In re D.L.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Zayas, Mock, Cunningham
{¶1} D.L. appeals his dispositions following his admission to conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted two felonious assaults, each with two firearm specifications, one for having a firearm on his person in violation of
{¶2} In the appeal numbered C-170154, D.L. appealed his receiving-stolen-property adjudication, but did not raise any assignments of error regarding that adjudication or disposition. Therefore, we dismiss that appeal as abandoned.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} On August 23, 2016, a complaint was filed alleging D.L. was delinquent for receiving stolen property, a felony of the fourth degree if committed by an adult. On November 7, 2016, two additional complaints were filed, charging him with two counts of felonious assault, felonies of the second degree if cоmmitted by an adult, each with two gun specifications.
{¶4} D.L. admitted to all of the charges. Both of the felonious-assault offenses occurred on November 6, 2016. D.L. fired multiple shots at Keyala White‘s vehicle while she was driving. One of the bullets struck her car, and one of the bullets struck Jonathan Blazar, an innocent bystander.
{¶6} D.L.‘s counsel objected to the imposition of two commitments for the firearm specifications. He argued that the court could only impose one commitment because the shots were fired as part of the same act or transaction.
{¶7} D.L. now appeals, arguing that multiple commitments on the firearm specifications violated his double-jeopardy and equal-protection rights, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object on constitutional grounds.
Relevant Statutes
{¶8}
{¶9} Dispositions for juvenile specifications are governed by
Double Jeopardy
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, D.L. argues that
{¶11} D.L. did not raise this issue below, and the failure to raise a constitutional issue at the trial level acts as “a waiver of such issue and a deviation from this state‘s orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for the first time on appeal.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1989), syllabus. “We may, in our discretion, review the issue of the statute‘s constitutionality for plain error.” State v. Flannery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140426, 2015-Ohio-1360, ¶ 7, citing In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988), syllabus.
{¶12} Because D.L. did not raise the issue below, we review for plain error. See In re J.T. at ¶ 15.
{¶13} It is wеll established that firearm specifications are penalty enhancements, not offenses. See State v. Adams, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120059, 2013-Ohio-926, ¶ 34, citing State v. Ford, 128 Ohio St.3d 398, 2011-Ohio-765, 945 N.E.2d 498, paragraph one of the syllabus. “Like other enhancement statutes, firearm specifications do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they enhance the punishment for the underlying offense and do not place the juvenile in jeopardy twice.” (Citations omitted.) In re J.T. at ¶ 20.
{¶14} Because we find that
Equal Protection
{¶15} Next, D.L. contends that
{¶16} D.L. did not object to the dispositions on equal-protection grounds during the juvenile court proceedings. Therefоre, this court reviews the trial court‘s decision for plain error. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2.
{¶17} The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” “The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a state never distinguish between citizens,
{¶18} Statutes are рresumed constitutional, unless a constitutional violation is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992). Courts must employ all rules of construction to uphold a statute whenever possible. Id.
{¶19} Legislation that distinguishes based on age is subject to the rational-basis test. See State v. McKinney, 2015-Ohio-4398, 46 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.). The rational-basis test “requires us to uphold the statutes if they are rationally related to a legitimate gоvernment purpose * * * .” State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 486, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 34. Under rational-basis review, Ohio courts have consistently found a reasonable basis to sentence juveniles differently than adults. See In re J.T., 2017-Ohio-7723, 85 N.E.3d 763, ¶ 32. “A rational basis exists for sentencing juveniles in a ‘different fashion’ than adults because the purposes of felony sentencing and juvenile sentencing are different, and juvenile courts are given wider discretion in the early release of offenders.” In re Z.S. at ¶ 27. Distinctions between juveniles and adults are permitted with respect to incarceration and detention. In re Chappell, 164 Ohio App.3d 628, 2005-Ohio-6451, 843 N.E.2d 823, ¶ 46 (7th Dist.).
{¶20} The juvenile system “provide[s] for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children.” Id. at ¶ 49. The state has a legitimate interest in “rehabilitating the juvenile as well as protecting the public.” In re J.T. at ¶ 34. Consistent with this purpose,
{¶21} In his third аssignment of error, D.L. asserts that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the constitutional issues addressed in the first and second assignments of error.
{¶22} To establish a claim for ineffectivе assistance of counsel, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating that (1) the performance of defense counsel was seriously flawed and deficient, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had defense counsel provided proper representation. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
{¶23} Sincе we have found no constitutional violations, we cannot conclude that D.L. received ineffective assistance in counsel‘s failure to object to the dispositions on dоuble-jeopardy and equal-protection grounds. We overrule his third assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶24} We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court in the appeals numbered C-170151 and C-170152, and we dismiss the appeal numbered C-170153.
Judgment accordingly.
MOCK, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.