In Re Chisholm's Will
96 S.E. 1031
N.C.
1918
Check Treatment
Clark, C. J.

The only exception is for error in disallowing the $100, interest for the three and one-third months elapsing after the expiration of the ninety days. The $6,000 was paid six and one-third months after judgment signed, without prejudice to either side as to the liability for the said interest.

A consent judgment is a contract between the parties thereto. Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 214; Bunn v. Braswell, 139 N. C., 135. Tlie consent judgment specifies that the $6,000 should be a lien upon the land of the caveator which was pleaded as security for the indebtedness. The caveator not having paid at the specified date, we can find no reason that said sum should not bear interest during the delay to make payment after the stipulated date. Rev., 1954, in the chapter on “Interest,” provides : “All sums of money due by contract of any kind whatsoever, excepting money due on penal bonds, shall bear interest; and when a jury shall render a verdict therefor, they shall distinguish the principal from the sum allowed as interest; and the principal sum due on all such contracts shall bear interest from the time of rendering judgment thereon until it be paid and satisfied.” Said section further provides: “In like manner, the amount of any judgment, or decree, except the costs, rendered or adjudged in any kind of action, though not on contract, shall bear interest till paid, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered according to this section.”

The learned 'judge was probably misled by the punctuation of the heading, which reads: “Contracts, except penal bonds and judgments to bear; jury to distinguish principal from.” There should have, been a comma after the word “bonds,” as the text of the section plainly shows. *213 Tbe meaning of tbe headline is, evidently, “Contracts (except penal bonds) and judgments to bear” interest.

Tbougb tbe caption of a statute may be called in aid of construction, it cannot control tbe text when it is clear. Blue v. McDuffie, 44 N. C., 131; Hines v. R. R., 95 N. C., 434; Jones v. Ins. Co., 88 N. C., 500; S. v. Woolard, 119 N. C., 779. Especially is tbis true as to tbe headings of a section in tbe Code prepared by tbe compilers. Cram v. Cram, 116 N. C., 288.

If, as we understand tbe face of tbe consent judgment, tbe $6,000 was due at that date by reason of the arrangement and settlement as to'the estate then made, tbe reasonable construction is, that said sum would bear interest from tbe first day of tbe term, as is tbe rule with judgments, and that tbe ninety days delay did not arrest tbe running of interest, but was merely time given in which to raise tbe money. Tbis is tbe natural and legal effect of such order. Just as when there is a decree of foreclosure and ninety days given, there is no cessation of tbe interest, which continues to run. But in tbis case, by consent, tbe only question submitted to tbe Court is whether or not tbe caveator is liable for tbe $100 interest accruing on tbe $6,000 during tbe three and one-tbird months after tbe lapse of tbe ninety days. No demand is necessary as to contracts and judgments to set tbe interest running. Tbe statute does that.

Tbe propounders are entitled to recover said $100, with tbe interest thereon, and tbe costs.

Eeversed.