133 F. 411 | E.D. Wis. | 1904
While the exceptions are independent in classification, both involve a primary question of the rule of pleading applicable to the issues respectively. In that view they are considered together, and the inquiry thereupon is not free from difficulty, owing to the want of clear precedents. My conclusions are, ‘ however, that the petition and answer on the one hand and the claims of damages on the other present distinct issues, which are to be separately adjudicated in the order named, as indicated by the opinion of -Judge Brown in La
This proceeding is commenced by the petitioner to limit liability, and the issuable allegations thereupon are the facts prescribed by statute as .the grounds for limitation. It is unquestionable that the petitioner must allege and prove the state of facts thus required to obtain the relief sought. Nevertheless, a claimant contesting the right to limit liability must take issue by answer to the petition (rule 56), and I am of opinion that such answer must “be full and explicit and distinct to each separate article and separate allegation,” as required by rule 27 for answer to libels. Thereupon “the cause must stand for hearing on proof like any other cause at issue.” Bened. Adm. Pr. (3d Ed.) § 580. The doctrine which is to govern admiralty pleadings is now settled, though uncertain prior to 1844, when the rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court as authorized by act of Congress. Thus, in an early case (Clarke v. The Dodge Healy, 4 Wash. C. C. 651, 656, Fed. Cas. No. 2,849) it was said, “If the answer does not acknowledge the truth of the allegations of the libel, it must be proved by those who assert it;” while Judge Dacombe, in Virginia Home Ins. Co. v. Sunberg (C. C.) 54 Fed. 389, 390, construes the rule and practice in admiralty to entitle the libelant “to an admission or denial of each distinct and separate averment in its libel, separately and distinctly.” The last-mentioned view plainly conforms to the intent of rule 27, and is deemed equally applicable to the pleadings upon the issue as to limited liability. The proof required in support of the petition that any liability incurred was “without the privity or knowledge of” the petitioner, does not reach the subsequent issue of liability, as it relates only to the personal negligence or conduct of the owners. Benedict’s Adm. Pr. (3d Ed.) § 565.
Upon the further issue of liability for damages arising out of the collision the petitioner brings the case within rule 56, which reserves its right to contest such liability. “No presumption arises from the happening of a collision against either vessel” (Henry’s Admr. Jur. & Proc. § 82) without fault on the part of one shown or confessed, and it is unquestionable that the general rules and practice in admiralty intend that all issues be well defined by pleadings in some form, with simple and explicit allegations of fact. I am satisfied, therefore, that the claim under which proof of liability is to be presented (rule 55) must be treated as a pleading in the nature of libel, and must set out “the various allegations of facts upon which the claimant relies in support of his suit,” in accord with rule 23. While this requirement is not expressed in rule 55, and neither of the rules states the method of framing such issue, nor mentions an answer to the claim, the hearing cannot proceed as contemplated by rule 55, for the purposes of a contest, without an issue presented in some form. The claimant, though called into court by the monition to prove any claim it may have, must prove that the damage was caused by fault of petitioner’s steamer, or fail of recovery. The petitioner is relieved from confession of liability by the allegations to that end in a petition; but those allegations are
In conformity with the views thus stated as to the status of answer and claim respectively as pleadings, my conclusions upon the exceptions may be briefly stated.
1. Exceptions to the Answer. The first, second, and third exceptions are sustained, as the answer is insufficient in each of the particulars noted therein. The denial in each instance assumes knowledge or information on the part of the respondent that the facts and circumstances were'not as alleged in the petition in certain of the essentials imposed by statute, but withholds disclosure of such information. Thus the denial to which the first exception is taken is the sole answer to the jurisdictional allegations that the Sacramento was, at the time of the collision, “stout, staunch, strong, and seaworthy, well and properly manned and equipped, and had on board a full and competent complement of officers and crew,” etc. The answer must be “full, explicit, and distinct” (rule 27), and this requirement is not met by denial alone. Commander in Chief, 1 Wall. 43, 17 L. Ed. 609. If the party answer
é. Exceptions to the Claim of Liability. Thé three exceptions- state a.single objection in different forms, namely, that the facts upon which ■ liability is asserted are not státed. The objection is well taken to the ■claim treated as a pleading, and the exceptions are sustained accordingly.