In re Dick
Petitioner, by this application for the writ of habeas corpus, seeks relief from his confinement in San Quentin Prison under a judgment of conviction on seven counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds (
The only issue of substance in this collateral attack on the judgment concerns the propriety of the multiрle convictions, as felonies, arising out of petitioner’s issuance of a series of checks with insufficient funds. Prior to 1955 the issuance of any one cheek or each subsequent cheсk, regardless of the amounts, constituted violations of
The courts have had difficulty in applying subdivision (b). For instance, in People v. Kennedy,
In the later case of People v. McCann,
In the instant case, the checks which the jury found defendant issued in violation of
It appears without dispute, and the People in fact concede, that petitioner was imрroperly convicted of seven felonies, and is entitled to some relief. We agree with the People’s interpretation of the statute that when petitioner issued the check charged in Count IV, making the total of checks issued to that time $60, the violation constituted a felony. Hence petitioner was properly convicted under Count IV, and improperly conviсted under Counts I, II and III.
The difficult question concerns Counts IV, X and XIII. In McCann it was held that once an accused has committed a first felony by the issuance of checks each in an amount not over $50 but whose total exceeds $50, he can continue to issue similar checks with immunity insofar as additional offenses are concerned. The People contend that if, after the initial felony is committed, the accused continues tо write checks not over $50 in amount, a second felony is committed when he issues the cheek which causes the total in this second series to exceed $50. In other words the state would group consecutive checks until 'the aggregate of the face amounts thereof exceeded $50, and after reaching that sum it would commence with a new series which it would treat in an identical manner. As the total of the checks charged in Counts IX, X and XIII in the instant ease did not exceed $50, the People concede that the judgment should be further modified by setting aside the cоnvictions on those counts. By implication, at least, they suggest that the issuance of checks in Counts IX, X and XIII should not be punished.
It is apparent that subdivision (b) has qualified
The foregoing conclusion is fortified by the qualifying language of subdivision (b). It purports to qualify subdivision (a) only in the case where the total amount of the checks “that the defendant is charged with and convicted of making . . . does not exceed $50.” Where the total exceeds $50 subdivision (b) does not purport to affect the established law and, as stated, the writing of each аnd any check with insufficient funds prior to the amendment constituted a felony. Bearing in mind, however, that the amendment is ameliorating in nature and that any doubt as to its effect should be resolved in favоr of one charged with wrongdoing (In re Tartar,
Not only is the foregoing consistent with procedures for charging wrongdoers with multiple counts of the same crime in the case of other offenses, it would also aрpear to be the only rationalization which gives consistency and realism to
Petitioner further contends that reversible error was committed by the admission in evidence of certain tape recordings of statements extracted from him in violation of his constitutional rights, аs proscribed in Escobedo v. Illinois,
The writ is granted and the Superior Court of Santa Clara County is directed to modify its judgment herein by vacating the convictions as to Counts I, II and III, and, in addition to the felony conviction on Count IV, to show that petitioner, in lieu of felony convictions on Counts IX, X and XIII, was convicted of a single misdemeanor in violation of