75 P. 1048 | Kan. | 1904
Counsel for petitioner contends that the discharge of the the grand juror Lindner was an arbitrary act of the court, without justification in law, and that the substitution of another person in his stead divested the grand jury of jurisdiction to inquire concerning crimes committed in the county, or to indict persons therefor. It is unnecessary to discuss the question further than to say that the grand jury, when it propounded the question which the petitioner refused to answer, was at least a defacto body. ( The State v. Marsh, 13 Kan. 596; In re McElroy, 10 Kan. App. 348, 58 Pac. 677 ; The State, ex rel. Dunn, v. Noyes, 87 Wis. 340, 58 N. W. 386, 41 Am. St. Rep. 45, 27 L. R. A. 776; In re Gannon, 69 Cal. 541, 11 Pac. 240; Ex parte Haymond, 91 id. 545, 27 Pac. 859.)
The four cases last cited hold to the doctrine that the legality of a de facto grand jury cannot be inquired into on hateas corpus proceedings for discharge from commitments based on indictments found by such body, under the rule that the acts of de facto officers cannot be questioned collaterally. (See, also, Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, 15 Sup. Ct. 389, 39 L. Ed. 422.)
It is next insisted that the petitioner should be discharged because the matter concerning which he was interrogated was privileged, and that to require a disclosure by a banker of the amount standing to a depositor’s credit on the bank books would be against public policy. Counsel, thus contending, frankly admits that he has found no adjudicated case which sustains his position. The relation of debtor and creditor exists between a depositor and a banker. By the inquiry in this case, it was sought to ascertain how much the bank owed Bellringer on March 1. The ordinary
The contention that to compel a disclosure from the witness would be an unreasonable search for and seizure of the depositor’s property is untenable. To obtain information from a witness of the amount and location of another’s money or property cannot come within the constitutional inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was nothing confidential, in a legal sense, between Davies, the bankerc and his depositor, which would allow the former to assert that the business transactions between them were privileged.
The writ of habeas corpus will be denied and the prisoner remanded.