In re DETMER/BEAUDRY, Minors.
No. 336348
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
August 22, 2017
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and SWARTZLE, JJ. SWARTZLE, J.
FOR PUBLICATION; Kent Circuit Court Family Division; LC Nos. 16-052784-NA, 16-052785-NA
I. BACKGROUND
AB and KD are minor children, and the two children and respondent-mother are of Native American heritage and are eligible for membership in the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Tribe). In September 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the trial court to remove the minor children from respondent-mother‘s care. The petition noted respondent-mother‘s extensive history with Children‘s Protective Services and alleged that inappropriate sexual contact had occurred multiple times among her minor children, including three other children who are not subject to this appeal. At the preliminary hearing, respondent-mother voluntarily placed most of her minor children into the care of the minor children‘s relatives. KD was voluntarily placed with her nonrespondent-father, but AB remained in respondent-mother‘s care. The trial court made no findings on whether DHHS made “active efforts” to provide remedial services or whether respondent-mother‘s continued custody posed a risk-of-harm to the minor children, as the placements at that time were voluntary.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the children in November 2016. At adjudication, the trial court ordered that AB be placed with his nonrespondent-father out of concern for his safety in respondent-mother‘s home. KD‘s prior voluntary placement was continued. The trial court expressly declined to make any findings as to active efforts or risk-of-harm, stating that these findings were unnecessary because AB was placed in the home of his nonrespondent-father and, therefore, he was still in the care of a parent. According to the trial court, because AB‘s father was a nonrespondent, under In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), AB‘s
Several days after the November 2016 hearing, respondent-mother‘s attorney emailed the trial court (copying the other parties), and notified the court that its written order of adjudication incorrectly identified respondent-mother as voluntarily placing AB with his nonrespondent-father. The trial court issued a corrected adjudication order shortly thereafter. The email did not make any specific mention of KD, though it did indicate that the “other children” had been “voluntarily placed.” Moreover, the referee and trial court held subsequent hearings in February 2017, and during both hearings, KD‘s placement with her father was characterized as voluntary, and neither respondent-mother‘s attorney nor anyone else objected to that characterization.
Respondent-mother appealed as of right, arguing that the placement of AB and KD violated protections set forth in the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA),
During the hearing, the trial court noted that both AB and KD had been returned to respondent-mother‘s care and residence in mid-June 2017. The trial court commended respondent-mother on the “fantastic job” that she had done in turning her life around, pursuing education, engaging in the available programming, and similar positive acts. The trial court recognized respondent-mother‘s “excellent responsiveness,” but the court did strike a cautionary note that with respect to this family, “we have been back and forth, and back and forth, and back and forth.” The trial court closed the case, but before doing so, it stated that the question of removal is an “incredibly important” one and expressed its hope that this Court would address it on appeal.
This Court heard oral argument on August 8, 2017. In response to questions about whether this appeal was moot, counsel for respondent-mother, the Tribe, and petitioner all agreed that the appeal was moot now that the case below had been closed. But, all counsel further asked this Court to reach the merits of the appeal regardless of mootness because the case involved an issue of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade appellate review. See In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148, 152 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984).
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Case Is Moot, But the Exception Against Deciding Moot Cases Applies
1. Judicial Authority and Mootness
Courts of this state derive their authority from Article VI of the
Generally speaking, a case becomes moot when an event occurs that makes it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief. Contesti v Attorney General, 164 Mich App 271, 278; 416 NW2d 410 (1987). Stated differently, “a case is moot when it presents nothing but abstract questions of law which do not rest upon existing facts or rights.” People v Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 35; 782 NW2d 187 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Where a court‘s adverse judgment may have collateral legal consequences for a [party], the issue is not necessarily moot.” Mead v Batchlor, 435 Mich 480, 486; 460 NW2d 493 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Turner v Rogers, 564 US 431; 131 S Ct 2507 (2011). Where no such collateral legal consequences exist, and there is no possible relief that a court could provide, the case is moot and should ordinarily be dismissed without reaching the underlying merits. Richmond, 486 Mich at 35.
