65 Conn. 17 | Conn. | 1894
There are two questions presented by this case : First, does § 91 of the General Statutes authorize a justice of the peace to issue a mittimus without a regular trial and judgment? The section is as follows:—
“ The grand jurors in each town, or any three of them, may meet to advise concerning offenses committed therein, and may call before them, at such meetings, any witnesses, to be examined touching the same ; and if any person shall refuse to appear before them at such meeting, being summoned by competent authority, they may apply to a justice of the peace for a capias, who may issue one to bring such person before them; and if any person appearing, or, being brought before them, shall refuse to be sworn, or, being sworn, shall refuse to answer any proper question, they may complain to any justice of the peace in the county where such meeting is had, who shall cause such person to be brought before him, and commit him to jail, there to remain, at his own expense, until he shall give evidence as required. ^ Said grand jurors, when so met, shall have all the powers of a justice of the peace, when holding court, to commit for contempt.”
The claim is, that the refusal to answer a proper question, asked in pursuance of this section, constitutes an offense;
The plaintiff suggests that the fact that in the Revision of 1821, and until the Revision of 1849, the statute read as follows : “ Such grand jurors may make complaint to any justice of the peace, who shall cause such person to be brought before him, and, on conviction, shall commit him to the common jail ” — proves that until 1849 a trial by the justice was necessary, and that the omission of the words “ on conviction ” in the Revision of 1849, did not alter the law. The words “ on conviction ” which were retained in the statute until 1849, will not bear the interpretation which the plaintiff gives them. These words were used in the original Act of 1750, and their meaning clearly appears by that Act. The Act provides that the grand jurors in each town shall meet once in three years, or oftener if necessary, “ to advise concerning such breaches of law as by their office they are to inquire after, and present, and shall have power to call before them * * * any persons as witnesses, in order to be examined touching such delinquency as they are inquiring after; and if any person refuse to appear * * * upon being summoned thereto by warrant from an assistant, or justice of the peace, (who are hereby directed to grant such war
In 1644 a grand jury was required to appear before every court yearly “ to make presentment of breeches of any laws or orders, or any other misdemeanors they know of in their jurisdiction.” 1 Colonial Records, 91. In 1668 at least one grand juror was required to appear from each plantation in the county. 2 Colonial Records, 98. In 1680 it was ordered that the grand jurors appointed by the County Courts should serve at least one year. 3 Colonial Records, 52. In 1681 the oath prescribed for grand jurors, who had now become a permanent inquest, was altered so as to include the obligation “with all due care and faithfulness to make diligent search ” for violations of law, as well as presentment of those within their knowledge. 3 Colonial Records, 95. In 1712 each town was required to appoint two or more grand jurors to serve as before, whose names should be returned to the clerk of the court, and a sufficient number of them be summoned as needed.
It will thus be seen, that the grand jurors of the towns were officers, annually appointed, and not only constituted the grand inquest of the county attending the superior courts for the purpose of presenting crimes, but were also charged with the duty at all times of making diligent search, with all due care and faithfulness, for the discovery of violations of law, and of presenting offenses discovered, to the judicial authority in each town, as well as at the sessions of the court.
The Act of 1750 practically authorized a local inquest to be held in each town as well as the grand inquest at the sessions of the court, and directed an assistant, who was a
The statute of 1750 has been modified in the process of time, both by changes in phraseology and in the duties of grand jurors and justices; but there has been no change in the purpose of the Act or in the authority for the summary commitment of a witness who refuses to testify. The omission of the words “ on conviction,” when the legislature enacted the Revision of 1849, was probably made because the words had lost much of their original significance, or were deemed unnecessary in the present form of the Act, or liable to misconstruction ; but, however that may be, it is clear that the alterations in the Act made in 1849 were intentional, and that the Act as altered does authorize a justice of the peace to issue a mittimus without a regular trial and judgment; and this operation of the Act has been unquestioned for nearly fifty years.
Second: Is the issue of a mittimus, in pursuance of § 91, in violation of any provision of the constitution ?
The plaintiff claims that his imprisonment under the mittimus was unconstitutional, because the statute authorized the mittimus to issue only upon conviction of a criminal offense, after trial; that the mittimus was in fact issued without such trial, and therefore he was imprisoned without due process of law.
