IN RE: DETACHMENT OF MUNICIPAL TERRITORY FROM THE CITY OF ADA
Case Number: 112837
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Decided: 03/31/2015
2015 OK 18
WATT, J.
Cite as: 2015 OK 18, __ P.3d __
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
IN RE: DETACHMENT OF MUNICIPAL TERRITORY FROM THE CITY OF ADA, OKLAHOMA, a Municipal Corporation,
DAVID B. SHERBERT and MARSHA SHERBERT, husband and wife; MICHAEL J. WILLIAMS and AMANDA WILLIAMS, husband and wife; NATHAN J. DIAL and TRACY L. DIAL, husband and wife; S. BRADLEY WILLIAMSON and STACY JILL WILLIAMSON, husband and wife; and BUCK PRICE FARM, an Oklahoma Limited Liability Company, Plaintiffs/Petitioners,
v.
THE CITY OF ADA, OKLAHOMA, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant/Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY, OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE THOMAS LANDRITH, JUDGE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
¶0 Property owners (Petitioners) sought to set aside an ordinance passed by the City of Ada, Oklahoma, (Respondent). Petitioners contend the City lacked jurisdiction to issue the ordinance based on the City‘s failure to provide the proper statutory notice of the proposed annexation by certified mail to certain property owners. The trial court upheld the annexation but certified the interlocutory order for immediate appeal. We previously granted certiorari. We hold that substantial compliance with the notice requirements is not sufficient under the applicable statutes in this case and reverse.
Jack Cadenhead, Seminole, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Petitioners,
Frank Stout, The City of Ada, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Respondent.
OPINION
WATT, J.:
¶1 The question before the Court is whether the Respondent, City of Ada, Oklahoma, fully complied with the Oklahoma annexation statutes when it annexed certain territory near its city limits. At issue is the construction of
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On February 19, 2013, the City of Ada, Oklahoma (City or Respondent) passed Ordinance No. 13-02 to annex certain real property, located in Township 3 North, Range 6 East of the Indian Base and Meridian, Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, into its corporate city limits. Petitioners are residents of Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, who own property within the annexed territory. They sought to set aside the ordinance, and City denied their request. They then filed their Petition for Declaratory Judgment and in the Alternative, for Detachment of Municipal Territory, on May 7, 2013, seeking a determination that the City lacked jurisdiction to pass the ordinance due to lack of compliance with
FACTS
¶3 At the hearing on their petition on January 14, 2014, Petitioners alleged the City failed to provide notice by certified mail to owners of property of five acres or more used for agricultural purposes, which abuts the boundaries of the annexed territory. Certified mail “return receipt requested” was sent to all owners of property within the territory to be annexed.5 They alleged the City provided only first class mail to those owners of abutting property, despite the use of the mandatory language “shall” in the statute.6 In construing
10. Legislative intent cannot be ascertained from a literal reading of the statutory language.
11. A party with actual notice of a proceeding is not prejudiced by failure to receive statutory notice.7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 The issue in this case involves statutory interpretation. It is, therefore, a question of law, governed by a de novo standard of appellate review. State ex rel. W.A. “Drew” Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d 199. When reviewing a trial court‘s legal rulings, this Court exercises plenary, independent and non-deferential authority. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, ¶9, 237 P.3d at 205, citing Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, §14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1083.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Only one sovereign power exists in state government: the State Legislature. In re: De-Annexation of Certain Real Property from the City of Seminole (City of Seminole), 2004 OK 60, ¶10, 102 P.3d 120, 125-126. Municipalities are political subdivisions of the State and must conform to the State constitution and the general laws of the state. City of Seminole, at 126. The power of annexation for altering local governmental boundaries has been conferred upon municipalities by the State Legislature through the Oklahoma Municipal Code.8 City of Seminole, at 126. It is a purely legislative function to determine whether property should or should not be annexed or detached from the corporate limits of a municipality. In the Matter of the De-Annexation of Certain Real Property, 1983 OK 44, 662 P.2d 1375. The primary judicial function in our review of municipal annexations is to ascertain whether the city has exercised its annexation power in a reasonable manner in compliance with state law, City of Seminole, at 128, within the scope of legislative authority. In the Matter of the De-Annexation of Certain Real Property, supra, at 1376; W.E. George v. Town of Bearden, 1985 OK CIV APP 5, 700 P.2d 1030. An annexation ordinance must recite jurisdictional facts. Jones v. Oklahoma City, 1952 OK 354, 250 P.2d 17. If it does, only the State can collaterally attack the ordinance. Id. If it does not, an interested party may attack its validity and show that jurisdictional facts did not exist. Id., citing Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Maltsberger, 1941 OK 226, 116 P.2d 977, 189 Okl. 363.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
¶6 The City argues the statute requiring notice by certified mail is unclear, as
¶7 “The authority of the Legislature extends to all rightful subjects of legislation not withdrawn by the Constitution or in conflict therewith.” See Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon (Dixon), 2008 OK 36, ¶22, 184 P.3d 546, 553, citing In re House Bill No. 145, 1951 OK 288, ¶0, 205 Okla. 364, 237 P.2d 624, 625 (syl. no. 2 by the Court). This Court does not examine the Constitution to decide whether the Legislature is permitted to act, Dixon, supra, 184 P.3d at 553, citing Tate v. Logan, 1961 OK 136, 362 P.2d 670, only whether it is prohibited from acting. Id., at 674-675. If there is any doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the validity of the Legislature‘s action; restrictions thereon should be strictly construed. Id.
