IN THE MATTER OF: D.K.W.
CASE NO. CA2014-02-001
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO CLINTON COUNTY
6/30/2014
[Cite as In re D.K.W., 2014-Ohio-2896.]
Lauren Raizk, 145 North South Street, Wilmington, Ohio 45177, for D.K.W.
Holly M. Simpson, 6284 Taylor Pike, Blanchester, Ohio 45107, for appellant
Susan Zurface Daniels, 116 North Walnut Street, Wilmington, Ohio 45177, for D.W.
Virginia Vanden Bosch, 9506 West State Route 73, Wilmington, Ohio 45177, Guardian Ad Litem
William C. Randolph, 1025 S. South Street, Suite 400, P.O. Box 568, Wilmington, Ohio 45177, for appellee, Clinton County Children‘s Services
M. POWELL, J.
{1} Appellant, H.S. (Mother), aрpeals the decision of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of her son, D.K.W., to appellee, Clinton County Children Services (the Agency).
{3} On September 29, 2011, the Agency filed a complaint alleging that ten-month-old D.K.W. was abused, neglected, and dependent. The Agency was initially granted protective supervision on an interim basis. On December 8, 2011, the juvenile court granted temporary custody of D.K.W. to the Agency. D.K.W. was placed with a foster family that same day. On December 13, 2011, following D.K.W.‘s parents’ plea of admit to the abuse allegation, the juvenile court adjudicated D.K.W. abused (the neglect and dependent allegations were dismissed). Temporary custody with the Agency was continued.
{4} A case plan was implemented to reunify Mother and Father with their son. The case plan required both parents to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations, obtain and maintain stable housing and income, and сomplete a parenting class. Mother was also required to complete a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations. Reunification was unsuccessful as both parents failed to participate in a substance abuse treatment program, continued to use drugs, specifically heroin, failеd to obtain stable housing and income, and failed to consistently attend visitation. Mother also failed to complete a mental health assessment.
{5} On January 24, 2012, with the agreement of the parents and as recommended by the child‘s guardian ad litem, D.K.W. was placed in the temporary custody of relatives, the Runyons. By all accоunts, D.K.W. was comfortable and well adjusted in the Runyons’ home, bonded with them and their two children, and had a great relationship with them. The Agency was very satisfied with the Runyons’ care of the child. D.K.W. remained in the
{6} On July 18, 2013, the Agency moved for permanent custody of D.K.W. A hearing on the motion was held on November 18, 2013, and continued on January 9, 2014. Amanda Couser, a caseworker for the Agency, was the solе witness to testify. In a report filed a few days before the permanent custody hearing, the guardian ad litem concluded it was in D.K.W.‘s best interest to grant permanent custody to the Agency. Counsel for the parties declined to cross-examine the guardian ad litem during the permanent custody hearing.
{7} On January 28, 2014, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that D.K.W. had been abandoned by his parents and that it was in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the Agency.
{8} Mother appeals, raising two assignments of error.
{9} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MOTHER‘S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE TO ALLOW FAMILY MEMBERS TO SEEK CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD WHEN THE COURT ALLOWED A CONTINUANCE IN PROGRESS TO RESOLVE A SCHEDULING PROBLEM.
{11} Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to continue the permanent custody hearing to allow exploration of a potential placement with the Runyons.
{12} The permanent custody hearing began on November 18, 2013, a Monday. On November 15, 2013, the Friday before the hearing, Mother moved to continue the hearing on
{13}
{14} Whether placement with a relative is an option that can provide a legally secure placement without a grant of permanent custody may be a relevant consideration under the best interest factors in
{15} We find that the juvenile court did not abuse its disсretion in denying Mother‘s late request for a continuance. At the time Mother moved for a continuance, the case was
{16} Mother‘s first assignment is overruled.
{17} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{18} THE TRIAL COURT‘S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{19} Mother argues that the juvenile court‘s decision granting permanent custody to the Agency was not in D.K.W.‘s interest and that such finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{20} Before a natural parent‘s constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of her child may be terminated, thе state is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory standards for permanent custody have been met. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982). An appellate court‘s review of a juvenile court‘s decision granting permanent custody is limited to whether sufficient credible evidence exists to support the juvenile court‘s determinаtion. In re Starkey, 150 Ohio App.3d 612, 2002-Ohio-6892, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.). A reviewing court will reverse a finding by the juvenile court that the evidence was clear and convincing only if there is a sufficient conflict in the evidence presented. In re Rodgers, 138 Ohio App.3d 510, 520 (12th Dist.2000).