This argument of the plaintiff would be conclusive if his construction of the statute were correct. His brief also claims that the statute is unconstitutional if his construction is not correct, and as the discharge of the plaintiff by the court
Section 91 does not create any criminal offense, nor does it relate to any judicial proceeding. The imprisonment imposed is not a penalty for any crime. It simply imposes a duty on the citizen, and seeks to enforce that duty when immediate obedience is essential by the temporary restraint of the person. The restraint of the person may be authorized by the legislature without the intervention of any court, in many cases where such restraint is necessary to the execution of the law and the enforcement of police regulations. The defendant in a civil action who refuses to turn out property for attachment may be committed to jail without trial. Selectmen may, without trial, take children from the custody of parents who neglect them, and bind them out to masters. General Statutes, § 2109. For certain infringements of the pauper laws they may, without trial, order an inhabitant of another State to be forcibly taken out of this State, and may expel from their town the inhabitant of another town; §§ 3292, 3293. A tax collector may, if necessary, commit to jail a citizen refusing to pay his taxes, there to remain until payment is made, or he be discharged in due course of law; § 3889. A collector who fails to collect and pay over the taxes may himself, without trial, be committed to jail, as on execution after judgment; § 3879. The moderator of any town meeting, or of any meeting of any society or other community, may order into custody any person who refuses to submit to his lawful authority, and have him forcibly‘removed until he shall conform to order ; § 52. The instance are numerous and familiar where officers are au- ■ thorized to restrain, without trial and even without process, ; persons who persist i n the open violation of law. This power 1 of summary compulsion to compliance with law may be committed to administrative as well as to judicial officers; and ¡when committed to judicial officers they act solely in an administrative capacity, unless the power is exercised in the ' course of judicial proceedings.
In this case the law imposed upon the plaintiff the duty of answering the proper questions put to him by the grand jurors. The legislature clearly has the right to enact such a law. His continued refusal to answer was an open and persistent defiance of the law when public interest demanded immediate obedience. The power of the legislature to authorize his restraint or imprisonment so long as he continues in such open defiance of law cannot be questioned.
It is true that the right to examine a witness and to compel him to testify, belongs to courts of justice, and is an essential part of a judicial proceeding; when he refuses to testify the judge may require him to answer or stand committed ; there is no trial of such witness, he is not committed as a punishment, but to enforce a particular duty; and no' evidence need in such case be taken. Wharton’s Criminal Pleading and Practice, § 967. And when this power of compulsion is exercised by a court of justice, it is natu
But it is also true that the power itself, while essential to judicial proceedings, is not distinctively a judicial power; it may be exercised by administrative as well as by judicial officers, and is in its essence, so far as it can be called distinctive of any department, distinctively an administrative power. The principle on which the power rests is, that when immediate enforcement of law is essential to its execution, the State cannot permit a citizen to obstruct, by his disobedience, such immediate execution of law, and lias the power to invest the officer charged with the administration of law, whether he be a judicial or administrative officer, with authority to compel, in such case of emergency, imrnediate obedience in the manner prescribed by law.
The real nature of the power to compel a citizen to answer a proper question, when a refusal to answer obstructs the necessary, immediate execution of law, has been obscured by the habit of calling every such refusal a contempt. It is a contempt, in the sense that every open defiance of law is a contempt of the authority of the State ; it is a contempt of court when done in the course of a judicial trial; but the summary enforcement of an answer is not an exercise by the court of its judicial power to punish contempt of court as a criminal offense, but of its administrative power to enforce a law, which if enforced at all must be enforced at once. In Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick., 476, Chief Justice Shaw, says: “ To give effect to this power it must be so applied'as to compel a specific performance of this duty. If it be said, that a witness may be indicted and punished, as for other breaches of duty, the answer is obvious, that besides the long delay and postponement of trials which this would occasion, the witnesses called to prove the case against the contumacious witness, might, in their turn, refuse to attend or to testify. Indeed, the necessity for the existence and exercise of this summary power to compel actual and prompt attendance of witnesses, and to require them to testify, is too plain to be seriously questioned.”
