MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON APPEAL
This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 25, 1994,
The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for reorganization in bankruptcy in May, 1991, and an amended plan of reorganization was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in June, 1992. The case was closed by the Bankruptcy Court on November 2, 1992, and was reopened by the Bankruptcy Court on Appellant’s motion on September 28, 1993.
The confirmed plan contains a provision staying creditors’ actions against third parties, including guarantors of any claim, pending execution of the plan. When the Appellant filed an action against two guarantors of the Debtor’s obligations to the Appellant these guarantors raised this stay provision as a defense to the Appellant’s enforcement action on them guaranty. The Appellant then sought direct relief from the Bankruptcy Court through a motion to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding. After reopening the case the Bankruptcy Court denied relief to the Appellant from the stay provision, declining to strike the post-confirmation stay.
Article VIII of the Bankrupt’s plan purportedly bars the Appellant’s claims against the two individuals who were guaran *292 tors by providing that “pending execution” of the plan, which will not occur until 1999, “all creditors will continue to be stayed from proceeding against ... any guarantors or endorsers of any claim.” It is thus clear that this is a post-confirmation injunction and violates 11 U.S.C. Section 524(e) and accordingly exceeds the power and authority of the Bankruptcy Court because the section referred to prohibits, release or a post-confirmation stay of the obligations of non-party guarantors.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that “confirmation of a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan does not discharge the obligations of a third-party guarantor.”
In
re
Sure-Snap Corp.,
Of course, the liability of a guarantor is “affected” regardless of whether it is released or, as in this case, stayed for a long period of time.
The Court notes that in the Appel-lee’s brief it is emphasized that the Appellant did not take any action diming the bankruptcy proceeding to have the stay eliminated from the plan. The Court does not regard this as being relevant because a creditor’s express or implied assent to an improper stay does not, and cannot, confer jurisdiction on the Court to provide such relief.
See Underhill, supra,
and
Newboles, supra.
In
In re A.J. Mackay Company,
In summary, it is the Court’s view that in entering the post-confirmation stay complained of the Bankruptcy Court simply committed a jurisdictional error that must be corrected. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court’s order appealed from is reversed and it is directed that the stay contained in Article VIII of the debtor’s plan of reorganization be stricken as exceeding the Bankruptcy Court’s authority.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