There is, however, a well-recognized exception to the dismissal of a moot case. Where a case presents an issue of public significance, and disputes involving the issue are likely to recur, yet evade judicial review, courts have held that it is appropriate to reach the merits of the issue even when the case is otherwise moot. Id. at 37; In re Midland Publishing, 420 Mich at 152 n 2.
2. The Case Is Moot
We agree with the parties’ counsel that this case is now moot. Both AB and KD have been returned to the care and residence of respondent-mother, and the trial court has ended its jurisdiction and ordered the case to be closed. None of parties’ counsel could identify a collateral legal consequence faced by respondent-mother, AB, or KD as a result of the temporary placement of the two children, and we are likewise not aware of any.
3. Public Significance, Likely to Recur, and Evading Judicial Review
Recognizing that the case is moot, we turn to whether the exception applies. The issue on appeal—whether a Native American child has been “removed” from a parent—has paramount public significance. As our Supreme Court explained in In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 531, fundamental due process includes “the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.” This right “is an expression of the importance of the familial relationship and stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association between child and parent.” Id. at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted). This significant liberty interest of parents “in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children,” id., is further reflected and magnified in efforts by federal and state governments to maintain the integrity of Native American families and tribes, see, e.g.,
Moreover, disputes involving the issue are likely to recur. One of the problems identified by Congress and our Legislature
Finally, on the matter of evading judicial review, the present case illustrates well the quandary faced by a parent who wishes to challenge on appeal the temporary removal of her child. Both AB and KD were placed outside the care and residence of respondent-mother, but this was not part of a final order of judgment, but rather as part of the trial court‘s ongoing monitoring of respondent-mother‘s progress with her parental programming, housing, education, etc. The trial court held periodic progress review hearings while this case was on appeal, and during the last of these hearings, the court determined that respondent-mother had made such significant progress that all of her children, including AB and KD, would be returned to her. While it is laudable that the trial court and parties worked so diligently to bring this case to a positive resolution, this diligence does not alter the fact that AB and KD were placed under the care and residence of someone other than respondent-mother. Given the typical pace of appellate review, it is unlikely that claims about temporary placements similar to those of AB and KD will achieve final resolution on appeal before the trial court either reverses or materially modifies the placement, or terminates the parent‘s rights altogether.
In sum, we agree with the parties’ counsel that this matter is moot, but also that the exception applies—this case involves an issue of public significance, it is likely to recur, and it is likely to evade appellate review. Accordingly, we will consider the merits of this appeal and decide whether AB and KD were “removed” from respondent-mother.
B. Statutory Protection of Native American Families
Respondent-mother, AB, and KD are eligible for membership in the Tribe, and both AB and KD are Native American children. Given this, the procedural and substantive provisions of MIFPA apply to certain proceedings regarding the minor children.
responds that the trial court did not “remove” either child and, accordingly, the provisions of
We review de novo issues involving the interpretation and application of MIFPA. In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 462-463; 861 NW2d 303 (2014). When interpreting a statute, the overriding goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In re Spears, 309 Mich App 658, 671; 872 NW2d 852 (2015). To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself. Id. “When construing statutory language, we must read the statute as a whole and in its grammatical context, giving each and every word its plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined.” Book-Gilbert v Greenleaf, 302 Mich App 538, 541; 840 NW2d 743 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, this Court must enforce the statute as written. In re Spears, 309 Mich App at 671.
In 2012, Michigan enacted MIFPA for the purpose of protecting “the best interests of Indian children and promot[ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”
When a Native American child is the subject of a child-protective proceeding, MIFPA provides, among other things, the following protections:
An Indian child may be removed from a parent or Indian custodian, placed into a foster care placement, or, for an Indian child already taken into protective custody, remain removed from a parent or Indian custodian pending further proceedings, only upon clear and convincing evidence that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, that the active efforts were unsuccessful, and that the continued custody of the Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child. [
MCL 712B.15(2) .]
By the statute‘s own terms, the trial court is not subject to these requirements when the Native American child is not “removed” from the parental home, “placed into . . . foster care,” or otherwise in “protective custody.”
