140 N.Y.S. 630 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
The application for the order was made on notice to the Board of Regents, subscribed by the attorney for the petitioner,
It appears that on the 14th day of September, 1889, the petitioner was duly licensed to practice medicine in the county of New York, and his license was duly registered on that day in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, as required by law. On the 8th day of April, 1904, he was duly convicted of the crime of attempted abortion, which is a felony, in the Court of General Sessions for the County of New York, and' sentenced to not less than one year and not more than two years in the State prison. The record of conviction shows that he had been theretofore convicted in the Court of Special Sessions of “keeping lying-in hospital without a license.” After serving sixteen and one-half months at Sing Sing, he was paroled, and on July 5, 1906, finally discharged.
At the time the petitioner was last convicted section 140 of the Public Health Law (Laws of 1893, chap. 661) provided, among other things, that no person should practice medicine “who has ever been convicted of a felony by any court, or whose authority to practice, is suspended or revoked by the regents on recommendation of a State board. ” It was provided by section 6 of chapter 647 of the Laws of 1887, which was in force when the petitioner was licensed to practice, that the conviction of a felony by any court of competent jurisdiction revoked the license of a physician and surgeon, but this was repealed when the Public Health Law was enacted. (Laws of 1893, chap. 661, § 209; renum. § 219 by Laws of 1900, chap. 667, § 2.) The Public Health Law, in so far as it relates to and regulates the practice of medicine, as it existed at the time of the last conviction of the petitioner, was repealed by .section 16 of chapter 844 of the Laws of 1907, which took effect on the thirteenth day of May of that year, and in so far as it affects this appeal it is sufficient to say that the provisions of the Public Health Law were re-enacted with certain changes and additions. The new provisions conferred
Prior to the 3d day of December, 1908, the Medical Society of the County of New York, a domestic membership corporation, applied to the Board of Begents of the University of the State of New York for the revocation of the license of the petitioner to practice medicine, and for the annulment of the registration of his license, on a petition duly verified based upon the indictment, conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the crime of an attempt to commit an abortion; and the petition was filed with the executive officer of the Board of Begents and a copy thereof was filed in the office of the secretary of the State Board of Medical Examiners. On the 3d day of December, 1908, the petitioner was duly served with notice of the time and place a committee, duly appointed by the State Board, of Medical Examiners, would hear the charges and with a copy of the charges, and on the return day he appeared by counsel and interposed no defense or objection to the granting-of the prayer of the petition. Thereafter, at a final meeting of the committee, held on the 10th day of March, 1909, a resolution was -unanimously adopted recommending to the Begents that the application of the Medical Society of the County of New York for the revocation of the petitioner’s license and for the annulment of the registration thereof be granted, and on the first day of April thereafter the Board of Begents, acting on said recommendation, revoked the license and registration and caused the fact to be certified to the clerk of the county of New York on the twelfth day of April by the First Assistant Commissioner of Education of the Department of Education of the State of New York, and it was received and filed by the
On the 31st day of March, 1911, the Governor duly issued a pardon to the petitioner, and a certified copy of the pardon was filed with the Board of Regents on the 23d day of June, 1911, but the Board took no action thereon.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the pardon had the effect of restoring to his client the right to practice medicine; but he concedes that the effect of the pardon is not presented for adjudication by this application, and manifestly the court is not required on this appeal either to construe the pardon or to declare its effect.
The petitioner, so far as the record shows, has made no attempt to obtain the relief which he asks on this application either by certiorari or mandamus, or by a suit in equity. Without expressing any opinion with) respect to the regularity or validity of the action taken under the statute with a view to revoking the license of the petitioner to practice medicine and annulling the registration thereof or as to whether he had or has any remedy by which his right to practice medicine may be authoritatively determined before he attempts to practice and thus subjects himself to prosecution,—we are of opinion that the court was without jurisdiction on mere petition or motion to grant the relief for which the application was made.
The Supreme Court has no authority upon a summary application over the county clerk, excepting in so far as he acts under the Constitution and law as clerk of the court, and manifestly in filing the certificate of annulment and marking the registration of the license as required by the statute, he was not acting as clerk of the court. The Constitution (Art. 6, § 19) provides that the “clerks of the several counties shall be clerks of the Supreme Court, with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law.” The provisions of the statute, to which reference has been made, requiring the county clerk to file the certificate and mark, the registration, were enacted pursuant to authority conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution, to impose duties upon the county clerk other than those required of him as clerk of the Supreme Court. The
For the reasons stated, the court acquired no jurisdiction by such application to grant the relief, and the order should, therefore, be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the application dismissed, without costs.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Clarice and Scott, JJ., concurred.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and application dismissed, without costs.