In Re Davis
Lead Opinion
Petitioner, by application for the writ of habeas corpus, asks that we declare that his confinement under a 1944 judgment of conviction of forgery is illegal and that he can be held only under certain 1948 judgments not here attacked. He urges that the 1944 judgment is invalid because he was only 18 years of age at the time of his arrest on the charge which resulted in that judgment and he was not referred to the Youth Authority pursuant to the requirements of section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as it then read. The problems raised by this contention are disposed of in our opinion in In re MeInturff, post, p. 876 [
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the 1944 charge of forgery. He was arraigned for judgment and sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. Execution of sentence was suspended for five years and probation granted. In August, 1945, the superior court made its order revoking probation; the declared ground is that “it appears to the satisfaction of this court, by competent evidence offered this day that the above-named defendant has breached and violated . . . [the] terms and conditions of the order of probation above referred to.”
We are satisfied that there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to notice and hearing preceding revocation of probation. The federal Constitution does not give such a right. (Escoe v. Zerbst (1935),
The following cases support our conclusion: People v. O’Donnell (1918),
We recognize that the courts of other states are not in accord as to whether notice and hearing must precede revocation of probation. (See
We have also concluded that, in the absence of express statutory procedural regulations, the administration of justice
This is not to say that one whose probation was revoked for no reason, or for an arbitrary reason despite his fulfillment of its terms, is without remedy. If the order of revocation is made in a case where imposition of sentence had been suspended, the validity of the order can be reviewed on appeal from the ensuing judgment of conviction; such judgment can be pronounced only after defendant is present and arraigned (
For the reasons above stated the order to show cause hereto
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
Notes
Petitioner has not shown that this recital is incorrect.
That section provides, in material part, that “In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, in person and with counsel. No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ...”
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent insofar as the opinion turns upon In re McInturff, this page.
The opinion and judgment were modified to read as above printed on November 1,1951.