In re CARYL CHESSMAN, on Habeas Corpus.
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY, Respondent; CARYL CHESSMAN, Real Party in Interest.
Supreme Court of California. In Bank.
*3 Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles E. McClung, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant in Crim. No. 5591, and for Petitioner in S.F. No. 19158.
Caryl Chessman, in pro. per., and Rosalie Asher for Respondent on appeal in Crim. No. 5591 and for Real Party in Interest in S.F. No. 19158.
No appearance for respondent in S.F. No. 19158.
SCHAUER, J.
By a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on October 17, 1951, Caryl Chessman, an inmate of San Quentin State Prison whose appeal from 17 judgments of conviction was pending, sought relief from allegedly illegal conditions of imprisonment which assertedly interfered with his representation оf himself.[1] On December 18, 1951, this court affirmed the judgments, two of which imposed the death penalty. (People v. Chessman,
Appealability of the Habeas Corpus Order
The principal ground of Chessman's motion to dismiss the appeal is that the superior court order is not appealable. The People have asked that this court pass on the question whether they can appeal from an order on habeas corpus which directs that a petitioner be granted relief but which does not order his release from custody.
In accord with the view that "The right of appeal is derived from our constitution or statutes" (Gale v. Tuolumne County Water Co. (1914),
Although in the last cited cases the court would not allow an appeal by the People except where there was literal compliance with statutory requirements that there be "conviction" in a case prosecuted "by indictment or information," a liberal view as to the meaning of the word "discharging" in section 1506 was taken in In re Larabee (1933),
In 1951 sеction 1506 of the Penal Code was amended to provide that "An appeal may be taken ... by the people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in all criminal cases...." It is Chessman's position that the order here is not appealable because it is not one "discharging" him. The People argue that as the uses of habeas corpus have been extended by judicial decision to the granting to prisoners of rights short of effecting their release from illegаl custody, there should be a concomitant extension of appealability to orders effecting these new uses of the writ. [1] The function of the writ of habeas corpus is solely to effect "discharge" from unlawful restraint, though the illegality in respect to which the discharge from restraint *6 is sought may not go to the fact of continued detention but may be simply as to the circumstances under which the prisoner is held, as, for example, where he questions the propriety of his detention as an habitual criminal (In re McVickers (1946),
The People as Parties to the Appeal
[4] It is Chessman's position that the appeal should be dismissed because the People are not parties who can maintain such appeal. The People are not named as respondents in the petition for habeas corpus; the respondents there named are the warden, two assistant wardens, and the chief custody officer of San Quentin. However, authority for an appeal in the name of the People is found in section 1506 of the Penal Code which since its enactment has provided that an appeal may be taken "by the people" from certain orders on habeas corpus.
Availability of Certiorari to Review Superior Court Habeas Corpus Order
[5] In support of his motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari Chessman contends that such writ will not lie to *7 annul an order of the suрerior court on habeas corpus, no matter how erroneous it may be, if the superior court had "jurisdiction," citing Matter of Hughes (1911), supra,
The Merits of the Superior Court Order
The original petition for habeas corpus dated October 3, 1951, alleges in pertinent part that Chessman has appeared and desires to continue to appear in his own behalf in his then pending appeal, and that he anticipates unjustifiable punishment, "depriving him of the use of books, typewriter, etc., on the pretext that he has violated a prison rule by helping another man prepare a legal document." A supplement to the petition, dated October 7, 1951, alleges that the warden refused to have the original petition mailed to the superior court for filing; he returned it to Chessman with a notation that "I note that you аnticipate that you are to receive some sort of punishment. I do not believe that any of us can look into the future and determine what will happen. I also note that you do not tell the truth throughout the petition." A further supplement, dated October 10, 1951, alleges that Chessman "is now confined in a `hole' cell," denied the use of "clerical supplies or legal books," and "has only a few sheets of this paper and pen." The petition and the two supplements were filed on October 17, 1951.
The writ issued and pursuant to its command Chessman was produced before the superior court; respondent warden filed a return and moved that the matter be dismissed. Chessmen filed a traverse to the return in which he asked that the petition stand as partial traverse and averred that the prison authorities "continue to treat petitioner in such a way ... as to deprive petitioner of his legal right effectively to litigate his case through the courts."
