In re Cripps
TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.
{1} Appellant Joseph Cripps appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for a certificate of qualification for employment (“CQE“). This Court reverses and remands the matter for a new hearing.
I.
{2} On May 28, 2021, a petition for a CQE for Mr. Cripps was filed in the trial court. The petition indicated that Mr. Cripps had two convictions from 2013 which disqualified him from employment or licensing in an occupation. Notices were issued pursuant to
{4} Mr. Cripps has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF BOTH LAW AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS IN DENYING PETITIONER-APPELLANT‘S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION DENYING HIS PETITION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF QUALIFICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT (CQE).
{5} Mr. Cripps argues in his assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his petition. Mr. Cripps argues that the trial court applied an incorrect version of the statute and that it made erroneous findings concerning the statutory elements.
{6} Mr. Cripps’ petition was filed in May 2021 and the hearing on his petition took place in September 2021, accordingly we will examine the version of the statute in effect during that timeframe.
{7} Here, the trial court first determined that Mr. Cripps, “[a]t [the] hearing and his written petition,” “failed to designate a collateral sanction that he suffered as a result of his conviction.” Then, the trial court examined the factors in
{8} We agree with Mr. Cripps that the trial court utilized an incorrect version of the statute in evaluating Mr. Cripps’ petition. This is evidenced by the language used in the trial court‘s entry.
{9} First, the trial court stated that, “[a]t [the] hearing and in his written petition, [Mr.] Cripps has failed to designate a collateral sanction that he has suffered as a result of his conviction.” It is true that
{10} While the definition of collateral sanction has not changed over the statute‘s history, the requirements of what must be included in the petition have. From the language used in the trial court‘s entry, it appears the trial court believed that Mr. Cripps had to identify in his petition a collateral sanction. However, the version of the statute in effect at the time of Mr. Cripps’ petition did not include that requirement. See former
{11} Later in the entry, the trial court examined the factors in
{12} The version of
[e]xcept as provided in division (C)(5) of this section and subject to division (C)(7) of this section, a court that receives an individual‘s petition for a certificate of qualification for employment under division (B)(2) of this section or that is forwarded a petition for such a certificate under division (B)(5)(a) of this section may issue a certificate of qualification for employment, at the court‘s discretion, if the court finds that the individual has established all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) Granting the petition will materially assist the individual in obtaining employment or occupational licensing.
(b) The individual has a substantial need for the relief requested in order to live a law-abiding life.
(c) Granting the petition would not pose an unreasonable risk to the safety of the public or any individual.
{13} The version of
Subject to division (C)(6) of this section, an individual is rebuttably presumed to be eligible for a certificate of qualification for employment if the court that receives the individual‘s petition under division (B)(2) of this section or that is forwarded a petition under division (B)(5)(a) of this section finds all of the following:
(a) The application was filed after the expiration of the applicable waiting period prescribed in division (B)(4) of this section;
(b) If the offense that resulted in the collateral sanction from which the individual seeks relief is a felony, at least three years have elapsed since the date of release of the individual from any period of incarceration in a state or local correctional facility that was imposed for that offense and all periods of supervision imposed after release from the period of incarceration or, if the individual was not incarcerated for that offense, at least three years have elapsed since the date of the individual‘s final release from all other sanctions imposed for that offense;
(c) If the offense that resulted in the collateral sanction from which the individual seeks relief is a misdemeanor, at least one year has elapsed since the date of release of the individual from any period of incarceration in a local correctional facility that was imposed for that offense and all periods of supervision imposed after release from the period of incarceration or, if the individual was not incarcerated for that offense, at least one year has elapsed since the date of the final release of the individual from all sanctions imposed for that offense including any period of supervision.
{14} If the application meets the requirements of
{15} The trial court‘s entry states in relevant part that, “[s]ubject to division (C)(5) of this section, a court that receives an individual‘s petition for a certificate of qualification for employment under division (B)(2) of this section or that is forwarded a petition for such a
{16} Thus, we cannot agree with the State that there is no evidence that the trial court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the matter. From the trial court‘s own words, it is clear that the trial court reviewed the matter under an inapplicable version of the statute. The trial court did not have discretion to disregard the appropriate statutory framework in reviewing the petition. See In re R.L.B., 2018-Ohio-3660, at ¶ 8. Moreover, “[a]s this Court is a reviewing Court, [] it is more appropriate for the trial court to apply the appropriate standard in the first instance.” Greer v. Finest Auto Wholesale, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29358, 2020-Ohio-3951, ¶ 41.
{17} Mr. Cripps’ assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{18} Mr. Cripps’ assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a new hearing so that it may consider the criteria set forth in the appropriate version of the statute.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
CARR, J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
APPEARANCES:
DARREN L. MEADE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.