If any person is imprisoned under this statute, but not in strict pursuance of its provisions, he may be discharged upon habeas corpus. Upon such habeas corpus the court may be called upon to decide the following questions: the official character of the grand jurors and justice; the legality of the mittimus on its face; the propriety of the question asked; and if a case can be imagined where the mittimus has been issued after the witness has answered the question, that fact might be at issue. It is difficult to see, and unnecessary now to determine, what other questions could arise. A proper question is any question the witness may legally be compelled to answer; the pertinency of the question must be largely if not wholly left to the judgment of the grand jurors. They are authorized to investigate in secret session. The whole object of their investigation might be defeated by disclosing to a witness the purpose of a question. We do not, however, say that their authority may not be so abused in pursuing an unjustifiable investigation, that the witness will be entitled to protection. The fact that we have no knowledge of such abuse during an administration of the law for one hundred and fifty years, does not demonstrate that such abuse may not occur in the future. In Anderson’s Case, decided in chambers by the late Chief
i Judged by the analogies of past legislation, § 91 is a lawful ¡ exercise of legislative power, and in the case above cited we j held that compelling a witness by commitment to give proper information essential to the investigation of crime, was not \ an unwarranted exercise of judicial power by the executive | department, where such compulsion was enforced by a mag- ! istrate acting in a ministerial capacity. The strongest case ;icited by the plaintiff, apparently in conflict with the doctrine j of In re Clayton, is Whitcombs Case, 120 Mass., 118. In / that case the court held that a law authorizing a city council j to commit a witness for refusal to testify, was in violation of ^ the Constitution of Massachusetts. The decision is based l in part on the special phraseology of the Massachusetts Conj stitution, particularly of the clause granting power to the ’ legislature to establish municipal governments, in connection ' with the fact that at the time the Constitution was adopted : it was no part of the law of the land that municipal boards ; of officers should have power to punish for contempt. The expressions relied on in this case relative to the general relations of the several departments of government, must be ;read in connection with the particular facts and the particular constitution under discussion. The rule invoked by the plaintiff is not necessarily involved in the decision of Whit- ; combs Case. It is the broad rule, that a constitution establish- ■ ing separate departments for the exercise of the powers ¡ granted, and vesting the judicial power in one department, ■.necessarily forbids the legislature to authorize administrative .officers, in the exercise of legitimate executive power, to use ]any method found essential to the exercise of that power which ,js also a method in common and necessary use in judicial proceedings ; and that any act done in pursuance of such legislation is necessarily in violation of the constitutional guaranty, ihat “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, but by due course of law.” This guaranty of the Constitution relates primarily to the protection of the individual against
This view of the origin and meaning of the phrase “ due process of law,” is suggested in the opinion delivered by Justice Miller in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97. See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 133; Marchant v. Penn. R. R. Co., 153 U. S., 380. No general definition of the acts which, done under color of law, are without
If this view of the constitutional guaranty be correct, the ^imprisonment of the plaintiff was by “ due process of law.” If it be claimed that the examination by the grand jurors, and the commitment of the plaintiff to compel an answer to a proper question, was in the nature of a judicial proceeding, and that the law authorizing such a proceeding by adminis- ; trative officers is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution dividing the functions of government and vesting the ', judicial power in the courts, the sufficient answer is, that \ these great functions of government are not divided in any | such way that all acts of the nature of the functions of one I department can never be exercised by another department; t such a division is impracticable, and if carried out would re-j suit in the paralysis of government. Executive, legislative, | and judicial powers, of necessity overlap each other, and ‘ cover many acts which are in their nature common to more 5 than one department. These great functions of government ; are committed to the different magistracies in all their fuilj ness, and involve many incidental powers necessary to their !i execution, even though such incidental powers in their in- ¡ trinsic character belong more naturally to a different department. No act can be more clearly within the functions of
It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations of this essential: principle of constitutional law, that a statute authorizing / administrative officers to perform executive functions by ¡ methods which partake of the judicial nature, is not neces-j sarily in violation of the constitutional provisions dividing, the functions of government and vesting the judicial power i in courts. The real question in each case is. not merely \ whether the act is of a judicial nature, but whether the act j isTSgitimately incident and necessaryj;q.^ of: pówefsTóñfided to the executive and_legislatiy_e_departments, t añd'hfot ó'bnoxious to anv pro] >ibition._of _the Constitution. 1 This quesHbiT hasT been answered by the application of various tests. The one most frequently applied is the inquiry \
