IN RE CHILD OF DANIELLE H.
Yor-24-355
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
February 26, 2026
2026 ME 19
Rеporter of Decisions. Argued: November 13, 2025. Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
[¶1] Danielle H. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Springvale, Moskowitz, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. During the pendency of the case, the mother was in and out of jail and several treatmеnt facilities for opioid use disorder. She asserts that the court misapprehended the nature of addiction and recovery when it found that she was unable to protect the child from jeopardy, unable to take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs, and failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate. See
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The child was born drug-affected in February 2023. The Department of Health and Human Services immediately petitioned for a child protection order and preliminary protection order, and the child has been in the Department‘s custody ever since. The mother agreed to an order finding jeopardy based on her chronic substance use disorder, including substance use during her pregnancy.
[¶3] The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother‘s parental rights on February 28, 2024, and a hearing was held on June 26 and 27, 2024. The GAL testified at the termination hearing, and the mother cross-examined her about her performance throughout thе case. The GAL testified that she had never met the mother in person or observed a visit between the mother and the child. She also testified that she had missed four out of nine family team
II. DISCUSSION
A. Parental Unfitness
[¶4] We review the trial court‘s findings of unfitness and best interest for clear error, and we uphold those findings if they are supported by any competent record evidence. In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019 ME 119, ¶ 5, 213 A.3d 108. “Proof of any one of the four statutory definitions of parental unfitness . . . is independently adequate to justify termination, if supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 6, 763 A.2d 1163.
[¶5] During most of the sixteen months between the child‘s birth and the termination hearing, the mother wаs participating in the Adult Treatment and Recovery Court.1 The recovery court program required that she participate in
[¶6] The mother аrgues that the trial court failed to account for the chronic nature of substance use disorder and showed “a tragic misapprehension about the nature of addiction and recovery, which may result in a relapse or a series of relapses, which are . . . an important part of the recovery process itself.” She argues that this misunderstanding undermines not only the finding that she failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate herself but also the finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.
[¶7] Wе acknowledge a possible inconsistency between Maine‘s statutory child protection framework and the current understanding of the
[¶8] In contrast, the minimum time required to complete the Adult Treatment and Recovery Court is thirteen months—and it is frequently much longer. See State of Maine Judicial Branch, Maine Treatment and Recovery Court Participant Handbook 15-19 (2022), available at https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treatment/trc-participant-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7X-9BGU]. This length of time is necessary partly because relapses, also known as symptom recurrences, are an expected part of recovery for many individuаls. See All Rise, Adult Treatment Court Best Practice Standards 7-8 (2025), available at https://allrise.org/wp-
[¶9] On the other hand, we have also said that “permanency is the central tenet of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act,” and the court views the timeframes from the perspective of the child and not the parent in determining whether to terminate parental rights. In re Child of Angela S., 2020 ME 60, ¶ 10, 232 A.3d 215 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court found, with support in the record, that the mother had a longstanding substance use disorder, she had an inconsistent history with multiple treatment programs, her future sobriety was uncertain, and her future plans were unclear. The court concluded that the mother was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a
B. Child‘s Best Interest
[¶10] We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court‘s conclusion concerning the best interest of the child. In re Child of Christian D., 2025 ME 16, ¶ 4, 331 A.3d 409. We view “the facts, and the weight to be given to them, through the trial court‘s lens.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] The mother argues that that the court was unable to make the best interest determination in the absence of a meaningful and reliable investigation and report from the GAL. GALs are required tо submit written reports, with recommendations, to the court reasonably in advance of each court hearing (except a summary preliminary hearing) and in any event at least every six months.
[¶12] GAL reports, if reliable, can be critical to a court‘s determination of the child‘s best interest. The GAL is a “disinterested party and an agent of the court” and “possesses competence and experience to make reasoned judgments about the reliability of information” because of the GAL‘s unique ability to review all relevant records and intеrview the child and involved persons. In re Chelsea C., 2005 ME 105, ¶ 14, 884 A.2d 97. Given the GAL‘s central role in child protection proceedings, it is the responsibility of everyone involved, including the court, to address any deficiencies in the GAL‘s performance.
[¶13] Here, the GAL did not interview the mother bеfore the termination hearing, did not observe any of the visits, did not visit the child as required, and failed to attend four out of nine family team meetings. The GAL filed only one
[¶14] As we have explained, the GAL‘s compliance with her statutory dutiеs “does not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in a parental rights termination hearing.” In re Aurora M., 2018 ME 4, ¶ 10, 177 A.3d 617. The mother cross-examined the GAL and highlighted the deficiencies in the GAL‘s performance through that cross-examination. See Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 A.3d 726 (“[O]ften the most effective challenge to the quality, completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem‘s work will be accomplished through cross-examination of the GAL at trial.“). It is up to the court to determine how much weight, if any, to give to the GAL‘s testimony and recommendations. See id.
[¶15] In this case, the court did not indicate that it relied on the GAL‘s recommendations or report in concluding that termination of the mother‘s parental rights was in the child‘s best interest. Instead, the court considered the relevant factоrs based on the other evidence it heard, including the child‘s age, need for permanency, and the mother‘s inability to parent, in reaching its
[¶16] Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly consider a permanency guardianship when deciding whether tеrmination was in the child‘s best interest. The court considered the child‘s need for permanency and specifically found that, because of that need, it was “unwilling to provide [the mother] with any additional time to attempt reunification.” See In re Child of Christian D., 2025 ME 16, ¶¶ 8-11, 331 A.3d 409 (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in ordering termination of parental rights instead of permanency guardianship when the trial court made specific, independent findings that termination was in the child‘s best interest). Although the court did not explain why it rejected a permanency guardianship, in the absence of a motion for further findings pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
Sarа A. Murphy, Esq. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellant Mother
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Springvale District Court docket number PC-2023-10
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLU