Case Information
*1
[Cite as
In re D.B.
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re D.B., :
(Appellant). :
(Prob. No. MI 20861) :
(REGULAR CALENDAR) :
D E C I S I O N Rendered on February 20, 2014 Steven McGann Law Office , and Steven McGann , for appellant.
Gregory S. DuPont, Attorney At Law, Ltd., and Gregory S. DuPont , for appellee Franklin County ADAMH Board. Blumestiel, Evans, Falvo, LLC , and J.M. Evans , for appellee Twin Valley Behavioral Health Care.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division
TYACK, J.
Appellant, D.B., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, Probate Division, committing appellant to the Franklin County Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Bоard ("Franklin County ADAMH Board") for a period not to exceed 90 days and authorizing the forced administration of psychotropic medication to him. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History On Dеcember 23, 2013, an affidavit of mental illness was filed regarding
appellant. The same day, an order of detention was issued. On December 24, 2013, an *2 application to authorize forced psychotropic medications fоr appellant was filed. Then, on December 27, 2013, a magistrate conducted a hearing on the affidavit and application. At the hearing, William Bates, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified that appellant had a psychotic disordеr not otherwise specified. (Tr. 5, 7-8.) According to Dr. Bates, appellant had a "significant disturbance of thought," resulting in grossly impaired judgment. (Tr. 8-9.) Dr. Bates opined that appellant represented a danger to himself because he wаs "completely unable to take care of his basic needs at this time on his own." (Tr. 9.) In addition, Dr. Bates felt appellant needed in-patient stabilization in a psychiatric facility because he was not cooperаtive with treatment. (Tr. 9.) Dr. Bates provided the following summary of the factual basis for his opinions:
It's somewhat confusing, but [appellant] apparently was in a shelter in Dayton at which time he was bothered by a cough, apparently hе was coughing, and he felt that his cough was somehow intentional and that it was affecting his emotions and his sternum, in particular, and as a result of that, he was having breathing difficulties.
He traveled from * * * Dayton to Las Vegas to Florida and baсk to Columbus, and somehow the cough kept following; it was harassing him.
His mother took him here to, I think, Grant Medical Center. They felt that he was having paranoid delusions, and he was pink-slipped to NetCare on the 20th of this month and transferred here on the 21st, where he remains grossly psychotic.
(Tr. 10.) After Dr. Bates testified, appellant introduced into evidence a few pieces of paper, some signed by appellant, with brief statements on them such as, "Perception," "I don't worry," "I'm innocent," and "High school diploma. Degree in culinary arts." (Tr. 19.) The magistrate orally found appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court- ordered hospitalization. Then the court proceеded to the hearing on the application for forced medication. (Tr. 20.) The court orally granted the application, finding appellant lacked the ability to give or withhold informed consent regarding his treatment, the *3 benefits of the proposed medication and treatment outweighed the risks of potential side effects, and no less intrusive treatment was available. (Tr. 37-38.) After the magistrate memorialized the oral findings in a written decision, appellant filed objections, which the trial court overruled. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and committed appellant to the Franklin County ADAMH Board, with placement at Twin Valley Behavioral Health Care, for a period of time not to exceed 90 days and granted the application for forced psychotropic medication.
Assignments of Error Appellant appeals and assigns two errors for our review:
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE DECEMBER 27, 2013 MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND DECISION FINDING THAT APPELLANT SUFFERS FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION. [II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE DECEMBER 27, 2013 MAGOSTRATE'S [sic] REPORT AND DECISION FINDING THAT APPELLANT SUFFERS FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS AND REQUIRES FORCED PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION.
Discussion Preliminarily, we note appellant acknowledges he was released tо family members
on January 24, 2014, so at first glance, this matter appears to be moot. Appellant's brief,
6. "Actions are moot when ' "they involve no actual genuine, live controversy, the decision
of which can definitely affect existing legal relations." ' "
In re K.W.
, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-
943,
{¶ 8} Under the first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court's finding that he suffered from a mental illness that required hospitalization was against the manifest weight of the evidence. "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence addressing all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed on appeal as against the manifest weight of the evidence." In re T.B. , 10th Dist. No. 11AP-99, 2011- Ohio-1339, ¶ 7 (" In re T.B. II "), citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. , 54 Ohiо St.2d 279 (1978). "R.C. Chapter 5122 sets forth specific procedures to be followed when a person is
committed to a mental hospital, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. When commitment
is against a person's will, it is particularly important that the stаtutory scheme be
followed, so that the patient's due-process rights receive adequate protection."
In re
Miller
at 101. "[T]he individual's right against involuntary confinement depriving him or
her of liberty must be balanced against the state's interеst in committing those who are
mentally ill and who pose a continuing risk to society or to themselves."
In re T.B.
, 10th
Dist No. 06AP-477,
part of this test must be established by clear and convincing evidence."
In re T.B. I
at ¶ 7.
" The first two parts of the test are found in R.C. 5122.01(A)." Initially, "there must be a
substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory." Second, "the
substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory must grossly
impair judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or the ability to meet the
оrdinary demands of life."
Id.
at ¶ 7, citing
State v. Welch
,
court-order is one who, because of the person's mentаl illness: (1) "[r]epresents a
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substantial risk of physical harm to self as manifested by evidence of threats of, or
attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm"; (2) "[r]epresents a substantial
risk of physical harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other
violent behavior, evidence of recent threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent
behavior and serious physical harm, or other evidence of present dangerousness"; (3)
"[r]epresents a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical impairment or injury to
self as manifested by evidence" he or she "is unable to provide for and is not providing"
for his or her "basic physical needs because" of his or her "mental illness and that
appropriate provision for those needs cannot be made immediately available in the
community"; or (4) "[w]ould benefit from treatment in a hospital" fоr his or her "mental
illness and is in need of such treatment as manifested by evidence of behavior that creates
a grave and imminent risk to substantial rights of others or the person."
"The Supreme Court of Ohio established a totality of the circumstances test
to determine whether a person is subject to hospitalization under R.C. 5122.01(B)."
In re
T.B. II
at ¶ 13, citing
In re Burton
,
R.C. 5122.01(B)(3) and (4). Appellant argues those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Admittedly, Dr. Bates opined appellant represented a danger to *6 himself because appellant was "completely unable to take care of his basic needs at this time on his own." (Tr. 9.) However, the only basis Dr. Bates gave for this opinion was the fact that appellant evidently heard a persistent, non-existent cough. We see no readily apparent connection between this fact and a finding that appellant manifested he was unable to provide for and was not providing for his basic physical needs because of mеntal illness. Likewise, we see no readily apparent connection between appellant's belief about a cough and a finding that his behavior created a grave and imminent risk to substantial rights of others or himself. Additionally, thе documents appellant introduced into evidence, while unusual, do not support such findings. Therefore, the court's finding that appellant was subject to hospitalization was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court erred when it involuntarily committed appellant, and we sustain the first assignment of error. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the probate court
erred when it found he suffered from a mental illness and requirеd forced psychotropic medication. According to the Supreme Court of Ohio:
A court may issue an order permitting hospital employees to administer antipsychotic drugs against the wishes of an involuntarily committed mеntally ill person if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the patient does not have the capacity to give or withhold informed consent regarding his/her treatment; (2) it is in the patient's best interest to take the medicatiоn, i.e., the benefits of the medication outweigh the side effects; and (3) no less intrusive treatment will be as effective in treating the mental illness.
Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd. , 90 Ohio St.3d 176 (2000), paragraph six of the syllabus. The magistrate applied this standard in granting the application for forced
administration of psychotropic medication. However, appellant's brief fails to mention this standard or articulate a specific argument for the second assignment of error that is distinct from his argument on the first assignment of error. See App.R. 12(A)(2). Nonetheless, the Steele test implies that a legally proper involuntary commitment order is a prerequisite to an order for forced medication. We have already determined the trial *7 court erred in this casе when it involuntarily committed appellant. Therefore, the court also erred when it granted the application for forced administration of medication. Accordingly, we sustain the second assignment of error.
Conclusion Have sustained both assignments of error, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
KLATT and CONNOR, JJ., concur.