F. A. Hihn Cоmpany, a corporation, and a creditor of said insolvent corporation, apрeals from the order of sale of the property of said insolvent debtor.
The first objection оn the part of the appellant is that the petition of the assignee for the sale is not sufficiеnt; that it does not allege that the property of the insolvent has been assigned to the petitiоner; that it does not show a necessity for the sale of the property; and that the description of the property is insufficient.
The petition states that the petitioner is the duly appointed, qualified, and acting assignee of the estate of the insolvent corporation; that as §ueh assignee he has taken possession of all the estate described in the petition, schedule, and invеntory of said insolvent; that in order to pay the debts of said insolvent it is necessary to sell all of its estate vested in the petitioner
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as such assignee; that all of the personal property belоnging to said estate, except a debt of five dollars due to said insolvent debtor from Peter G. Brown, is set out in full in the schedule and inventory attached to his petition on file in this court in said matter, and a full desсription of the real property of the insolvent asked to be sold is set out in the petition. It was not. necessary to describe the -personal property in detail. It "Was sufficient to refer to the schedule and inventory on file. 'By the adjudication in insolvency the property of the insolvent passed from the insolvent, and comes under the control of the court.
(Rued v. Cooper,
Appellant also objects to the order of sale for the reason that the property was ordered to be sold together, and not separаtely, and that the order directed what paper the notice of sale should *573 be published in, and for ten days only. The only requirement of the insolvent law in reference to public sales is that such sales shall be made “as ordered by the court.” The special directions referred to by appеllant are in the cas'e of private sales and the sale of perishable property. (See Insolvent Law, secs. 25, 29, 30.) There is nothing in the contention of the appellant that the judge purpоrting to make the order was without jurisdiction in the premises. It appears that the order of sale wаs made and signed by George H. Bahrs, one of the judges of the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, at the time sitting in the place of Lucas F. Smith, judge of the superior court of Santa Cruz county, in which county the proceedings were pending. It is said by appellant that this court must take notice that there is but one judge of the superior court of Santa Cruz county, and that Judge Bahrs is not judge of said court. But. this court must also take notice that “a judge of any superior court may hold a supеrior court in any county, at the request of the judge of the superior court thereof, and upon thе request of the governor it shall be his duty so to do.” (Const., art. VI, sec. 8.) Nothing appearing to the contrary, the court must also presume that this provision of the fundamental law was complied with, and that Judge Bahrs was legally holding court in Santa Cruz county at the time the order was made.
Order affirmed.
Garoutte, J., and Harrison, J., concurred.