OPINION OF THE COURT
Petitioner is the biological mother of a son, Christopher, born in 1983. On November 25, 1996, petitioner and her husband
On March 10, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for revocation of the judicial surrender based upon her claim of failure of the conditions of the surrendеr instrument that Christopher be adopted by the Dills and that petitioner and Christopher’s siblings be permitted ongoing contact with Christopher. The petition sought to revoke the judiсial surrender, to enjoin respondent from promoting or permitting the adoption of Christopher, to establish an early date for the review of Christopher’s foster care status, and to direct respondent to reinstate visitation with Christopher. Following a hearing, Family Court denied the petition except to the extent that petitioner was ultimately permitted to reestablish contact with Christopher. Petitioner appeals.
The definitive issue for our consideration is whether the provision of thе surrender instrument that Christopher be adopted
Social Services Law § 383-c (1) provides that: “[t]he guardiаnship of the person and the custody of a child in foster care under the age of eighteen years may be committed to an authorized agency by a written instrument which shall be known as a surrender.” Of greatest, relevance here, the statute also provides that: “the instrument shall be upon such terms and subject to such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto” (Social Services Law § 383-c [2]) and further that: “the child will be adopted without the parent’s consent and without further notice tо the parent, and will be adopted by any person that the agency chooses, unless the surrender paper contains the name of the person or pеrsons who will be adopting the child” (Social Services Law § 383-c [5] [b] [iii] [emphasis supplied]). Finally, Social Services Law § 383-c (6) (c) provides: “[i]n any case in which the authorized аgency determines that the persons specified in the surrender will not adopt the child, the agency promptly shall notify the parent thereof, unless such notice is еxpressly waived by a statement written by the parent and appended to or included in such instrument.”
As can be seen, the plain language of Social Services Law § 383-c (2) and (5) (b) (iii) mandates the conclusion that, in enacting Social Services Law § 383-c, the Legislature intended that biological parents be permitted to establish terms for аnd impose conditions upon the adoption of their children, including the right to select the proposed adoptive parent or parents, subject only to the advance approval of the court. Further, the statute makes express provision for the very circumstance presented here, i.e., “that the persons specified in the surrender will not adopt the child” (Social Services Law § 383-c [6] [c]) and requires that the biological parent be given notice in such event (Sociаl Services Law § 383-c [6] [c]). Nonetheless, respondent’s analysis would render the giving of such notice an empty act by providing the biological parent with no means of
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that statutes will not be construed in such a way as to render them ineffective (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 144, at 291-292). Thus:
“In the course of construing a statute the court must assume that every provision thereof was intended for some useful purpose, and that an enforceable result was intended by the statute. The courts will not impute to lawmakers a futilе and frivolous intent, and the intention is not lightly to be imputed to the Legislature of solemnly enacting a statute which is ineffective. Statutes are to be interpreted workably, аnd a statute must not be construed in such a way that would result in the Legislature having performed a useless or vain act.
“A construction which would render a statute ineffective must be avoided, and as between two constructions of an act, one of which renders it practically nugatory and the other enables the evident purposеs of the Legislature to be effectuated, the latter is preferred” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 144, at 291-292).
Obviously, for the Legislature to construct a statutory scheme that (1) gives biological parents the right to specify who will adopt their child, (2) limits their consent to the adoption accordingly, and (3) provides for notice to the biological parents if the adoption cannot be completed on those terms, but then deprives the biological parents of any recourse is senseless, and we decline to interpret Social Services Law § 383-c in such a fashion (see, Matter of Shannon F.,
The authority cited by respondent for a contrary result is not persuasive. Notably, cases dealing with a postadoption breaсh of an agreement that the biological parents be permitted ongoing contact with the child (see, e.g., Matter of Sabrina H.,
Respondent’s additional contentions have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Petеrs and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied petitioner’s application for revoсation of her judicial surrender; application granted and matter remitted to the Family Court of St. Lawrence County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Notes
Petitioner’s husband has taken no part in this appeal or the underlying proceedings in Family Court.