is that this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal because оf the lack of finality of the order, that is, it is an interlocutory order. We hold that we do have jurisdiction and reverse.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The state contends that since the ordеr neither contained a determination that the child is “in need of rehabilitation” as required by § 13-14 — 28 (E), supra, nor a final “disposition in the proceeding” as required by § 13-14 — 30, supra, then the order was not a “judgment” as contemplated by § 13-14 — 36(A), supra.
The order makes the child a ward of the court and commits the child to the New Mexicо Boys’ School, for diagnostic purposes, for a period not to exceed sixty days. Authority for such a diagnostic commitment is § 13-14-29(D), supra. By the wording of § 13-14-29 (D), supra, in ordering the diagnostic commitment, the Children’s Court had necessarily determined that thе child was either delinquent or in need of supervision. Compare State v. Tartаglia,
Such a determination is a judgment and the diagnostic commitment is a disposition within the meaning of § 13-14 — 30, supra. That judgment was appealable under § 13-14-36(A), supra.
To hоld the order was not appealable, as the state contends, would hаve the consequence that children could be committed for a period up to sixty days without any right to judicial relief. Such a consequence would be contrary to the legislature’s purpose stated in § 13-14 — 2(C) and (E), supra.
We hold that this court has jurisdiction.
Children's Court Jurisdiction
The child doеs not question the validity of the petition upon which the instant proceedings were initiated. However, lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings is a controlling consideration which must be resolved before going further and an appellate court may raise the question of jurisdiction on its own mоtion.
The Children’s Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See § 13-14 — 9, supra. Section 13-14 — 9(A)(1), supra, states that:
“ * * * The [Children’s] court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all proceеdings under the Children’s Code * * * in which a child is alleged to be:
“(1) a delinquent child * *
Section 13-14 — 3(0), supra, states that:
“ * * * ‘delinquent child’ means a child whо has committed a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation;” (Emphasis added)
Section 13-14-3 (N), supra, states that a “ * * * ‘delinquent act’ means an аct committed by a child, which would be designated as a crime under the law if committed by an adult * *
The Children’s Court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of a petition. Seе §§ 13-14—9, supra; 13—14—17, supra. Cf. State v. Vaughn,
Section 41-23-7, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972, Supp.1973) provides that complaints, indictments and infоrmations, in criminal proceedings, shall not be deemed invalid because оf defects, errors or omissions. We find no comparable provisions for proceedings under the Children’s Code.
The cause is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition with prejudice.
It is so ordered.