In Re Colonial Ford, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Mabey
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RALPH R. MABEY, Bankruptcy Judge.INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Bankruptcy Code contains several provisions which promote the private, cooperative, negotiated rebuilding of financially distressed debtors. One of these measures,
In January, 1977, Colonial Ford, Inc., the debtor, ceased operation as an automobile dealership. Since May, 1975, it has been embroiled in litigation with Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Credit Company, the United States Small Business Administration, and other creditors. This litigation embraces three lawsuits, one of which has journeyed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and back and resulted in a judgment for $2,897,125 in favor of Ford Credit and against Colonial. Execution on this judgment and liquidation of the former dealership site, which Colonial continues to hold and lease to others, was enjoined by the district court pending resolution of these cases.
In July, 1981, Colonial and its creditors settled their differences.
1
The agreement, in essence, accomplished two objectives. First, with the exception of a single cross-
Colonial was unable to sell or refinance the property and filed a petition under Chapter 11 on March 30,1982. Ford Credit filed a motion to abstain pursuant to
THE POLICY OF ENCOURAGING WORKOUTS
Second, workouts are economic. Economy, of course, is improved through expedition, as noted above. But the workout is economic because it avoids the superstructure of reorganization: trustees, committees, and their professional representatives. These and other costs of administration push junior interests “under water,” and because they must be paid at confirmation, diminish prospects for a plan. Moreover, bankruptcy may shipwreck relationships necessary to keep a business afloat. Customers are reluctant to deal with the manufacturer who may not survive to honor the warranty of his product or with the lessor who cannot guarantee the habitability of his premises. The cost of overcoming this reluctance, through marketing campaigns and the like, may be high. Sales will be difficult; prices may be low. Suppliers may dwindle. Costs of credit may increase. “[W]hen word of financial difficulty spreads, the debtor’s own debtors often decline to pay as they would have in the ordinary course, suddenly reporting that the dresses were the wrong size, were the wrong color, or were not ordered.” Coogan, Broude and Glatt, “Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills,” 30 Bus.Law. 1149, 1155 (1975). Likewise, “accounts receivable can deteriorate to an unbelievable extent as soon as word gets around that the debtor is headed for the cemetery.” Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 27, pt. 1, at 483 (1975). These circumstances, among others, handcuff a debtor doing business in Chapter 11.
Third, the workout is sensible. Workouts contemplate, indeed depend upon, participation from all parties in interest, good faith, conciliation, and candor. The alternative is litigation and its bedfellows — bluff, pettifoggery, and strife. Moreover, the parties who are “on-site,” and prepared by education or experience, are more able than a judge, ill-equipped in resources and training, to rescue a beleagured corporation. “The courtroom,” after all, “is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consultant.” In re Curlew Valley Associates, 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1981). The problems of insolvency, for the most part, are matters for extra-judicial resolution, calling for “business not legal judgment.” Id.
With these advantages in mind, the authors of the Code encouraged workouts in at least two ways.
Second, the Code, in several specific respects, contemplates that workouts will be a prelude to, yet consummated in, bankruptcy. Thus, for example,
SECTION 305(a)(1) AND THE POLICY OF ENCOURAGING WORKOUTS
Thus, the Code encourages workouts outside, or concluded inside, Chapter 11. Encouragement on both fronts is necessary because dissent from a workout may assume a variety of shapes. Creditors who would otherwise pursue their rights under state law are kept in tow because preferences may be undone following a petition in bankruptcy. Others may be bound, assuming a consensus in number and amount, through confirmation of a plan. What, however, of the maverick who threatens prematurely to disrupt out-of-court negotiations by an involuntary petition, or the party, creditor or debtor, who has “buyer’s remorse” and seeks a recapitulation of the
(a) The Court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if—
(1) The interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.
Congress realized, however, at some point in the study and revision of the Commission bill, that abuse could occur in connection with voluntary as well as involuntary petitions. Hence, it rewrote Section 4-208(a) and moved it to
Colonial questions the applicability of
The Applicability of
Whether the Interests of Creditors and the Debtor are Better Served by Dismissal
The Interests of Creditors
In this case, the interests of creditors are better served by dismissal. They agreed to a workout because it ended the litigation, and although they compromised their claims, the present value of the amounts to be realized at payout or foreclosure exceeded what they might have gained over time. This was not a workout where debt is rolled over with an eye to recovery, while recognizing the possibility of bankruptcy. Nor was it a workout where a deal was struck prepetition to be confirmed under the auspices of Chapter 11. Here the out-of-court composition was comprehensive, including virtually all creditors and the debtor. It was also final. A business which had lain dormant for years was not to be revived without the elimination of prior debt and the infusion of fresh capital. 15
The Interests of Colonial
Colonial argues that its interests are better served in Chapter 11; otherwise it would not have filed a petition. This argument, however, may be astigmatic for at least two reasons.
