In re D.H.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} In the instant appeal, submitted on the record and briefs of the parties, appellant, Regina Byler, appeals the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common
{¶2} On November 22, 2005, the agency filed a complaint in the Juvenile Court alleging that D., and her half-brother, E.B. (hereinafter “E.“) (d.o.b. 8/22/91), were abused, neglected and dependent children. According to the complaint, D. was sexually abused by E., who entered a plea of “true” to a charge of Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of
{¶3} On November 28, 2005, the trial court appointed Carolyn and Rick Kirkpatrick as guardians ad litem for the children.
{¶4} On November 30, 2005, the trial court entered an order placing D. in the temporary custody of the agency, with the consent of appellant and Scott, D.‘s father.1 A preliminary case plan was subsequently filed which, among other things, ordered that E., D., and Regina complete mental health assessments.
{¶5} On January 13, 2006, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on the complaint. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that D. was an abused and dependent child. In so concluding, the court stated as follows:
{¶7} The court held a dispositional hearing on February 13, 2006. In its judgment entry following the hearing, the court ordered that the children remain in the temporary custody of the agency. The court noted that E., D. and Regina had completed their initial assessments, and that E. and D. had begun treatment, but Scott and Merl had not. The court noted, in its concerns that “[t]reatment for [E.], [D.] and Regina is expected to be lengthy and has only just begun.” In addition, the court issued a no contact order against Regina, which ordered her not to intentionally be within 1/4 mile of the children, with the exception that she “may have contact with the children consistent with the therapeutic recommendations of the children‘s counselors.”
{¶8} On March 23, 2006, the trial court issued an agreed order of child support, in which Regina was ordered to pay $84.21 per month.
{¶9} On May 19, 2006, the court held a review hearing. At this time, Regina was in the Trumbull County Jail awaiting trial on the criminal charges brought as a result of her sexual activity with E.. As a result, Regina was unable to continue counseling, and had not completed a sexual aggression assessment, as ordered.
{¶11} On October 18, 2006, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody, pursuant to
{¶12} A hearing on the agency‘s motion was held on January 11, 2007. At the hearing, Regina executed a voluntary permanent surrender of custody of E. to the agency. On January 22, 2007, the trial court entered judgment granting permanent custody of E. and D. to the agency.
{¶14} “The Juvenile Court erred in determining that granting permanent custody to the Agency was in the best interest of the child.”
{¶15} In her sole assignment of error, Regina raises three arguments: First, she argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to discuss of all the best interest factors as contained in
{¶16} As an initial matter, we note the well-established legal axiom that a parent‘s right to raise a child has been described as an essential and basic civil right. In re Hayes (1997) 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 651. Accordingly, the permanent termination of parental rights has been described as the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case. In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, at ¶14; In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that a parent “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.” (Citation omitted.) Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d at 49.
{¶18} If any of the preceding elements are found by clear and convincing evidence, the court is then obligated to ascertain, by clear and convincing evidence, what is in the best interest of the child. Noda, 2005-Ohio-2213, at ¶29; Goff, 2003-Ohio-6089, at ¶7.
{¶19} In making a permanent placement determination based upon the best interest of the child, the court is required to consider all relevant factors under
{¶20} When reviewing a trial court‘s decision on a manifest weight of the evidence basis, an appellate court is guided by the presumption that the findings of the trial court were correct. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80; In re Williams, 10th Dist. Nos. 01AP-867 and 01AP 868, 2002-Ohio-2902, at ¶7. “The rationale for this presumption is that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the evidence by viewing witnesses and observing their demeanor, voice inflections, and gestures, and may use these observations in assessing the credibility of the testimony.” In re Memic, 11th Dist. Nos. 2006-L-049, 2006-L-050, 2006-L-051, 2006-Ohio-6346, at ¶21, citing Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 80. Accordingly, judgments which are supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, at syllabus.
{¶21} The aforementioned “standard of review for weight of the evidence issues applies *** when reviewing awards of permanent custody to public children services
{¶22} In the instant matter, the trial court found that
{¶23} In its judgment entry, the trial court considered D.‘s “interaction with parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and *** other significant persons,” and made the following relevant findings:
{¶24} “[D.] was sexually abused by her brother, [E.]. [E.] was sexually abused by his mother ***. [E.] has no contact with either of his parents or his sibling ***. [D.] initially resided with her grandmother, but was removed from her grandmother‘s home and placed with her aunt due to grandmother‘s inability to provide for her. [D.] has adjusted well to her aunt‘s home. Her aunt has expressed an interest in adopting [D.] if [D.] becomes eligible for adoption.”
{¶25} As is clear from the foregoing, there is no evidence that the trial court failed to consider this first factor. “This court has held on several occasions that the provisions of
{¶26} Contrary to Regina‘s assertions, the trial court addressed D.‘s interrelationship and interactions with her in other portions of the judgment entry. In this regard, the court stated as follows:
{¶27} “Before *** Regina *** could be considered as a possible custodian *** [she] would have to successfully completed intensive sex offender treatment and be closely monitored for an extended period of time after [she] is released from prison. Adult sex offender treatment typically takes approximately 3-5 years to complete successfully.” *** Regina *** is currently incarcerated for committing a sexual offense against her son. She has not yet completed sex offender treatment.”
{¶28} As is clear from the foregoing, the trial court addressed the interrelationship or interaction between D. and Regina in making its decision. Essentially, the trial court acknowledged that there was no interrelationship or interaction between D. and Regina.
{¶29} Our review of the record supports the trial court‘s findings. D. had been in the temporary custody of the agency since December 1, 2005. A no contact order was issued against Regina in February of 2006 following the adjudicatory hearing. Regina had been incarcerated since March of 2006, pending her trial on the Sexual Battery charges. In June 2006, Regina was sentenced to four concurrent three year prison terms for these charges. Thus, there was competent, credible evidence to support the aforementioned finding of the trial court.
{¶31} At trial, Sharon testified that she has had custody of D. since February 2006. By all accounts, D.‘s grades, attitude, personal hygiene, and behavior had improved dramatically since that placement. She is attending counseling regularly. Although D. misses her mother, she remains “angry” with her and doesn‘t think she can provide her with a safe environment. When asked if the agency had discussed the possibility of having legal custody of D., Sharon stated that she was only interested in adoption rather than legal custody, because she felt that D. “needs a stable home and stable guidance.”
{¶32} With regard to fulfilling its statutory duty under
{¶34} The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.
concur.