{¶ 2} In a March 20, 2006 journal entry, the court stated that the case had been settled аnd dismissed with prejudice, and the court expressly retained jurisdiction over post-judgment motions:
{¶ 3} "Court notified that this case is SDWP at Defendant's costs. Final. This Court retains jurisdiction over all Post Judgment Motions. Court costs assessed to the Defendant(s). * * *." *5
{¶ 4} On March 27, 2006, Marshall filed а motion to strike the ex parte notification of dismissal by defendants (Grande Pointe Health Community, et al.). In addition, she filed a motion for relief from judgment and a request for a status conference. The request for status conference was made bеcause, according to Marshall, the case had not settled, and Tyus and Marshall were unaware of the defendants' communication to the court that the matter had been dismissed. The motion to strike was denied.
{¶ 5} Also, on March 27, 2006, D C filed a motion to dеclare and enforce its charging lien for attorney's fees. D C asserted that it had a contingency fee contract with Tyus; the case had settled for $150,000; it had done 95 percent of the work; and it was entitled to 95 percent of the fee, plus expenses.3
{¶ 6} On April 28, 2006, the court issued the following order:
{¶ 7} "Pursuant to discussions with all counsel, the court has transmitted the check tendered to the court, as settlement in this matter, in the amount of $150,000 to * * * Ms. Joy Marshall. The court orders that Ms. Marshall may distribute no more than $85,000 * * * to the Plaintiff at this time; the remaining funds [$65,000] must be maintained in the proper accounts pending the court's ruling on the outstanding dispute regarding the lien on attorney's fees filed by plaintiff's prior counsel." *6
{¶ 8} On June 22, 2006, D C withdrew its motion to declare and enforce the charging lien. On June 26, it filed a motion to intervene to аssert the charging lien and renewed its motion to declare and enforce the charging lien. The motion to intervene was granted on June 26, 2006. Marshall filed a motion to withdraw as Tyus's counsel, which was granted on August 15, 2006. Tyus did not contest the motion to declare аnd enforce the charging lien and retained Cassandra Collier-Williams as her new counsel.
{¶ 9} The remaining $65,000 of settlement funds was divided by the trial court with an award to D C of $47,500 for attorney's fees and $2,943 for costs incurred; $4,557 was to be paid to Marshall for her servicеs; and Tyus was to receive $10,000. Tyus had no objections to this allocation.
{¶ 10} Marshall was ordered to transmit the money to attorney Collier-Williams by August 18, 2006. On August 21, 2006, the court was informed that Marshall had not obeyed the order. Marshall was then ordered to appear on August 23, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. for a show cause hearing. She called to inform the court that she was running late in returning from Columbus, Ohio, and that she would be there as soon as possible. Consequently, she did not appear on time.
{¶ 11} At the hearing, Tyus informed the court that Marshall hаd transmitted the entire $150,000 to her, despite the court's orders to give Tyus no more than $85,000 until the fee dispute had been settled. Tyus stated that upon receiving the money, she had paid Marshall $50,000 for attorney's fees in June or July 2006. *7
{¶ 12} A bench warrant was issued for Marshall for her failure to appear. When she finally appeared in court, she was remanded to custody and then later released on bond.
{¶ 13} On September 21, 2006, Marshall's show cause hearing was held. She did not produce the funds, but informed the court that she had transmitted the money to Tyus. According to her IOLTA records, she had given Tyus two checks: one for $85,000 and one for $65,000. Nothing in her records accounted for the check Tyus tendered to her. D C contended that it had received neither the $2,943.07 in expenses nor the $47,500 in аttorney's fees. Marshall was remanded to jail for contempt. She is currently out on bond.
{¶ 14} Marshall brings this appeal asserting seven assignments of error for our review; however, the dismissal of Appeal No. 88763, renders assignments of error II, III, IV, VI, and VII moot.
{¶ 15} "I. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction after it dismissed the case."
{¶ 16} Appellant argues that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction after it dismissed the case. This argument lacks merit. The trial court did have jurisdiction. The court's March 20, 2006 order exprеssly retained jurisdiction over post-judgment motions.
{¶ 17} In Tyus v. Grande Pointe Health Community, Cuyahoga App. No. 88077,
{¶ 18} "In State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath (1991),
{¶ 19} In light of that ruling, it is clear that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the motion to declare and enforce a charging lien and to issue contempt charges. Because the trial court had jurisdiction over post-judgment motions, appellant's argument is without merit.
{¶ 20} Appellant also argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over her because she was not a party to the action. We do not agree. Appellant was the counsel of record, and the court has personal jurisdiction over her for purposes of enforcing its orders. SeeIn re Kinross (1992),
{¶ 21} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. *9
{¶ 22} "V. The trial court's contempt orders are invalid and void, and are against the manifest weight of the evidence."
{¶ 23} Appellant argues that the court's order of contempt was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The standard in reviewing a trial court's findings in a civil contempt proceeding is abuse of discretion. "A trial court possesses broad discretion in contempt proceedings."Pavlik v. Barium Chemicals, Inc., Jefferson Appellate No. 02-JE-33,
{¶ 24} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained as follows:
{¶ 25} `"An abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in opinion. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of will, of a determinatiоn, made between competing considerations. In order to have an "abuse" in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, nоt the exercise of judgment but the defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.'" Id. at 845-846, quoting Huffman v. Hair Surgeons, Inc. (1985),
{¶ 26} Appellant was held in contempt under R.C.
{¶ 27} The court did not abuse its discretion when it issued its order of civil contempt. Appellant was ordered to transmit funds to the plaintiff so that appellee *11 D C could receive its attorney's fees. D C has not received any fees because appellant disobeyed the court's orders on several occasions. According to Tyus, appellant sent her a seсond check in June or July 2006. In return, Tyus sent appellant an estimated $50,000 attorney fee check.
{¶ 28} Appellant repeatedly argues that she did not violate court orders because she disbursed the funds between the time that D C withdrew its motion to declare and enforce the charging lien and rеfiled that motion along with a motion to intervene. This argument fails. Appellant knew there was still an outstanding dispute regarding fees and that the court's order prohibited her from transmitting funds until the court ruled on the dispute. The court had yet to rule on the dispute, regardless of D C's motion to withdrawal, so even if appellant had issued a check to Tyus between the time D C withdrew its motion and then refiled the motion, appellant was not following the court's order to keep the funds until the fee dispute was ruled upon by the court. Therefоre, it was clearly within the court's discretion to find her in contempt.
{¶ 29} Finally, appellant contends that she cannot comply with the court's orders because she has already disbursed the money to Tyus. In the final show cause hearing, although appellant testified that Tyus did not pay her any attorney's fees, Tyus informed the court that she had paid appellant approximately $50,000 in fees. At that hearing, appellant refused to answer several questions; therefore, the trial court found her in cоntempt and remanded her to custody. *12
{¶ 30} As we discussed above, the trial court correctly held appellant in contempt; therefore we affirm the contempt finding. However, we find that there are disputes remaining regarding which parties are still оwed money and whether appellant is retaining funds that do not belong to her.
{¶ 31} The September 21, 2006 journal entry orders appellant to transmit to Collier-Williams a check for $60,443, "which represents $10,000 in additional settlement proceeds to plaintiff Tyus and $50,443 in аtty fess (sic) to the firm of Dickson and Campbell * * *." We find that this amount may exceed the amount that appellant has in her possession. Appellant and Tyus agree that appellant sent Tyus a second check for $65,000; however, Tyus also claims she sеnt a check for $50,000 back to appellant for attorney's fees. From these numbers, it appears that appellant could have $50,000, at most, in her possession. Finally, D C alleges that it has not received any funds in payment of attorney's fees. It is clear that disputes remain regarding what amount, if any, remains with appellant and what amount is still owed to D C.
{¶ 32} In view of these disputes, we reverse and remand for a hearing to determine which parties are owed money and what amount, if any, appellant is retaining in funds that do not belong to her. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share thе costs herein taxed. *13
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR
"II. The trial court erred in granting a post-judgment motion for attorney fees where attorney fees were not included within a count in the complaint."
"III. Thе trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fee distribution where the funds were properly distributed after the order expired."
"IV. The trial court erred in suggesting to intervenor and then granting the post-judgment motion to intervene."
"VI. The triаl court violated Joy Marshall's due process rights."
"VII. The trial court erred in determining that intervenors had a valid charging lien."