First, it ignores the question of who is the debtor for purposes of
Second, it overlooks the benefits which debtors in general may derive from out-of-court workouts and which Colonial in particular obtained in this settlement. The choice to settle out of court rather than to file for reorganization, more often than not, will be enlightened; Management eager for asylum in bankruptcy may pause if faced with displacement by a trustee. Shareholders likewise must reckon with the prospect of a creditor’s plan, wresting control of the business and eliminating their interest. Moreover, their equity, already thin or nonexistent, may not survive the burden of administrative debt. Debtors, as well as creditors, are familiar with the old saw that a “good” liquidation out of court is better than a “bad” reorganization in Chapter 11. Since the odds are stacked against obtaining confirmation of a plan, 18 and in light of the probability of conversion to Chapter 7, debtors may be well-advised, where their creditors are cooperative, to forego the dislocations and trauma, the depressed markets, the higher cost of money, and other disadvantages of bankruptcy, and work out an arrangement, even if it contemplates an eventual liquidation.
Colonial (or its shareholder, if she is the debtor) garnered these general benefits and two additional bonuses from its settlement. (1) Mrs. Belnap, by paying the SBA, may assume its right of redemption upon foreclosure of the property. This assumption, if exercised, is free and clear of any claim by Colonial or its creditors. This option, given the dictates of
These reasons motivated Colonial to make an agreement with its creditors which composed the debt and provided for sale, refinancing, or foreclosure of the property. The alternative of bankruptcy was available then, as now, and entered the calculus of decisionmaking, but was rejected in favor of the settlement. Colonial asserts, however, that reorganization better serves its interests at present. Attempting to divine the interests of Colonial, given this doublemindedness, is problematical. But even if full credit is given to its present protestations, these do not counterbalance the reasons for avoiding bankruptcy. Even assuming that the protestations and the reasons have equal weight, the policy of encouraging out-of-court workouts, embodied in
CONCLUSION
The Code encourages out-of-court workouts.
Notes
. Details of the claims asserted and positions taken in this litigation, while reviewed by the parties in their memoranda in order to show the “bad faith” of one another, is not repeated. The ruling of the court, given below, is based upon the purpose of
. These reductions, with other concessions, were substantial. Ford Credit, for example, held a judgment for $2,897,125. An injunction barring execution, however, had prevented collection from the fall of 1976 until the settlement in 1981. The settlement reduced the judgment to $1,250,000, provided a moratorium on interest for all but $50,000 of this amount, and postponed foreclosure another nine months. All but three creditors, by default or acquiescence, are dealt with in the settlement. One of these, Ken Rothey, is counsel to and an officer of Colonial. He holds an attorneys lien on the unsettled cross-claim. The others, LeGrande Belnap and Doris Belnap, shareholders of Colonial, have a claim for wages.
. Ford Credit also sought dismissal of the case for want of “good faith” under
The court is satisfied that it was appropriate to rule on the question of abstention without reconvening the hearing and receiving more evidence. The court assumed, for purposes of its ruling, that Colonial was in “good faith” and had a reasonable prospect for rehabilitation, and dismissal would not have been allowed for these reasons under either
.For a description and analysis of workouts, see generally, Billig, “What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for ‘Friendly Adjustment,’ ” 14 Cornell L.Q. 413 (1929); Coogan, Broude and Glatt, “Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills,” 30 Bus. Law. 1149, 1154-1160 (1975); Roberts and Lazarus, “When the Workout Doesn’t Work Out— An Outline,” 12 Real Prop.Prob.Tr.J. 437 (1977); Rome, “The Business Workout — A Primer for Participating Creditors,” 11 U.C.C. L.J. 183 (1978); Statement of Peter F. Coogan, Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 27, pt. 1, at 394-397 (1975); Statement of Patrick A. Murphy, id. at 436-438, 478-488.
