OPINION
The State of Texas filed a petition to commit Darius Briggs as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.150 (West 2010). A jury found that Briggs suffers from a behavioral abnormality that “predisposes” him to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The trial court rendered a final judgment and an order of civil commitment. In two issues, Briggs contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) overruling his objection to the sole jury question in the trial court’s jury charge; and (2) excluding certain testimony during trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The Jury Charge
In issue one, Briggs contends that the trial court abused its discretion by submitting a jury question that did not track section 841.003(a)(2) of the SVP statute. Briggs argues that this alleged error resulted in an improper judgment.
In this case, the trial court submitted the following question. to the jury: “Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that DARIUS DAMASCUS BRIGGS suffers from a behavioral abnormality that predisposes him to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence?” Although Briggs’s proposed jury charge contained an identical question, Briggs filed a written objection to use of the word “predisposes” and, at the charge conference, Briggs again objected to use of the word “predisposes.” Briggs argued that using the word “predisposes” in the jury question misstated the law, reduced the State’s burden of proof, and failed to track the applicable statutory language. Briggs reasserts these arguments on appeal.
Section 841.003(a) of the SVP statute defines a “sexually violent predator” as a person who: “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added). Section 841.002(2) defines a “behavioral abnormality” as a “congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
Briggs contends that the jury must determine whether he suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The State contends that the words “likely” and “predisposes” are interchangeable and have been used interchangeably by this Court. 1
We need not determine whether the words “likely” and “predisposes” are synonymous and may be used interchangeably. The SVP statute expressly requires the judge or jury to “determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062(a) (West 2010). The Legislature has set forth various definitions to aid in this determination, including the definition of “behavioral abnormality” found in section 841.002(2) and the definition of “sexually violent predator” found in section 841.003(a).
Id.
§§ 841.002-.003. Reading sections 841.002(2) and 841.003(a)(2) in conjunction, a person, to be found an SVP, must suffer from a behavioral abnormality that predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense, such that he becomes a menace to the health and safety of another, and that behavioral abnormality makes him likely to
We must, therefore, determine whether Briggs suffered harm as a result of the form of the jury question. We will not reverse unless the error: “(1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals.” Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a). “Charge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.”
Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley,
Briggs contends that the erroneous jury question caused harm by lowering the State’s burden of proof and asking the jury to answer the wrong question. The State contends that “[c]onsidering the weight of the evidence ... it [cannot] be concluded that this possible error in the charge probably contributed to an incorrect verdict.”
At trial, the State bore the burden of proving that Briggs is a sexually violent predator. A “sexually violent predator” is a person who is a repeat sexually violent offender and suffers from a behavioral abnormality. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a). The trial court granted a directed verdict on the issue of whether Briggs is a repeat sexually violent offender, leaving the jury to determine whether Briggs has a behavioral abnormality, i.e., a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting Briggs’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense, such that he becomes a menace to the health and safety of another, and that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Id. §§ 841.002(2); 841.003(a)(2).
Dr. Jack Randall Price, a psychologist, testified that Briggs is at a high risk of reoffending, does not understand the risk he poses to society, is sexually deviant, is a psychopath, “is a person with little to no control over his emotions and behavior[,]” and demonstrates an “ingrained” pattern of behavior. Dr. Michael Arambula, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that Briggs’s denial of his prior offenses indicates that his condition is still active, that denial by a sex offender means that the offender is “likely to repeat” the offense again, and that Briggs’s history “shows that he’s been sexually dangerous.” Arambula testified that Briggs’s mental condition and risk factors make Briggs sexually dangerous to society. On cross-examination, Arambula explained that a behavioral abnormality refers to a mental condition, coupled with risk factors, that makes a person “sexually dangerous” such that he poses a “significant risk to the community[.]” Both ex
During closing arguments, the State argued that Briggs is a predator. The State explained that it has the burden to prove that Briggs has a behavioral abnormality and argued that it proved this requirement through expert testimony. The State defined “behavioral abnormality” as a “congenital or acquired condition that by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense to the extent that the person becomes a ... threat to the health and safety of another person.” Briggs’s counsel told the jury that it must determine whether Briggs has a “behavioral abnormality, a congenital or acquired condition that affects his emotional or volitional capacity, which predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense to the extent that he becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person[.]” Counsel argued that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Briggs has a behavioral abnormality that affects his emotional or volitional capacity and predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense.
Our review of the entire record demonstrates that the evidence in this case was not so sharply conflicting as to warrant reversal because of the improper instruction.
See Crump,
Limitation of Testimony and Cross-Examination
In issue two, Briggs contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain testimony on the basis of collateral estoppel or collateral attack. Briggs contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony in two instances. He argues that exclusion of the testimony prevented him from presenting his case to the jury and challenging the data relied on by the State’s experts.
“We review a trial court’s evi-dentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld,
During cross-examination of Dr. Price, Briggs attempted to elicit testimony regarding whether the reports of his sexual offenses indicated an intent to commit sexual assault. The State objected on grounds of collateral estoppel. The trial court sustained the State’s objection. The record does not indicate that Briggs made an offer of proof to show the questions he would have asked Price, what Price’s answers would have been, and what he expected to prove by Price’s answers. He has not preserved error regarding the exclusion of Price’s testimony.
2
See Day,
During Briggs’s testimony, his counsel attempted to ask why Briggs pleaded guilty to his sexual offenses. The State objected on grounds of collateral es-toppel. The trial court excluded Briggs’s testimony. Briggs’s counsel subsequently made an offer of proof to show what Briggs’s testimony would have been. Briggs testified that he pleaded guilty for various reasons, such as the fact that he was offered an acceptable plea bargain or could not afford an attorney.
Collateral estoppel applies where “(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.”
Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell,
“A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.”
Browning v. Prostok,
At the civil commitment proceeding, Briggs sought to testify to the reasons why he pleaded guilty to prior sexual offenses. Briggs’s proffered testimony directly relates to his guilt,
ie.,
whether he pleaded guilty to the sexual offenses because he committed the offenses or whether he pleaded guilty for some other reason. Regardless of the reasons for his guilty pleas, Briggs’s guilt had already been determined in the prior criminal proceedings and could not be relitigated. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Briggs’s testimony on grounds of collateral estoppel or collateral attack.
See id.; see also Johnston,
Having overruled Briggs’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In SVP proceedings, trial courts have used the words "likely” and "predisposed” interchangeably.
See In re Commitment of Taylor,
No. 09-10-00231-CV,
. We also note that the trial court subsequently allowed Briggs to ask Price whether Briggs’s convictions contained an element of intent, to which Price answered, "Yes, there is an element of intent in these convictions.”