On July 27, 1925, thе Prosecuting Attorney of Greene County filed in the circuit court of said county an information charging J. D. Wallace, the then Prosecuting Attorney of Oregоn County, with the crime of seduction under promise of marriage. The venue was changed to the Circuit Court of Douglas County, where, on September 25, 1925, he was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary. The judgment was affirmеd by this court December 20, 1926. On October 5, 1928, a member of the bar, in good standing, filed in this сourt a written and verified charge informing the court of said conviction, аlleging that the crime involved moral turpitude, and praying that Wallace be removed from the practice of law in the courts of this State. A certified copy of *206 the record of said conviction is attached to the information. The answer admitted the conviction, but denied that the crime involved moral turpitude. Other matters not material to the issues presented were therein alleged.
The relevant provisions of the statute follow:
“Sec. 681. ' Any attorney or counselor at law may be removed or suspended from practice in the courts of this Statе for any of the following reasons: First, if he be convicted of any criminal offense involing moral turpitude; second, if he unlawfully retain his client’s money or if hе is guilty of malpractice, fraud, deceit or misdemeanor whatsoevеr in his professional capacity. . . .
“Sec. 686. If the charge allege а conviction for any criminal offense involving moral turpitude, the court shall, on production of the record of such conviction, remove thе attorney so convicted or suspend such attorney from practiсe for a limited time, according to the nature of the offense, as thе court may deem just, and without further trial. ...”
It wall be noted that the -word “may” is used in Section 681 in conferring on the courts the power to remove or suspend attorneys. The power conferred is for the protection of the bench, the bar and the public. For this reason the word “may” as used is mandatory.
By thе terms of Section 686, the conviction of an attorney of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude is conclusive. Defendant argues that, even sо, seduction under promise of marriage does not involve moral turpitude. The accepted definition follows:
“Moral turpitude is an act of bаseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a mаn owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man; evеrything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good morals.” [5 Words & Phrases (1st) p. 4580; 3 Words & Phrases (2d) p. 444; 5 Words & Phrases (3d) pp. 214, 215.]
The relation created by an engagement to marry is one of confidence and trust. An abuse of that relation for the satisfaction of sexual desires is not only contrary to good morals but is an act of baseness and deрravity. We have no doubt that seduction under promise of marriage involves moral turpitude.
Defendant directs attention to a note in 9 A. L. R. 189. Cases are there reviewed holding that neither fornication, sexual immorality, visiting houses оf ill-fame, nor the ’keeping of such a house, constitutes unprofessionаl conduct. Disbarment by reason of a conviction of crime is expressly excluded from the annotation. In this .proceeding the defendant is not сharged with unprofessional conduct, but with a conviction of crime 'involving mоral turpitude.
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On the facts found by the jury (State v. Wallace,