. Other antidotes for delay are detailed in In re South Village, Inc., 25 F.Supp. 987 (D.Utah 1982).
. As stated by the sponsors of the Code: “One cannot overemphasize the advantages of speed and simplicity to both creditors and debtors. Chapter XI allows a debtor to negotiate a plan outside of court and, having reached a settlement with a majority in number and amount of each class of creditors, permits the debtor to bind all unsecured creditors to the terms of the arrangement. From the perspective of creditors, early confirmation of a plan of arrangement: first, generally reduces administrative expenses which have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors; second, permits creditors to receive prompt distribution on their claims with respect to which interest does not accrue after the filing date; and third, increases the ultimate recovery on creditor claims by minimizing the adverse effect on the business which often accompanies efforts to operate an enterprise under the protection of the Bankruptcy Act.” 124 Cong.Rec. HI 1,102 (daily ed., September 28, 1978).
. Section 4-208(a) provided: “Upon the filing of an involuntary petition under section 4-205(c)(1) or (2), unless the debtor consents to relief or defaults, the court shall as soon as possible, in accordance with the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, hold a hearing to determine whether the relief sought is in the best interests of the debtor and its creditors. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving that relief is in the best interests of the debtor and its creditors. If the court determines that it is not, the case shall be dismissed. The court may require that the petitioner file a bond in such amount as the court may determine to indemnify the person against whom the petition is filed for such costs, counsel fees, expenses, and damages as may be allowed.” Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 77 (1973).
. The notes to the Commission proposal ob- • served: “Subdivision (a) recognizes that involuntary relief has been facilitated under the proposed Act. This has been done to allow creditors to force timely proceedings and to encourage voluntary proceedings while there is still a possibility of rehabilitation or before all assets are dissipated. It is also hoped that litigation will be avoided and expenses thereby saved. On the other hand, the need for protection of a business debtor from the devastating impact of the mere filing of an involuntary petition is recognized. This section supplies safeguards that are not found in the present Act, except as indirectly provided, both to debtors that should and those that should not be in proceedings, by technical niceties and the expense of litigation. The judge is given broad discretion to dismiss a case after hearing. The case may be dismissed even though the requirements of § 4-205(c)(l) or (2) are met. This is necessary since a debtor may temporarily be unable to pay debts or one creditor might properly force a liquidation that would harm creditors. The judge can best deal with these difficult cases, given adequate discretion. It is anticipated that Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will treat the filing of the petition like the situation where there has been the issuance of a temporary restraining order and establish procedures similar to those found in
.The legislative history, by way of illustration, not prescription, points to an involuntary petition filed by a “few recalcitrant creditors.” “A principle of the common law requires a court with jurisdiction over a particular matter to take jurisdiction. This section recognizes that there are cases in which it would be appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction. Abstention under this section, however, is of jurisdiction over the entire case. Abstention from jurisdiction over a particular proceeding in a case is governed by proposed
. Published opinions by appellate courts which have been invited to review orders under
That courts have overlooked the bias for workouts and against litigation reflected in
Other measures, while not strictly analogous, are nevertheless instructive on the point of nonappealability, expedition, and economy. For example,
. Colonial also argues that abstention is inappropriate because its composition occurred in federal not state court. Some cases have suggested that
. The authorities which have addressed this point concur.
See, e.g.,
Kennedy, “The Commencement of a Case Under the New Bankruptcy Code,” 36 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 977, 1023 (1979) (“The authority of the court to abstain under
Approximately 35 published opinions have dealt with
.This paucity of guidelines has led to speculation over the scope of
. It could be argued that a court should be more cautious where an involuntary case is brought under
. Indeed, Ford Credit, in reliance upon the settlement, has made payments of $50,000 in attorneys fees to Colonial, and $85,000 in property taxes to its shareholder. Colonial has not offered to refund these monies or otherwise unscramble performance under the agreement.
. Where the court decides whether to excuse a custodian from turnover under
. The fragmentation of the interest of a debtor under
. Statistics are sparse. In this district, however, 261 petitions under Chapter 11 had been filed and were pending for over 6 months as of September 30, 1982. Of these, 43 or 16 percent had achieved confirmation. R. Wily, Estate Administrator’s Report of Chapter 11 Cases iii (United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, Third Quarter, 1982).
.Unless the class of unsecured claims consents, Colonial would have to pay unsecured claims in full or eliminate any option to Mrs. Belnap.
See,