C. The Trial Court Erred With Respect to AB
1. In re Sanders Is Not Dispositive
Before reaching the dispositive issue with respect to AB, we first note that the trial court‘s reliance on In re Sanders was misplaced. The trial court appears to have believed that because AB was placed with his father—who was not a respondent to the proceedings and no efforts had been made to petition his involvement—this placement meant both that the trial court could not make a ruling that would infringe AB‘s nonrespondent-father‘s parental rights and also that the provisions of MIFPA did not apply. As to the first point, the trial court was certainly correct that it did not have authority to infringe AB‘s nonrespondent-father‘s parental rights. As our Supreme Court explained in In re Sanders, “We accordingly hold that due process requires a specific adjudication of a parent‘s unfitness before the state can infringe the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 422.
Yet, as to the second point, the trial court erred. Neither the holding nor
2. AB Was “Removed” from Respondent-Mother
Under MIFPA, a child-protective proceeding involving a Native American family must generally comply with the provisions of
MIFPA does not define “removed.” In the absence of a statutory definition, we may turn to dictionaries in common usage for guidance. See In re Lang, 236 Mich App 129, 136; 600 NW2d 646 (1999). Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “removal” as the “transfer or moving of a person or thing from one location, position, or residence to another.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed). For its part, Merriam-Webster has several definitions of “remove“; ignoring the ones dealing with transferring a legal proceeding from state court to federal court or dismissing an officeholder from office, the remaining definitions involve the physical movement of an object, the most apt definition being the following: “to change the location, position, station, or residence of.” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed).
These definitions focusing on physical transfer or movement are consistent with how “removal” and “removed” are used in MIFPA and other child-protection provisions in Michigan
law. For example, the Legislature explained that the framework of MIFPA is “designed to prevent the voluntary or involuntary out-of-home care placement of Indian children.”
Indeed, this reading is consistent with the Legislature‘s use of the term “removed” in other sections of the Probate Code involving minors. Compare, for example, the different timelines for a dispositional review in a child-protective proceeding when a child “remains in his or her home” versus when a child is “removed from his or her home.”
Thus, we understand “removed” in
DHHS responds that this Court‘s decision in In re England, 314 Mich App at 264-265, demonstrates that AB was not “removed” from respondent-mother because AB was not transferred or moved from both of his parents, but instead remained placed with one of his parents. In re England is not, however, applicable here. The Native American child in In re England did not move residences. See id. The child had physically resided with his mother and physically remained with his mother throughout the proceedings. See id. In contrast, AB did not remain in respondent-mother‘s physical care but was required to move residences. In other words, although AB was placed with a parent, this does not negate application of the statute‘s provisions, which are triggered when a Native American child is “removed from a parent” and which occurred in this case when AB was physically removed from respondent-mother and placed in his nonrespondent-father‘s care and residence.1
Because AB was removed from a parent, the trial court was required under MIFPA to make findings on whether active efforts were made to provide remedial services, whether those efforts were successful, and whether respondent-mother‘s continued custody of AB posed a risk of emotional or physical harm to the child.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err With Respect to KD
Turning to KD, the placement with her nonrespondent-father was not court ordered, nor was it ordered by law enforcement on an emergency basis. Rather, the record shows that respondent-mother voluntarily placed KD with her nonrespondent-father. There is nothing in the record to suggest that either the court or the parties understood the voluntary placement to be a permanent relinquishment of any of respondent-mother‘s parental rights, nor is there anything in the record to suggest that respondent-mother was somehow precluded from revoking the voluntary placement and requiring more formal proceedings regarding KD. This is
Our child protection laws, including MIFPA, constrain the state from interfering in the parent‘s fundamental right to parent unless and until sufficient proof has been presented that the child‘s moral, emotional, mental, or physical welfare needs protection by the state. See In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 409-410; see also Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652; 92 S Ct 1208; 21 L Ed 2d 551 (1972). Although the Legislature has extended some provisions of MIFPA to certain proceedings in which a Native American parent voluntarily gives up her fundamental rights, see, e.g.,
III. CONCLUSION
Respondent-mother and her children, AB and KD, are eligible for the protections afforded to Native American families under MIFPA. The trial court removed AB from the care and residence of respondent-mother, and this removal triggered the statutory protections set forth in
With respect to KD, the trial court did not remove her from the care and residence of respondent-mother, as explained above. We affirm with respect to KD‘s voluntary placement with her nonrespondent-father.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause