In re D.J.
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Appellant D.J. (hereinafter “Father”) appeals the judgment entered by the Stark County Common Pleas Court, Family Court Division, awarding permanent custody of his biological child D.J. (hereinafter “the Child”) to Appellee Stark County Department of Job and Family Services (hereinafter “SCJFS”).
{¶2} On September 17, 2024, SCJFS filed a complaint in the trial court alleging the Child and his two siblings were dependent, neglected and/or abused. The trial court found the Child was dependent and awarded temporary custody to SCJFS. At the time the case was filed, Father was believed to be the biological father of all three children. Father was later found not to be the biological father of one of the children, Z.J., and he was dismissed from her case.
{¶3} After Appellant’s dismissal from Z.J.’s case, SCJFS filed a motion seeking permanent custody of all three children. The motion was granted by the trial court. The trial court found the Child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. As to Father, the trial court found Father completed a parenting assessment as required by his case plan. As a result of the assessment, Father was to participate in substance abuse treatment to address his marijuana use, participate in counseling to address mental health issues, participate in an intensive parenting program, and maintain employment and appropriate housing. Father moved to Chicago during the pendency of the case and did not submit to drug testing. He did not inform the case worker of any mental health or substance abuse treatment he engaged in after moving and did not sign a release for any service providers in Chicago in order to demonstrate compliance with the case plan. Father showed no evidence of participating in a parenting program in Chicago.
{¶4} Father requested an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (hereinafter “ICPC”) application. Father had active warrants throughout the case and was not compliant with his case plan. When SCJFS reached out to Illinois about an ICPC, Illinois
{¶5} Father provided no verification of income. He told the case worker he was working odd jobs in Chicago, and if given custody of his children, he would apply for public assistance.
{¶6} Father was charged with domestic violence against Mother in 2022. The charge was later reduced to misdemeanor assault. Father was ordered by the municipal court to participate in anger management and substance abuse treatment. Father failed to comply, and the municipal court issued a warrant for his arrest. He was arrested and released, but Father was again ordered to participate in treatment. Father again failed to comply, and a second warrant for his arrest was issued. The pattern continued throughout SCJFS’s involvement with the family. After moving, Father was unable to travel from Chicago to visit the Child but visited virtually.
{¶7} The trial court also found permanent custody to be in the best interest of the Child. The Child was previously placed in foster care with his two sisters but was removed from the home due to behavior issues. The Child has been diagnosed with Autism level 2. The Child has speech delays and is on a waiting list for occupational therapy. Canton City Schools will review the Child for an IEP to address his anger outbursts and provide behavioral health services. The child is thriving in the foster home and attends preschool daily. The trial court found there was a bond between the Child and Father, and the Child looks forward to both in-person and virtual visits with Father. However, the trial court found the benefits of permanence outweigh the harm caused by severing any bond between the Child and his parents. The trial court granted permanent custody of the Child to SCJFS.
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
{¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF APPELLANT AS A NON-OFFENDING PARENT AND INSTEAD LUMPED APPELLANT INTO THE MOTHER’S HISTORY, CONDUCT, AND HOUSEHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES, CONTRARY TO
{¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS BY ALLOWING APPOINTED COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW WHILE APPELLANT WAS INCARCERATED AND UNABLE TO APPEAR, DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE COUNSEL AND PROCEED PRO SE, AND CONTINUING THE CASE WITHOUT A VALID WAIVER OF COUNSEL, AFTER COUNSEL HAD ALREADY UNDERMINED APPELLANT BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS TO THE COURT.”
{¶12} “IV. THE PERMANENT-CUSTODY JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE UNDER
{¶13} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING APPELLANT’S
I., II.
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court did not timely conduct an adjudicatory hearing on its initial finding of dependency. In his second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred in considering evidence of Mother’s
APPLICABLE LAW
{¶15} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an award of temporary custody is a final, appealable order, and a parent’s failure to timely appeal a judgment awarding temporary custody renders the judgment res judicata as to later proceedings:
“[A]n adjudication that a child is neglected or dependent, followed by a disposition awarding temporary custody to a public children services agency pursuant to
R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) constitutes a ‘final order’ for purposes ofR.C. 2505.02 and is appealable to the court of appeals pursuant toR.C. 2501.02 .” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 161, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). And “an appeal of an adjudication order of abuse, dependency, or neglect of a child and the award of temporary custody to a children services agency pursuant toR.C. 2151.353(A)(2) must be filed within 30 days of the judgment entry pursuant toApp.R. 4(A) .” In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, 900 N.E.2d 607, ¶ 18.The judgments granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case were issued on March 20, 2019, for K.K. and D.T., and June 10, 2019, for M.K. Pursuant to
App.R. 4(A)(1) , the mother and the father had 30 days from those respective dates to file notices of appeal to challenge the juvenile court‘s failure to comply with the 90-day time limit in formerR.C. 2151.35(B)(1) . They did not.
“[U]nless it is vacated on appeal, a voidable judgment has the force of a valid legal judgment, regardless of whether it is right or wrong.” State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 17, citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 494, 5 Ohio Law Abs. 830, 159 N.E. 594 (1927). “Res judicata bars relitigation of a matter that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal when a final, appealable order was issued in accordance with the law at the time.” State v. Griffin, 138 Ohio St.3d 108, 2013-Ohio-5481, 4 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 3. Because the mother and the father failed to timely appeal the judgments of temporary custody, the judgments are valid and the current challenge is barred by res judicata.
ANALYSIS
{¶16} Father failed to timely appeal the finding of dependency and the judgment granting temporary custody to SCJFS. Therefore, we find he is barred in the instant appeal from raising issues related to the adjudication under the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶17} We further find that even if Father had timely appealed, his arguments are without merit. Even if the trial court failed to conduct the adjudicatory hearing within sixty days as required by
{¶18}
As used in this chapter, “dependent child” means any child:
B) Who lacks adequate parental care by reason of the mental or physical condition of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian;
(C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship[.]
{¶19} A finding of dependency does not require parental fault. Instead, the focus is on the child’s condition regardless of who is the responsible party. In re R.C., 2023-Ohio-146, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). Therefore, the trial court could consider Mother’s drug issues in finding the Child to be dependent.
{¶20} The first and second assignment assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶21} In his third assignment of error, Father argues the trial court violated his right to counsel. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
{¶22} A parent is entitled to legal representation in a dependency, neglect, or abuse action.
{¶23} Father has not provided this Court with a transcript of the proceedings below. While he has filed a document with this Court which purports to be an
{¶24} By judgment entry filed December 18, 2025, the trial court made the following findings:
On July 14, 2025, Attorney Bernard Hunt filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for [Father] in part because [Father] filed pro se motions and asked the court to remove Attorney Hunt. The Motion to Withdraw was granted and Attorney Seth Arkow was appointed. On September 3, 2025 Attorney Arkow filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for [Father], in part because [Father] asked Mr. Arkow to withdraw and filed pro se motions. The Motion to Withdraw was granted. A Permanent Custody hearing was scheduled for October 21, 2025 at 1:00 PM. The court appointed D. Coleman Bond to represent [Father], and continued the trial to January 8, 2026 and January 20, 2026. Attorney Bond filed a motion to withdraw, in part because [Father] does not agree with the way Attorney Bond is handling his case and because [Father] states he has named Attorney Bond in a Federal law suit. [Father] appeared today by zoom and explained he was not satisfied with counsel because they would not file the motions he wanted them to file. He wishes to represent himself and intends to file emergency motions. The court explained to [Father] that the court will not appoint a fourth attorney to represent him.
{¶26} The third assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
{¶27} In his fourth assignment of error, Father argues that the judgment of the trial court granting SCJFS permanent custody is not supported by the evidence. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
{¶28}
{¶29} Following the hearing,
{¶30} Therefore,
{¶31} If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under
{¶32} Because
{¶34} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing,
ANALYSIS
{¶35} The trial court found Father achieved only minimal compliance with the case plan. He moved to Chicago during the pendency of the case, and an ICPC could not be entered with Illinois due to Father’s ongoing active warrants and his noncompliance with his case plan. The trial court found Father had not complied with the case plan enough to justify an extension of temporary custody to allow Father more time to complete the case plan. Therefore, the trial court found Father had failed to substantially remedy the conditions that cause the Child to be removed. The trial court’s findings of facts support the trial court’s finding the Child could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time.
{¶37} Father has not supplied this Court with a transcript of the proceedings, and as discussed earlier in this opinion, Father’s
{¶38} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V.
{¶39} In his fifth assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court erred in overruling his
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶40} “A motion for relief from judgment under
{¶41} To succeed on a
{¶42}
- mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
- newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);
- fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
- the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
- any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
{¶43} The use of a
ANALYSIS
{¶44} Father filed the same
{¶45} We find Father’s
{¶46} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court, Family Court Division, is affirmed.
{¶47} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J.
King, P.J. and
Hoffman, J. concur.