¶8 Besides the Legislature‘s use of the words “shall be mailed by certified mail” near the reference to the owners of “five (5) acres or more used for agricultural purposes” in B(2), we consider the intent of the statute as a whole. See Adams v. Fry, 1951 OK 127, 230 P.2d 915. Consideration of subsection C of
¶9 The notice by publication “in a legally qualified newspaper of general circulation” of the proposed annexation “shall describe the boundaries of the territory proposed to be annexed by reference to a map, geographical locations, legal or physical description or other reasonable designation.” [emphasis added].
¶10 While we find legislative intent to provide notice by certified mail to the abutting agricultural owners, we also hold the legislature intended no less than certified mail for the agricultural owners of five acres or more within the annexed territory. A legislative enactment must be construed in accordance with the plain ordinary meaning according to the import of the language used. Smith v. Broken Arrow Public Schools, Independent School Dist. #3, 1983 OK CIV APP 19, 665 P.2d 858, 12 Ed. Law Rep. 152 (approved for publication by the Supreme Court), citing In re Certification of Question of State Law, 1977 OK 16, 560 P.2d 195. A court may not ignore the plain words of a statute. Allgood v. Allgood, 1981 OK 21, 626 P.2d 1323. The plain words of this statute provide that “every person” owning five acres or more used for agricultural purposes shall receive notice by certified mail.15 With such inclusive language, the best interpretation is to apply it to both groups of property owners already mentioned in the statute.
¶11 The record is clear that the City of Ada did not send notice by certified mail to all owners of five acres or more of agricultural land abutting the boundaries of the annexed territory. The City did send notice, however, to such owners by first class mail. One such owner, Mr. Plumlee, who owns more than five acres of agricultural property in section 14, testified that he did not receive any kind of prior notice of the proposed annexation. If the City had utilized notice by certified mail, it would have been obvious whether City had sent notice to Mr. Plumlee.16 While the evidence submitted points only to Mr. Plumlee who did not receive notice, one property owner without notice is too many.
¶12 At the hearing on January 14, 2014, the City‘s attorney presented a document titled “Affidavit of Mailing” which was admitted as “Respondent‘s Exhibit 1“. It certifies that on January 31, 2013, the City Attorney mailed the notice to all owners of property within the annexed territory by first-class mail and by certified mail. It also certifies that notice was mailed by first-class mail to all owners of property abutting any public right-of-way that forms the boundary of the territory proposed to be annexed.17
¶13 The court recognized that the statute requiring specific types of notice was not followed. Moreover, the court still declined to set aside the annexation after noting that one owner testified he received no notice.18 As stated above, the court‘s order included a ruling that there was no prejudice to a party with actual notice of a proceeding, even if it is not the statutory notice. The court thus decided substantial compliance with the statutory notice provisions was sufficient, even though it found the statute was ambiguous. The problem with the court‘s ruling in this case is that it disregards the obvious legislative intent to provide a higher level of notice to specific groups of property owners: those who own five acres or more used for agricultural purposes within the annexed territory, as well as those owners of five acres or more used for agricultural purposes
¶14 The personal notice requirements of annexation cases, as required by
¶15 We, therefore, hold that strict compliance with the personal notice provisions of
¶16 REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR
FOOTNOTES
