Case Information
*1 Before P ROST , Chief Judge, T ARANTO and H UGHES , Circuit
Judges.
P ROST , Chief Judge .
Mr. Thomas L. DiStefano, III, appeals the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) rejection of claims 24 through 26 of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/868,312 (’312 Application). The Board issued a Decision on Remand on July 16, 2014, and then issued a Second Decision on Request for Rehearing on December 3, 2014. The Board’s decision affirmed the rejection of claims 24 through 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 for anticipation based upon U.S. Patent No. 6,026,433 (“D’Arlach”). In so doing, the Board determined that one of the limitations of independent claim 24 fell within the printed matter doctrine and therefore was not entitled to patentable weight. This court vacates and remands.
B ACKGROUND Mr. DiStefano’s patent application claims a method of designing web pages. The purported invention is a meth- od that enables an individual to design a web page with- out requiring them to “learn HTML or to interact extensively with a web page designer.” ’312 Application at 3, ll. 12–15.
The application’s primary embodiment includes a graphical user interface composed of a primary display screen and an overlaid design plate. The overlaid design plate is composed of several parts, including menu but- tons to assist in editing the website and a design place that can be used to display and edit web assets. The application describes web assets as including Java ap- plets, scripts, stock art, digital art, background images, textures, etc. The web assets can come from a web asset database, be uploaded directly by users, or be obtained from independent third party websites. When the user finishes editing a web asset, the user can drag the web asset from the design plate onto the website.
There is only one independent claim at issue in this case, claim 24. Claim 24 reads:
A method of designing, by a user in a user inter- face having first and second display regions each capable of displaying a plurality of element [sic], an electronic document, comprising: selecting a first element from a database includ- ing web assets authored by third party authors and web assets provided to the user interface or outside the user interface by the user; displaying the first element in the second display region;
interactively displaying the electronic document in the first display region; modifying the first element displayed in the sec- ond display region upon receiving a first command to modify the first element in the second display region; and
displaying the modified first element in the first display region, wherein the modified first element forms at least part of the electronic document.
’312 Application at 19 (emphasis added).
This is not the first time this case has been before us on appeal. We previously held in this case that the Board had not properly designated its anticipation rejection as a new ground of rejection and we therefore remanded this case back to the Board. In re DiStefano , 562 F. App’x 984, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
On remand, the Board found that D’Arlach anticipat- ed claims 24 through 26. The Board’s analysis focused on claim 24’s limitation “selecting a first element from a database including web assets authored by third party authors and web assets provided to the user interface from outside the user interface by the user” (henceforth referred to as the “selecting limitation”) as the parties agreed that all of the other limitations were anticipated by D’Arlach. J.A. 5–12. The Board determined that the selecting limitation should not be afforded patentable weight under the printed matter doctrine. Thus because all the other limitations had been conceded as anticipated by D’Arlach, the Board concluded that claim 24 was invalid as anticipated.
In performing the printed matter analysis, the Board concluded that “web assets’ origination from third party authors and the user cannot patentably distinguish (i.e., cannot breathe novelty into) the claimed method, particu- larly because the web assets’ origins have no functional relationship to the claimed method.” J.A. 32. That con- clusion treats the “origins” as printed matter. See also J.A. 33 (“the web assets’ origins clearly cannot be func- tionally related to the claimed method and therefore cannot patentably distinguish the claimed method over D’Arlach”). Moreover, in this court, the Director defends the printed-matter rejection only on the ground that the Board treated the origins, not the web assets themselves as printed matter. Appellee’s Br. 19. The Director does not rely on the Board’s footnote in its response to a re- quest for rehearing that “[t]he ‘printed matter’ is analo- gous to the web assets.” J.A. 18 n.11.
