In re CRYSTAL J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Kern County Department of Human Services, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Kenneth J., Defendant;
Crystal J., Appellant.
Court of Appeal, Fifth District.
*647 Beth A. Melvin, South Lake Tahoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Susan M. Gill, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Certified for Partial Publication.[*]
OPINION
LEVY, J.
Appellant, Crystal J., appeals the juvenile court's denial of her motion to declare her aunt and uncle, Deborah and Orrie G., her de facto parents. In addition, she claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to place her with Deborah and Orrie. In the published portion of this opinion we find that appellant lacks standing to appeal the court's ruling on the de facto parent motion because she is not aggrieved. In the unpublished portion of this opinion we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
BACKGROUND
Crystal was removed from the home of Deborah and Orrie due to unsanitary living conditions. At the time of her detention, Crystal, who was 15 years old, had been living with her aunt and uncle for seven years. Crystal's father placed Crystal with Deborah and Orrie after Crystal's mother died. After Crystal's detention, a Welfare and Institutions Code,[1] section 300 petition was filed alleging that Crystal's father failed to protect Crystal by allowing her to live in an uninhabitable home. The *648 juvenile court sustained the petition and set the matter for a further hearing.
After the jurisdictional hearing, Crystal moved to have Deborah and Orrie declared her de facto parents. The motion was based upon the fact that Crystal had been living with her aunt and uncle for seven years, and that they had cared for all of her needs during that time. Relying on In re Kieshia E. (1993)
At the dispositional hearing, Crystal argued that the juvenile court should place her with her aunt and uncle. The juvenile court found that placement with Deborah and Orrie would be inappropriate and ordered her placed in foster care. The court provided that Deborah and Orrie could have two hours of supervised visitation with Crystal each week.
DISCUSSION
I. Crystal lacks standing to challenge the denial of the de facto parent motion.
Crystal appeals the denial of her motion to declare Deborah and Orrie her de facto parents. Having requested briefing on the issue of standing, we conclude Crystal is not aggrieved by the ruling and lacks standing to challenge denial of the motion on appeal.
Section 395 provides that a "judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment. . . . ." The California Rules of Court provide that in a proceeding "under section 300, the petitioner, child, and the parent or guardian each has the right to appeal from any judgment, order, or decree specified in section 395." (California Rules of Court, rule 1435(b).) Appellant argues that these provisions give her standing to appeal the denial of her de facto parent motion. We disagree.
While a child normally has standing to appeal a juvenile dependency judgment, case law has established that an appellant must demonstrate error affecting his or her own interests in order to have standing to appeal. (In re Devin M. (1997)
A de facto parent is one who "on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his psychological need for affection and care." (In re B.G. (1974)
It is clear that an individual seeking de facto parent status has standing to appeal the denial of his or her motion. (In re Joel H. (1993)
Appellant attempts to distinguish her case from Vanessa Z. and Daniel D. by arguing that she, unlike a parent, has an interest in the denial of a de facto parent motion. Noting that a de facto parent has a substantial interest in the "`"companionship, care, custody, and management"'" of the child (In re Kieshia E., supra,
In In re Kieshia E., supra, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that de facto parents have a substantial interest in maintaining the relationship they have forged with the child. (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 76-77,
A grant of de facto parent status gives a person the right to be present at the dependency hearing, to be represented by counsel, and to present evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1412(e); In re Patricia L. (1992)
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that de facto parent status provides the de facto parent only the right to be present, to be represented and to present evidence in a dependency proceeding. While courts have described the relationship as substantial, and one deserving of protection, this discussion relates to the reason why a de facto parent is accorded standing to appear in the proceeding. The rights afforded to a de facto parent affect only such persons, not any other party. Appellant, as a party to the dependency proceeding, is already afforded the right to be present, to be represented, and to present evidence. (§§ 349, 358, subd. (b); California Rules of Court, rule 1455(b).) The fact that Deborah and Orrie were denied de facto parent status in no way precluded appellant from presenting evidence regarding her relationship with them, or arguing that she should be placed with them. Indeed, appellant informed the court of her relationship with her aunt and uncle, called her aunt and uncle as witnesses to testify, elicited information regarding their relationship with her, and argued that she should be placed in their care. As the denial of the motion in no way affected appellant's rights, she lacks standing to appeal the ruling.
Appellant goes on to argue that she should have standing to appeal the denial of the de facto parent motion because the motion was brought on her behalf. Relying on In re Elizabeth M. (1997)
In Elizabeth M., the court held that a mother had standing to challenge the denial of her section 388 petition, noting that the mother was statutorily empowered to bring such a motion and explaining that she had an interest in promoting the best interest of her child. (In re Elizabeth M., supra,
*651 II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's placement with her aunt and uncle.[**]
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's dispositional orders are affirmed.
ARDAIZ, P.J. and BUCKLEY, J., concur.
NOTES
Notes
[*] Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.
[**] Baxter, J., did not participate and Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
[1] All further references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
[**] See footnote *, ante.