{¶ 2} On November 8, 2004, FCCS filed a complaint for abuse, neglect and/or dependency alleging D.T., born November 5, 2004, tested positive at birth for cocaine and marijuanа. After an emergency care order was issued, the trial court on November 10, 2004 determined D.T. was neglected and dependent, a finding D.T.'s parents did not contest. D.T. was temporarily committed to the custody of FCCS and was placed in foster care at the home of foster parent J.Q., where she continued to reside throughout these proceedings.
{¶ 3} FCCS and D.T.'s parents agreed to a case plan aimed at reunification; the court approved and adopted the case plan on January 24, 2005. Because the parents failed to complete the case plan, FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody on October 27, 2005, alleging that, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 4} On August 17, 2006, the trial court established a deadline of August 31, 2006 for all relatives, interested in seeking possible placement of D.T., to contact FCCS *3 and file motions for custody with the court. As of the deadline, no filings were made with the court, but T.H., designated in the record as a paternal second cousin, subsequently filed a motion on December 6, 2006 seeking intervention as a pаrty and custody of D.T.; J.Q. filed a similar motion on February 16, 2007. On April 18, 2007, the trial court joined J.Q. as a party but denied T.H.'s motion to intervene, concluding T.H. lacked a relationship with D.T.
{¶ 5} Trial was held May 16, 17, and 18, 2007, and again on June 11, 12, and 13, 2007. Both parents testified, as did J.Q., T.H., the FCCS case worker, and the guardian ad litem. The trial court issued its decision on October 4, 2007 granting FCCS's motion for permanent custody of D.T. and terminating the parents' parental rights. The court also denied T.H.'s motion for custody and dismissed J.Q.'s motion for custody as moot.
{¶ 6} Appellant appeals, assigning two errors:
Assignment of Error One
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF [T.H.'s] MOTION TO BE MADE A PARTY WAS ARBITRARY AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Assignment of Error Two
A PERMANENT CUSTODY ORDER UNDER ORC §
2151.414 (B)(1)(D) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT CREATES AN UNREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL UNFITNESS.
I. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} Appellant's first assignment of error asserts T.H. should have been permitted to intervene in the proceedings that led to determining custody of D.T. Appellant contends the arbitrariness of the trial сourt's order is apparent from two different aspects *4 of the proceedings. Initially, appellant noted the trial court's deadline itself was arbitrary, falling nearly nine months before the trial occurred. Additionally, appellant points out the trial court denied T.H.'s motion to intervene but then joined J.Q. as a party even though he filed his motion to intervene more than two months after T.H. filed her motion. Appellant's first assignment of error thus resolves tо whether the trial court acted arbitrarily in granting J.Q.'s motion to intervene while denying T.H.'s motion. {¶ 8} Initially, we question appellant's standing to assert the rights of others who are not parties to this appeal. See In re Conn, Franklin App. No. 03AP-348,
{¶ 9} Even if we assume appellant has standing, she could not prevail. Ohio courts have applied the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure in dеtermining intervention issues in R.C.
{¶ 10} The trial court nonetheless has discretion under Civ. R. 24(B) to permit intervention in the circumstances set forth in the rule. An order denying a motion to intervene under Civ. R. 24(B) will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. In reJ.W., supra, at ¶ 26, citing In re Goff, Portage App. No. 2001-P-0144,
{¶ 11} In most instances, the party seeking to intervene in a permanent custody proceeding is a grandparent. A grandparent may be made a party in a permanent custody proceеding if he or she (1) possesses a legal right or protected interest in custody or visitation, or (2) stands in loco parentis to the child, exercised significant parental control, or assumed parental duties for the benefit оf the child. In reJ.W., supra, at ¶ 27, citing In *6 re Schmidt (1986),
{¶ 12} Because the first prong of the test tracks the language of intervention as of right in Civ. R. 24(A), a standard appellant does not contend T.H. satisfies, we address the second prong that considers whether T.H. stoоd in the role of a parent for D.T. According to the record, T.H. did not, as she never exercised parental responsibility, duties or control. As a result, even if T.H. had filed a timely motion to intervene, the trial court, in its discretion, сould have properly denied her motion. T.H.'s untimely motion provided further reason for the trial court, under the circumstances here, to deny intervention.
{¶ 13} By contrast, J.Q.'s exercise of parental responsibility towards D.T. plаces his intervention within the trial court's discretion. As the trial court noted in its decision, D.T. "has never known any other permanent care giver other than her foster father. He is her rock, and she is a child with special emotional needs that require professional care and persistent efforts by her foster father." (Decision, 17.) While the trial court may not have been required to grant J.Q.'s intervention motion, In re Thompson (Apr. 18, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APF08-1144, the wide discretion the trial сourt possessed in determining parties to a juvenile court action includes naming foster parents as parties. In *7 re Zhang (1999),
{¶ 14} In an effort to constrain the trial court's discretion in determining her motion to intervene, T.H. at trial emphasized she is a relative of D.T. A trial court, however, is not required to consider placing a child with a relative prior to granting permanent custody to an agency, as relatives seeking custody of a child are not afforded the same presumptive rights that a parent receives. In re Zorns, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1297,
{¶ 15} Appellant nonetheless suggests that denying T.H.'s motion to intervene prevented T.H. from develоping a relationship with D.T. Appellant's argument turns the intervention standard on its head. AsIn re J.W. makes clear, intervention in a permanent custody proceeding is predicated on the intervenor's pre-existing exercise of рarental responsibilities with regard to the child. Mere desire to establish such a relationship and become involved in a child's life is not grounds for intervening. *8
{¶ 16} In the final analysis, even though T.H. was not a party to the permanent custody proceedings, she not only was permitted to testify at the trial, but the trial court considered whether she would be an appropriate placement for D.T. Moreover, despite her late filing, FCCS and the guardian ad litеm completed separate investigations into T.H.'s suitability for custody. Neither the investigation results nor her testimony favored T.H. Due to her limited visitation with D.T., the investigators found no bond existed between T.H. and D.T., and T.H.'s home study was not apprоved. Moreover, in its decision, the trial court noted T.H.'s testimony regarding her finances was not credible, she has a criminal record, and she demonstrated poor judgment in providing for the safety of her own children by keeping two dogs bred for aggressiveness a year after the dogs bit a neighbor. As a result, even had T.H. been given party status, the outcome of the proceedings would not have been different.
{¶ 17} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 18} Appellant's second assignment of error contends that R.C. {¶ 19} Initially, appellant failed to raise the argument in the trial court. The failure to raise at the trial court level the constitutionality of a statute or its application, when the issue is apparent at the time of trial, waives the issue and deviates from this state's orderly procedure. The issue therefore need not be heard for the first time on appeal. In *9 re N.W., Franklin App. No. 07AP-590,
{¶ 20} Notwithstanding waiver, this court also addrеssed the issue: whether R.C.
{¶ 21} Having overruled appellant's two assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
*1McGRATH, P.J., and BROWN, J., concur.