In re Dave D.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the plaintiff was reckless, and that his recklessness was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (see Wadhwa v Long Is. R.R., 13 AD3d 615 [2004]; Lassalle v New York City Tr. Auth., 11 AD3d 661 [2004]; Mooney v Long Is. R.R., 305 AD2d 560 [2003]; Gao Yi Feng v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 285 AD2d 447, 447-448 [2001]; cf. Brown v Long Is. R.R., 304 AD2d 601, 601-602 [2003]). Since, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
Mastro, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.