Chessman, although under sentence of death, personally appeared at six hearings in the superior court between October *8 26, 1951, and March 7, 1952. The following facts were established: The delay in the filing of the original petition was due to the fact that the warden sent it to the attorney general with a request for advice as to whether he should mail it to the court for filing; the attorney general advised that the warden should permit its filing. On October 9, 1951, the prison disciplinary committee found that Chessman had violated a prison rule by aiding another inmate and punished him by a reprimand; also on October 9, 1951, Chessman created a loud disturbance and for this he was summarily punished by confinement in a "quiet cell," without typewriter, books, or his papers, from October 10 to 15, 1951. On October 16, 1951, the disciplinary committee found Chessman guilty of disorderly conduct and he was punished by confinement to his own cell for 10 days. On October 26, 1951, Chessman first appeared in the superior court in the habeas corpus matter, the facilities which had been given him in connection with his representation of himself had been restored to him, and he admitted that the question of the deprivation of such facilities "in the abstract ... is moot."
During the course of the hearings Chessman wrote to Mr. Garry, attorney of record for another prisoner, that he wished to see Mr. Garry; Mr. Garry called at the prison to talk with his client, then asked to see Chеssman; an assistant warden informed Mr. Garry that he could not see Chessman because he was not attorney of record for him. Mr. Garry sat with Chessman at the counsel table as "legal advisor" during one of the hearings on the habeas corpus matter.
The superior court ordered that the warden's motion to dismiss be denied and that Chessman "be remanded to the custody of the Warden ... with directions that the said Petitioner continue to be allowed the free exercise of the following legal and constitutional rights:
"(1) That the said Petitioner be allowed immediate access by mail to the сourts of this State and of the United States at all times;
"(2) That the said Petitioner be allowed to make all reasonably necessary legal research for, and to prepare and file with any such court, any document he deems necessary to the maintenance of protection of his civil rights or to the effective representation of himself on appeal from, or in collaterally attacking, any or all of those judgments of conviction under which the Respondent Warden derives his legal authority to hold the said Petitioner in custody.
*9 "(3) That the said Petitioner be allowed to retain his personal legal papers and books at all times during which he may reasonably make use of them for the purposes hereinabove set forth.
"(4) That while so representing himself on appeal or in collaterally attacking any or all of those said judgments of conviction, the said Petitioner should be allowed privately to consult with attorneys of his own choosing and to consult and communicate with other responsible persons, so long as the said Petitioner and those who confer with him at the prison or communicate with him upon legal mattеrs comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Prison respecting such activities."
[6] The writ of habeas corpus has been allowed to one lawfully in custody as a means of enforcing rights to which, in his confinement, he is entitled. It has been held that a prisoner is entitled to, and habeas corpus is available to enforce, "the right to file in any court a petition or other document which purports to seek some remedy or relief relating to the offense for which he was imprisoned" (In re Robinson (1952),
[7] The present order cannot be upheld as one enforcing such rights, for at the time of the hearings and the making of the order Chessman was not being deprived of those rights. The petition for habeas corpus had been filed and the delay preceding its filing was no longer a ground for complaint. Aside from the fact that the warden temporarily took the erroneous position that he could refuse to permit the filing of the petition for habeas corpus, no violation of any right to which a prisoner is entitled was made to appear. The temporary separation of Chessman from his papers was shown to have been an incident of punishment for his violation of a reasonable prison rule against the creation of loud disturbances. The refusal to permit him to see Mr. Garry was shown to have been based on the reasonable ground that Mr. Garry was not his attorney. [8] It is manifest from the *10 entire record of this habeas corpus proceeding that Chessman is claiming not rights but special privileges. As the court which tried him and this court have previously had occasion to point out, Chessman's decision to represent himself did not entitle him tо greater privileges than other prisoners. (See People v. Chessman (1951), supra,
[9] When it developed at the hearings that Chessman was not then being deprived of rights to which he as a prisoner was entitled, the superior court should have granted the People's motion to dismiss. Instead it made an order which purports to declare that Chessman "continue to be allowed" privileges which are not enforceable rights of prisoners. [10] For example, it would be manifestly impossible to allow prisoners "immediate access by mail to the courts ... at all times." [11] As indicated above, prisoners have the right to prompt and timely access to the mails for the purpose of transmitting to the courts statements of facts which attempt to show any ground for relief, but they have no legally enforceable rights to engage in legal research.[2] Since it has not been shown that Chessman was being deprived of any rights at the time of the making of the superior court order, and since that order purports to declare that he is to be allowed future privileges to which he is not entitled, the order cannot be upheld.