Mr. DiStefano now appeals. We have jurisdiction un- der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
D ISCUSSION We review the Board’s decision in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. Dickinson v. Zurko , 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. In re Gartside , 203 F.3d 1305, 1315– 16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Anticipation is a factual question and thus reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Morsa , 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
When determining a claim’s patentability, the Board must read the claim as a whole, considering each and every claim limitation. In re Gulack , 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983). However, we have long held that if a limitation claims (a) printed matter that (b) is not func- tionally or structurally related to the physical substrate holding the printed matter, it does not lend any patenta- ble weight to the patentability analysis. Id . at 1384–85. In performing this analysis we do not strike out the printed matter and analyze a “new” claim, but simply do not give the printed matter any patentable weight: it may not be a basis for distinguishing prior art. As we opined in In re Gulack :
Where the printed matter is not functionally re- lated to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability. Although the printed mat- ter must be considered, in that situation it may not be entitled to patentable weight.
Id . at 1385 (footnote omitted).
The first step of the printed matter analysis is the de- termination that the limitation in question is in fact directed toward printed matter. Our past cases establish a necessary condition for falling into the category of printed matter: a limitation is printed matter only if it claims the content of information. See 1 Chisum on Patents § 1.02[4] (2015) (printed matter, for giving no weight to “information recorded in any substrate or medium” in comparing prior art and claimed subject matter, is limited to “the content of the information”).
The printed matter doctrine dates back to Ex Parte Abraham , 1869 C.D. 59 (Comm. Pat. 1869) (finding that coupons with various kinds of stamps and figures are not patentable). However, the modern rule did not fully develop until 1931 in the case In re Russell , 48 F.2d 668, 669 (CCPA 1931). The claimed invention in Russell related to “improvements in indexes particularly to the indexing of names in directories, and is claimed to be applicable to dictionaries, etc.” Id . at 668. Our predeces- sor court held that “[t]he mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof . . . .” Id . at 669 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Since 1931, both our predecessor court and our court have consistently limited the printed matter rule to matter claimed for its communicative content. After Russell , our predecessor court found that “a chart listing the characteristics of real estate in such manner as to expedite real estate assessments” and markings on meat “arranged in a certain manner for the purpose of identify- ing the meat” were both printed matter. In re McKee , 64 F.2d 379, 379–80 (CCPA 1933). More recently we con- cluded that an FDA label providing the dosage instruc- tions for using a medical product was printed matter, [8] that a label instructing a patient to take a drug with food was printed matter, [9] that instructions on how to perform a DNA test were printed matter, and that numbers A principal cut of meat bearing a series of identify- ing marks in relatively close spaced relation and having their longitudinal axes arranged substan- tially parallel to the planes in which said meat is to be subdivided in forming minor cuts of meat for purchasers.
McKee , 64 F.2d at 379 (emphasis added). Claim 17 is representative and reads:
A kit for treating a respiratory disease, the kit comprising (a) a budesonide suspension in a sealed container, the suspension containing 0.05 mg to 15 mg budesonide and a solvent, and (b) a label indicating administration by nebulization in a continuing regimen at a frequency of not more than once per day .
AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc. , 633 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. , 616 F.3d
1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing claim 21). Claim 21 depends on claim 17 and is representative. It reads:
The method of claim 1, further comprising inform- ing the patient that the administration of a thera- peutically effective amount of metaxalone in a pharmaceutical composition with food results in an increase in the maximal plasma concentration (Cmax) and extent of absorption (AUC(last)) of metaxalone compared to administration without food.
U.S. Patent 6,407,128. Claim 19 is representative and reads: printed on a wristband were printed matter. By con- trast, we found in In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994), that a computer-based structural database was not printed matter, not because it involved a computer, but because the data structures “contain[ed] both information used by application programs and information regarding their physical interrelationships within a memory.” Lowry , 32 F.3d at 1583–84.
A kit for normalizing and amplifying an RNA population, said kit comprising instructions de- scribing the method of claim 1 and a premeasured portion of a reagent selected from the group con- sisting of: oligo dT biotinylated primer, T7 RNA polymerase, annealed biotinylated primers, strep- tavidin beads, polyadenyl transferase, reverse transcriptase, RNase H, DNA pol I, buffers and nucleotides.
