31 F. Supp. 979 | D. Maryland | 1940
The present question arises under Chapter XI of the Chandler Bankruptcy Act o'f 1938, and relates particularly to the matter of appointment of a creditors’ committee provided for in section 338 of Chapter XI, 11 U.S.C.A. § 738.
When the debtor’s petition for an arrangement with its creditors was filed in this case, it was approved as to form and referred to the referee as specifically authorized by section 331, 11 U.S.C.A. § 731. Shortly thereafter the Securities & Exchange Commission filed a petition for intervention and a motion to dismiss the proceeding, on the ground that the nature of the case was such ■ that the proceeding should have been brought only under Chapter X, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq. The motions were denied. See In re Credit Service, Inc., D.C., 30 F.Supp. 878. A like conclusion in a similar case had been reached by the Second Circuit, In re United States. Realty & Improvement Co., 108 F.2d 794. In the latter case a petition for certiorari is, I understand, now pending in the Supreme Court.
The referee promptly proceeded with the administration of the case and held a first meeting of creditors on November 6, 1939, and an adjourned meeting on December 19 and 20, 1939, at which latter time the creditors elected a committee. The creditors present in person or by attorney nominated several different committees and on the ensuing vote it was found that no one of the several committees had received a majority of votes cast by creditors holding a majority of claims both in amount and in number. The votes of a number of creditors (voting by proxy) had been challenged on the ground that the votes had béen obtained in substance by and for the interests of persons closely connected with the management of the corporation; and after taking testimony on this point the referee concluded as a fact that the votes should be rejected on that ground. As a result the committee of which Mr. Alexander Randall is chairman was declared by the referee to have received a majority in number and amount of creditors properly voting. The Randall Committee received the votes of 267 creditors holding principal value of claims in the amount of $613,200. The disallowed votes that had been cast for the Foley Committee represented 340 creditors with claims aggregating $542,900. A small number of claims (4) representing in amount $22,000 was voted for another committee. Two creditors holding $6,500 of claims voted in opposition to the appointment of any committee. Creditors voting for the Foley Committee whose votes were rejected by the referee because obtained for the management of the corporation, have apparently acquiesced in the proceeding as they have not petitioned for review. The only petitioner for review is Samuel Weinrott, a Philadelphia lawyer, who held a power of attorney from a Philadelphia client holding claim in the amount of $5,000. The principal points presented by his petition to review the referee’s proceedings are that the referee should not have permitted any voting for the several committees before first taking vote of all creditors as to whether they wished a committee appointed; and a further ground of error assigned is the rejection by the referee of votes for the Foley Committee. It is to be noted, however, that the referee did not disallow vote on the claim of Mr. Weinrott who alone petitions for review. In connection with the petition for review the referee has filed a certificate reciting in detail the whole of the proceedings and the substance of the testimony before him in the matter and has also filed separately a memorandum of law in support of - his
In the first place, it is not very clear that the sole petitioner has a sufficient standing with respect to the proceedings questioned to justify a reversal of the referee’s orders; nor does it appear that the petitioner has sustained any substantial damage by the order. His vote was not rejected and even if it had been it would not have affected the result. Apparently he opposed the appointment of any creditors’ committee. It is apparent, however, the overwhelming majority of disinterested votes, both in number and amount, were in favor of the appointment of a creditors’ committee. And it does not appear that the petitioner will be prejudiced by the existence or activities of the committee except possibly in that the expenses of the committee as they may hereafter be approved by the court, may in some small degree diminish the interests of a creditor in the estate. This does not seem at the present time at least to be a very substantial question in view of the nature of the case as a whole.
But assuming that the petitioner has a sufficient standing to question the referee’s order, I am satisfied that it should not be reversed. The whole matter, both of law and facts, is so fully and clearly stated in the referee’s certificate and memorandum that it is quite unnecessary to. review his discussion in any detail. There seem to have been so far no reported cases dealing with the appointment of a creditors’ committee under Chapter XI. The statute itself in section 338, 11 U.S.C.A. § 738, provides in substance that the creditors may appoint a committee (if none has already been appointed under section 44 of the ordinary Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 72). The authority and activities of such a creditors’ committee when appointed seem not to have been expressly outlined in Chapter XI except insofar as reference is made to sections 44, sub. a and sub. b. Subsection (a) provides that the general creditors of a corporate bankrupt, exclusive of its stockholders or members, and of its officers and members of its managing or controlling bodies shall appoint one or three trustees; and subdivision (b) provides that creditors who are qualified to appoint trustees may also appoint a committee of not less than three creditors who may consult and advise with the trustees regarding the administration of the estate and make recommendations to the trustee with regard to his duties and submit to the court questions regarding the administration of the estate. Section 337 of Chapter XI, 11 U. S.C.A. § 737, incidentally provides that administration expenses incurred by the committee and its agents or attorneys are to be provided for in the “arrangement” proposed by the debtor corporation in “such amount as the court may allow”.
I think it reasonably clear from these related provisions of the bankruptcy statute that the creditors’ committee under Chapter XI is to be elected in the same way and to have the same status ás a creditors’ committee in ordinary bankruptcy.
The only substantial question at the present time is whether the referee was justified in rejecting the votes cast for the Foley Committee. It is clear enough from the recital of facts made by the referee that these votes had been obtained substantially in the interest of the management of the corporation. The situation, therefore, was for all practical purposes similar to that which has frequently arisen in ordinary bankruptcy where the bankrupt endeavors to control the election of a trustee at a creditors’ meeting. The decided cases referred to by the referee in this connection amply support his conclusion that votes obtained in this way by or for the interests of the bankrupt should be properly rejected. See particularly In re Wink, 206 F. 348, D.C.Md., decided by Judge Rose when district judge; Beale v. Snead, 4 Cir., 81 F.2d 970; In re Bloomberg, D. C., 48 F.2d 635, by Judge Sanborn, district judge; Merchants’ National Bank v. Continental B. & L. Ass’n, 9 Cir., 232 F. 828; In re Hale Desk Co., 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 1. The Randall Committee declared elected by the referee appears to be an entirely disinterested committee, the members of which were nominated and elected by creditors apparently having no former relation whatever to the management of the corporation as stockholders, directors, officers or otherwise. Their activities to date as stated by their counsel at the hearing on this petition for review, have apparently been in the best interests of the creditors
These circumstances seem to point very clearly to the conclusion that the present: petitioner has sustained and will sustain no substantial prejudice by the continued: activity of the Randall Committee. It is. true that it is incurring and will have to incur in the completion of its work possibly some. substantial expenses but this will clearly be in the interests of the creditors.. The debtor has so far been continued in the-management of the business without the appointment of a trustee or a receiver;, and the court has so far had no request from any of the parties in interest to make such an appointment. It appears, however, that the amount of moneys now currently handled by the debtor itself is comparatively small in amount and adequately-covered by a $10,000 bond which it has-been required to give; and it is said that the more considerable sums of money handled by branch managers of loan offices is protected by fiduciary bonds. If at. any time hereafter before the conclusion, of the case, circumstances arise -which induce any of the parties in interest to apply for the appointment of a receiver, that, application will, of course, be duly considered by the referee or a judge of this court.. I am also informed that arrangement has-been made whereby disbursements can be-:
The order of the referee is hereby affirmed.