{22} Second, the court must find that any of the following apply: the child is abandoned; the child is orphaned; the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month periоd; or where the preceding three factors do not apply, the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.
{23} When considering the best interest of a child in a permanent custody hearing, the juvenile court is required under
{24} The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence, and Mother does not dispute, that D.K.W. is an abandoned child. Pursuant to
{25} Mother, however, disputes the juvenile court‘s finding that granting permanent custody of D.K.W. to the Agency was in the child‘s best interest. Specifically, Mother argues the juvenile court failed to earnestly consider all relative placements for D.K.W., especially the Runyons in light of their expressed interest in obtaining custody of D.K.W. again.
{26} In considering D.K.W.‘s interaction and interrelationship with relatives and any other person who may significantly affect the child pursuant to
{27} Amanda Couser, a caseworker for the Agency, was the sole witness to testify at the permanent custody hearing. The guardian ad litem‘s report was filed a few days before the hearing. In her report, the guardian ad litem concluded that upon interviеwing the Runyons, the great-grandmother, and the foster parents, it was in D.K.W.‘s best interest to grant permanent custody to the Agency. Couser testified D.K.W. was in need of a legally secure permanent placement and that the Agency was unable to recommend any relative placement at this point.
{29} In her report, the guardian ad litem stated the great-grandmother was close to D.K.W. and visited him, and that she would take custody of D.K.W if she could. However, the great-grandmother “ha[d] lied to the Agency in the past to protect mother, and there is doubt she would be able to protect [the child] from mother or father.” The great-grandmother has never filed a motion for legal custody of D.K.W.
{30} With regard to the Runyons, Couser testified that during the 11 months they had temporary custody of D.K.W., the Agency never had any concerns and the child was well adjusted and was bonded with the Runyons and their two children. In fact, it was the Agency‘s intention tо have the child live permanently with the Runyons. Ultimately, though, the Runyons told the Agency they could no longer care for D.K.W. due, in part, to familial hardship. Another reason provided by the Runyons was their hope that placing D.K.W. back in foster care would prompt his parents to comply with the case plan. Couser testified that following the child‘s removal from their custody, the Runyons visited D.K.W. only twice despite the foster parents’ open door visitation policy. A third visit was cancelled by the
{31} In her report, the guardian ad litem noted that the Runyons (1) gave up custody of D.K.W. “in the hopes that [Mother and Father] would ‘see the light’ and give up drugs,” (2) now realize it was a mistake, (3) have hired an attorney to assist them in adopting D.K.W. if the Agency gets permanent custody, and (4) hope to get D.K.W. back in their care. As stated earlier, the Runyons have never filed a motion for legal custody of D.K.W.
{32} Couser testified D.K.W. has been with the same foster family throughout the case, initially for a month after he was removed from his parents, and sincе December 18, 2012, when the Runyons gave up custody. Couser testified that D.K.W. is very comfortable in the foster parents’ home, appears very well adjusted and bonded, and has a healthy attachment with the foster family. Couser also testified the foster parents have been great advocates in ensuring D.K.W. receives needed spеech services.
{33} In her report, the guardian ad litem noted that D.K.W. is bonded with, and is flourishing in the care of the foster family. The foster parents enjoy having him in their home and their one-year-old daughter and D.K.W. are attached to each other. The foster parents are “foster to adopt.”
{34} In light of the foregoing, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither the Runyons nor the great-grandmother were a viable placement for D.K.W. The juvenile court is vested with discretion to determine what placement option is in the child‘s best interest. In re B.K., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2006-03-011, 2006-Ohio-4424, ¶ 25. As stated earlier, a juvenile court is not required to consider placing a child with a relative before granting permanent custody. In re D.S., 2011-Ohio-1279 at ¶ 41. The willingness of a relative to care for a child does not alter what the court must consider in determining permanent custody. In re Patterson, 134 Ohio App.3d 119, 129 (9th Dist.1999).
{36} The juvenile court reviewed D.K.W.‘s custodial history in detаil. See
{37} In light of the foregoing, and after a thorough review of the record, we find that the juvenile court‘s decision granting permanent custody to the Agency is in D.K.W.‘s best interest and not against the manifest wеight of the evidence. “A child‘s best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re Keaton, 4th Dist. Ross Nos. 04CA2785 and 04CA2788, 2004-Ohio-6210, ¶ 61. Courts are not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the relevant factors under
{38} Mother‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{39} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
M. POWELL, J.