In re Ngai , 367 F.3d 1336, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Claim 1 is representative and reads:
An educational and recreational mathematical device comprising at least one band which is end- less or adapted to have ends thereof fastened to form an endless band and a plurality of individual digits imprinted on the band at regularly spaced intervals, the digits when all read consecutively clockwise as a number constituting a quotient ob- tained by dividing a number constituted of . . . Gulack , 703 F.2d at 1383 (emphasis added). Claim 1 is representative and reads:
A memory for storing data for access by an appli- cation program being executed on a data pro- cessing system, comprising: a data structure stored in said memory , said data structure including information resident in a da- The common thread amongst all of these cases is that printed matter must be matter claimed for what it com- municates. Only if the limitation in question is deter- mined to be printed matter does one turn to the question of whether the printed matter nevertheless should be given patentable weight. Printed matter is given such weight if the claimed informational content has a func- tional or structural relation to the substrate. For exam- ple, in Gulack we determined that while a sequence of digits printed on a wrist band constituted printed matter, the sequence deserved patentable weight because the informational content of the sequence (what numbers were represented) was functionally related to the endless- band physical structure of the substrate. Gulack , 703 F.2d at 1385. Similarly, in In re Miller , our predecessor court determined that while the text written on a measur- ing vessel was printed matter, it must be given patentable weight because there was a “functional relationship between a measuring receptacle, volumetric indicia thereon indicating volume in a certain ratio to actual volume, and a legend indicating the ratio, and in our judgment the appealed claims properly define this rela- tionship.” 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969). Thus, as we have consistently held, once it is determined that the limitation is directed to printed matter, one must then determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to the associated physical substrate, and only if the answer is “no” is the printed matter owed no patenta- ble weight.
Here, the Board erred at the threshold step. Although the selected web assets can and likely do communicate some information, the content of the information is not tabase used by said application program and in- cluding: . . .
Lowry , 32 F.3d at 1581 (emphasis added).
claimed. And where the information came from, its “origin,” is not part of the informational content at all. Nothing in the claim calls for origin identification to be inserted into the content of the web asset. Therefore, the Board erred in finding that the origin of the web assets constituted printed matter in the claims at issue and erred in assigning the origin no patentable weight under the printed matter doctrine in finding anticipation by D’Arlach. Thus we vacate the Board’s finding that claim 24 was anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102. In so doing we also vacate the Board’s finding that dependent claims 25 and 26 are anticipated.
C ONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the Board’s rejection of claims 24 through 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and remand for further findings.
VACATED AND REMANDED C OSTS Costs awarded to Appellant.
[1] Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1) the Board in- corporates the holdings of the Decision on Remand in its Second Decision on Remand, except for when the deci- sions conflict.
[2] The court does not reach the claim construction dispute regarding dependent claim 25.
[3] The Board additionally concluded that claims 25 and 26 were also anticipated, but as we ultimately find the Board’s anticipation analysis of claim 24 to be in error, we need not discuss the dependent claims.
[4] The patent application at issue in this case was described as follows: In order to accomplish the object in view, the ap- plicant proposes to employ stamps of various kinds with coupons annexed, to be severed when the stamp is attached to the dutiable article. The stamps bear figures indicative of the quantity and quality and other peculiarities of the article. The coupons correspond, and by means of these, and registers of them kept by the government, it is claimed that frauds in evading the tax are pre- vented. Abraham , 1869 C.D. 59.
[5] Claim 6 of the patent application is representative and reads: A directory comprising a part in which surnames are arranged phonetically with the given names of the respective surnames arranged otherwise than phonetically, and another part in which the sur- names are arranged otherwise than phonetically with reference to the section in the first- mentioned part where surnames are arranged phonetically. Russell , 48 F.2d at 668.
[6] Claim 2 of the relevant application is representa- tive and reads: A valuation chart for buildings comprising a rec- ord sheet having details of building constructions arranged in groups designated by classes, each class having listed thereunder the details of build- ing construction frequently found in buildings of that class, and the details being arranged similar- ly in order in all the classes, whereby when the details of construction of a building to be valued are checked on the record sheet under the nearest approximated classes, the preponderance of checks in any class group will directly indicate the class of buildings to which that particular building belongs and the checks missing in that class group or found in the groups of the other classes will in- dicate directly the extent to which that building being valued differs from the usual run of build- ings of that class. In re Reeves , 62 F.2d 199, 199 (CCPA 1932) (emphasis added).
[7] Claim 3 of the relevant patent application is rep- resentative and reads: