In re Consolidated Mortgage Satisfaction Cases
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} This case involves motions for class certification in 12 cases brought by appellants-mortgagors
{¶ 2} Ostensibly to deal with the high volume of separate claims on its docket invoking
{¶ 3} Appellees, which are the mortgagees,
{¶ 4} We are asked to determine whether the certification of the classes by the trial court was proper based on the law and facts before it. In particular, we are called upon to discern whether appellants met the predominance requirement for certifying a class, found in
{¶ 5} At the outset, we are mindful that a trial judge is given broad discretion when deciding whether to certify a class action. Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc. (1987),
{¶ 6} Seven prerequisites must be met before a court may certify a case as a class action pursuant to
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} While
{¶ 9} Appellees contend, and the court of appeals found, that class certification is inappropriate because to determine liability under
{¶ 10} Respectfully, we reject the conclusion of the court of appeals. Clearly, the claims brought by each plaintiff invoke a common question of law: whether a particular lender violated its duty to record a satisfaction of mortgage. In resolving this common question, the trial court of course will be presented with different evidence relating to each lender’s failure to record a satisfaction of a residential mortgage. While appellees assert that sifting through these facts in a class action suit will be arduous, we are not compelled to agree. The mere existence of different facts associated with the various members of a proposed class is not by itself a bar to certification of that class. If it were, then a great majority of motions for class certification would be denied.
{¶ 11} In answering the common legal question, the trial court will need to gather evidence relating to each mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. For example, evidence will need to be presented concerning each appellant’s date of indebtedness and date of mortgage satisfaction. As noted by appellants, it is possible that the facts surrounding each claim can be systematically obtained in a single adjudication through the use of bank records and databases. The facts to be presented are not so complicated that use of the class action tool would be unduly cumbersome. Instead, the nature of this evidence demonstrates that there is factual commonality among class members.
{¶ 12} We find that the trial court is in the best position to consider the feasibility of gathering and analyzing class-wide evidence. Since the trial court’s ruling did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness, we find that it acted within its discretion in resolving that there are common questions of fact among class
{¶ 13} We next must consider whether a class action is the superior method to be utilized in achieving a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. When evaluating “the utility and propriety of employing the class action device,” Schmidt,
{¶ 14} With respect to the first factor, appellants assert that, as opposed to bringing each suit individually, they have an interest in grouping their actions due to the very nature of the remedy sought. Since appellants each seek only $250 under
{¶ 15} As to the second and third factors listed above, it is apparent that in the forum of Hamilton County there are many claims concerning violations of
{¶ 16} As to the fourth factor, we are certain that there will be some difficulties incurred in the management of these class actions. However, we are convinced that the trial court gave adequate thought to the problems that might arise and determined that any risk was overpowered by the circumstances supporting class action certification. Thus, our review of the relevant factors
{¶ 17} In a situation such as the one at bar, the class action is the preferable method for dealing with evidence of a party’s recurring malfeasance because the ability to avoid duplication of a court’s time, effort, and resources is an important and relevant consideration. We liken the case at hand to our previous decision in Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (1998),
{¶ 18} The rationale applied in Cope applies with equal force here. Individual plaintiffs in this case have been grouped with other plaintiffs to present suits against the same lenders. These lenders presumably have utilized standardized procedures for recording satisfactions of residential mortgages, procedures that are allegedly faulty. While of course we take no stand on the merits of the allegations by appellants, Cope is instructive on the issue of class certification.
{¶ 19} We conclude that the predominance requirement of
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. Appellants named in this case are June McDonald, Edmond Weeden, Algie Weeden, John E. Nolan, Brenda Parehman, Jordan Godbold, David Fluker, Patricia Schultz, Thomas P. Tressler III, Anna Hutchinson, Jeffrey Bley, Octavia Gray, Clarissa Boyd, Peter Kabengele, Blanche Kabengele, Christopher W. Godley, Steven Breckheimer, Deborah Breckheimer, Edward Busch, Cora Busch, Mary R. Scott, Ronald Kellerman, Carolyn Kellerman, Gregory Badger, and Thomas Theim.
. Appellees named in this case are Star Bank, Nationsbanc Mortgage Corporation, Huntington National Bank, Beneficial Ohio, Inc. (a.k.a. Beneficial Mortgage Co. of Ohio), Fleet Mortgage Corporation, First Union Home Equity Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, Associates Financial Services Corporation, Capstead, Inc., Provident Bank, Union Savings Bank, and Guardian Savings Bank.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 21} Because I believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominated over questions affecting only individual members, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 22} In a class action seeking damages, the court must find that common questions of law or fact predominate over questions that are particular to members of the class. Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank (1998),
{¶ 23} “ ‘[A] claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (1998),
{¶ 24} In the case at bar, there are evidentiary issues that require individualized proof for each plaintiff, including identification of each mortgagee (complicated by assignments and reassignments), determination of each mortgage’s payoff date, determination of whether each mortgage was satisfied or could be satisfied if it was an open-ended mortgage, determination of the transmittal dates of each
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 20} Like Justice Lundberg Stratton, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs had met the predominance requirement for certifying a class as required by