Another test not infrequently applied is the inquiry whether the act in question is a legitimate exercise of the police power necessarily inherent in government. The term “police power ” is often used as a term of convenience and not of clearly ascertained legal principle. It was found to be the most convenient phrase for designating the extent of State legislation, when such legitimate legislation covered the same ground included in the exclusive power of legislation given to Congress; notably in the wide field covered by the power to regulate inter-state and foreign commence. As used in this connection the term has acquired a more definite meaning through the many decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but such meaning relates rather to what it has been decided to cover, than to what it may in fact cover. As Justice Grier says in the License Cases, 5 Howard, 504 : “ Without attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of this power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the restriction or punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals, must come within this category.” But the term is much more indefinite when used to designate that exercise of executive power which involves and justifies, as a necessary incident, the performance of acts by administrative officers that may partake of a judicial nature; and the necessity for its use in this connection, except as a term of convenience, is much less obvious. The truth is, that all such tests are
> From whatever point of view we consider the imprison- : ment of the plaintiff, it was in “ due course of law.” The Í law authorizing it follows the analogies of our legislation ¡long prior to the adoption of the Constitution, has been in 'force for one hundred and fifty years, and clearly comes |within the most narrow definition of the police power inherent in the State government. It is also within the prinfciples of constitutional law controlling such legislation. The power to punish crime and to preserve the public peace and morals belongs to the State government in all its fullness, and is essential to its existence. Legislation authorizing investigation as to the existence of crime is a legitimate exercise of this power; the conduct of such investigation prior to the prosecution of a person for the commission of a particular crime is beyond doubt an executive function, and in the execution of such investigation the State has the plainest right to proper information within the knowledge of every citizen, and to compel the disclosure of such information by any method consistent with constitutional limitations. In an emergency demanding immediate action it has the right to compel, as Chief Justice Shaw says, “the specific performance of this duty,” obligatory on every person, and for that purpose to hold him in custody of the law. ^Such compulsion may be as essential to the efficient exerj cise of executive power as of judicial power, and its use by .administrative officers is no more an infringement of the exclusive powers vested in the judicial department because 'such compulsion is in ordinary use in judicial proceedings, than is the summary enforcement of a debt to the government because the payment of debts can ordinarily be enforced only by judicial process issued upon judgment of a court; or the destruction of a building to prevent the spread of a fire; or the taking of land to prevent the spread of disease,
We conclude, therefore, that § 91 is an exercise of legislative power for a purpose included in the powers vested in the State government, and is not in violation of any provision of our Constitution, or of the United States Constitution applicable to the limitation of State legislation.
As § 91 authorized the justice of the peace to issue the mittimus in this case without a formal trial and judgment, and was a lawful exercise of legislative power, we find nothing in the record to authorize the discharge of the plaintiff by the court below. By his return the sheriff justified under a mittimus, valid on its face, reciting every fact required by law in order to authorize the issue of the mittimus. The plaintiff’s reply does not contradict a single fact recited ; it does not make a single allegation of fact inconsistent with the validity of his commitment; it substantially admits the official character of the grand jurors and justice of the peace; that the plaintiff appeared before the grand jurors lawfully convened under the statute, and was duly sworn; that the questions recited were asked him; that he willfully and contemptuously refused to answer the questions; that the com
The reply, in addition to the statement that these matters do not appear by the return, makes the same claim of the necessity of a formal trial, by way of alleging that the plaintiff demurred to the complaint, claimed the right to plead not guilty to the complaint, and to answer to the allegations of the complaint, and to be confronted with the witnesses against him; that these claims were all denied* and that there was no such trial and judgment on the complaint. But the reply does not allege that the plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity of purging himself by answering the questions, or that he did not have full opportunity to make any statement or present any reasons he saw fit, why the mittimus should not issue, or that the justice did not have ample reason for making his finding as recited in the mittimus. On the contrary, the reply is a substantial admission of all these facts. The reply is simply a claim that the return
The court below should have adjudged the reply insufficient, and unless the plaintiff offered to prove facts showing illegality in the proceedings, should have forthwith remanded him to jail. The case as it appears before us, especially by the plaintiff’s own claims, indicates that he openly and willfully obstructed the execution of the law. So long as he persists in such obstruction his imprisonment is lawful and well deserved.
There is error in the judgment appealed from, and the case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, to be proceeded with to judgment in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.