On Application por Bail.
Pursuant to the provisions of Michigan’s one-man grand jury law, CL 1948, § 767.3 et seq., as amended (Stat Ann 1954 Rev and Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.943 et seq.), appellant (Colacasides) was granted immunity from subsequent prosecution for any offense concerning which his answers to certain questions may have tended to incriminate him — the questions being stated in the order granting immunity entered by the grand juror, Judge George B. Bowles of Wayne circuit. See CLS 1961, § 767.6 (Stat Ann 1954 Rеv § 28.946). Colacasides, nevertheless, refused to answer the questions, and he was then cited for contempt and a circuit judge other than the one who propounded the questions conduсted a hearing thereon. Colacasides was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to confinement for a period of six months or until the grand jury proceedings terminate or until he purges himself to the satisfaction of the grand juror or to the satisfaction of the sentencing judge. He filed his claim of appeal with this Court and an application for bond pending the appeal.
1.
We have first been asked to decide whether the contempt proceedings were civil or criminal. The purpose of the sentence being to enforce rather thаn to punish for disobedience of the grand juror’s order, we are satisfied that the contempt is civil.
“The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?
*302
Here the purpose was to obtain answers to the questions for the grand jury.”'
Shillitani
v.
United States
(1966),
In Shillitani, the United States Supreme Court held that the sentences before it “were clearly intended to operate in a prospective manner — to coerce, rather than punish. As such, they relate to civil contempt.” 1 So, too, on the facts in the case at bar.
■2.
Colacasides claims that the provisions of revised judicаture act, PA 1961, No 236, § 6080, stating that “any person arrested on civil process is entitled to bail during the time within which he may appeal the ■ proceeding on which the arrest was made, or until a final determination of his appeal has been made” (CLS 1961, § 600.6080 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev §27A.6080]), required the sentencing judge and require us to set bail during the pendency of his appeal.
■ The one-man grand jury law has its own provisiоns for punishing contempts (CLS 1961, § 767.5 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.945]), which vary both as to possible sentence and procedure from those set forth in. the revised judicature act. (CLS 1961, § 600.Í701 et seq. [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.1701 et seq.}).
“There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt. . (Citations omitted.) And it is essential that courts be able to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses. (Citation omitted.) A grand jury subpoena must command
*303
the same respect. (Citation omitted.). Where con-; tempt consists of a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings, the witness may be confined until compliance. (Citations omitted.) The conditional nature of the imprisonment — -based entirely upon the сontemnor’s continued defiance — justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the safeguards of indictment and jury (Citation omitted.), provided that the usual due process requirements are met.”
Shillitani
v.
United States
(1966),
We do not interpret EJA, § 6080, as so modify-ing the provisions concerning contempts arising, from refusals to answer questions during the course of a one-man grand jury proceeding (CLS 1961, § 767.5 [Stat Ann 1954 Eev §28.945]), or thе inherent and essential judicial power to enforce court orders through citations for contempt 2 as to oblige the sentencing judge or this Court to allow bail tó all civil contemnors without regard to the circumstances.
3.
In deciding whether to set bail on appeal, courts consider not only the likelihood of appearance, but also the possible harm to thе community.
Rehman
v.
California
(1964), bail denied
While it has not been suggested that Colacasides’ release will result in physical harm to anyone, his release would, in our opinion, pose a risk of harm to the community. The Bowles grаnd jury was authorized by the circuit judges of Wayne county on an application claiming there is evidence of irregulari *304 ties which requires investigation in such manner. Under the terms of the order of сommitment before us and because of the nature of the grand jury proceedings, the appellant must be released when the grand jury terminates. Shillitani v. United States, supra. The grand jury has a limited life. In the normal course appellant’s appeal might not be briefed, heard, and decided by this Court until a date after the grand jury ceases to function. To allow bail to appellant while he exhausts his aрpellate remedies would set a precedent that would seriously impede the inquiry. The public interest is, therefore, involved. We regard this as a valid consideration in a case such аs this. See United States v. Coplon (CA 6, 1964), 339 F2d 192, 194, where the court made the following observation:
“We conclude that appellant’s contention as to self-incrimination is so clearly without merit that his appeal cаn be for no other purpose than to delay the disposition of this matter beyond the termination of the current grand jury proceedings.”
4.
We have, therefore, given preliminary consideration to appellant’s contention that the immunity granted does not conform to constitutional requirements. As to the substantiality of the appeal, this is the only ground that was argued orally or in thе briefs. 3
We have given careful consideration to Colaeasides’ claim that the immunity granted him pursuant to the provisions of CLS 1961, § 767.6 (Stat *305 Arm 1954 Rev § 28.946) does not meet constitutional requirements.
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that:
“Immunity offered must be as broad as the constitutional protection for which it is sought to be substituted; and the test is whether the immunity becomes a complete substitution for the constitutional privilege.” In re Watson (1940),293 Mich 263 , 276.
Tested by that standard, the Supreme Court held that immunity granted pursuant to the Michigan statutory provision last mentioned satisfied constitutional requirements.
Colacasides’ counsel calls our attention to
Garrity
v.
State of New Jersey
(1967),
It does not appear that either Garrity or Spevack support Colacasides’ contention that he is entitled tо protection against the use of his testimony (should he testify under the cloak of the immunity granted to him) in a proceeding that might be instituted for, say, the revocation of his licenses to operate a restaurant and dispense alcoholic beverages. 4
*306 Nor are we advised why the immunity granted should not be interpreted as covering such use of his testimony, if constitutionally required in order tо compel his testimony.
In our opinion, Michigan’s procedures for grant-„ ing immunity should he interpreted so as to accomplish the purpose sought to he achieved when enacted, nаmely to grant snch immunity as is constitutionally required in order to compel testimony. 5
Without passing on the merits, we are not yet persuaded that so interpreted such procedures will be' found cоnstitutionally deficient. 6
Qur view of the substantiality of the ground of appeal argued on this motion disinclines us to allow hail.
*307 5.
If appellant desires that his appeal he heard promptly and thаt the time for filing briefs and the record be shortened, this Court will, upon receipt of the record (including transcript) and appellant’s brief, direct appellee to file its brief within the same time from the date of our order used by appellant and will set a date for hearing not later than 10 days after appellee’s brief is due. If appellant requires an order to obtain immеdiate transcription of- the testimony, an appropriate order will be entered upon defendant’s request.
Application for bail denied.
Notes
Compare
Penfield Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission
(1947),
Compare
Perin
v.
Peuler
(On rehearing, 1964),
“Allowance of bail pending appeal depends upon a dеtermination whether the appeal presents a substantial question.” [Douglas, Circuit Justice],
Yanish
v.
Barber
(1953),
If the immunity statute protects a witness to the extent of his constitutional immunity, he is obliged to testify — “he has, of eourse, when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim that it is
criminal
in nature.”
Ullmann
v.
United States
(1956),
*306
The court rejected contentions that the immunity granted there was inadequatе because it did not cover “disabilities imposed by Federal and State authorities and the public in general — such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, State registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general public opprobrium.” (
See Annotation: Adequacy of Immunity Offered as Condition of Denial of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. 53 ALR2d 1030.
See
Murphy
v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
(1964),
In' a case involving the construction of an immunity statute, the United States Supreme Court stated: “words may be strained 'in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt.’ ”
Ullmann
v.
United States, supra
(
Compare
Murphy
v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
(1964)