For the reasons above stated, the motions of Chessman are denied; the writ of review is discharged and the review proceeding is dismissed; the order on habeas corpus is reversed and the cause on habeas corpus is remanded to the superior court with directions that the writ be discharged, the petitioner be remanded to the custody of the warden, and the proceeding be dismissed. Let the remittiturs issue forthwith.
Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I see no occasion for reading words into section 1506 of the Penal Code which makes appealable only an order of the *11 superior court which discharges petitioner from custody. It has been held repeatedly that in only those situations expressly covеred by section 1506 was an order in habeas corpus proceedings appealable because the rule prior to its enactment had been that the state could not appeal. (In re Alpine,
Aside from the question of appealability I cannot agree with the majority opinion on the merits. While it is difficult to ascertain precisely what the holding is, the result is a complete reversal of the judgment. That reversal seems to be predicated upon the ground that because petitioner was given the facilities to which the order said he was entitled the question has become moot. In reaching that conclusion the majority ignores the fact that the evidence supports the order of the superior court in that the conduct of the prison authorities was such that it could at least be inferred that they would continue to withhold the facilities from petitioner unless a court ordered otherwise. It is similar to a case in which an injunction is sought, and there is a showing of threatened injury by defendant, but after the injunction is ordered he says he will be a "good boy." His belated repentance furnishes no basis for reversing the judgment granting the *12 injunction. The majority opinion purports to decide the question anew in spite of its being bound on appeal by the conclusion of the trial court on conflicting evidence.
The evidence shows that the prison authorities delayed for 14 days in permitting petitionеr to have access to the courts; that despite the advice of the attorney general petitioner was deprived of such access; that petitioner was deprived of his personal books and papers and prevented from working on his case; indeed, this is admitted by the warden and he insisted on his right to do so; that the warden refused to permit petitioner to consult with an attorney whom petitioner had requested to call at the prison and consult with him and the warden testified that if petitioner asked to see that attorney again, "I am not prepared to say whеther or not we would approve it." All of these things justified the superior court in concluding that there existed a real danger that the prison authorities would continue to deny the rights to which petitioner was entitled. It is of little significance that at the time of the hearing petitioner was not being deprived of his rights. That constituted nothing more than a conflict in the evidence on the question of what the warden's future conduct would be. Or it might be viewed as a confession that they had been wrong in their action and, in effect, a stipulation that the order made by the trial court should be made. Judicial protection of the rights of a prisoner would indeed be a mockery if the courts would always accept the pious protestations of the prison authorities that the rights would be accorded and then blithely disregard them the next day, leaving the prisoner to commence again his weary journey through the court process toward a chimerical goal. Such conditions are intolerable in a civilized society, yet this court now espouses them.
In mandamus proceedings it has been held that the writ is proper where the conduct of the officers indicates thеy do not intend to perform their duty. In Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Caminetti,
With reference to injunctions the rule has been stated to be: "However, the mere cessation by defendant of the alleged acts or conduct, before or after the beginning of a suit for injunction, has been held not a bar to the issuance of an injunction, and in a proper case, as where there is a reasonable ground to believe that there will be a resumption of such activities, a court of equity may issue an injunction." (43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 22(d); see also Boggs v. North American Bond etc. Co.,
The rights assured to petitioner by the order of the superior court are important and any impairment thereof must be carefully scrutinized. It is said in Ex parte Hull,
The majority states that prisoners have a right to prompt and timely access to the mails "for the purpose of transmitting to the courts" facts which show ground for relief but they "have no legally enforceable rights to engage in legal research." For that conclusion it cites the code sections to the effect that petitioner is civilly dead. What bearing that has on a prisoner's right to defend himself does not appear. If he may transmit "facts" to the courts in an attempt to obtain relief he should also be entitled to transmit legal propositions. To do either requires reasonable opportunity to prepare the facts and the law. If that requires legal research then a reasonable opportunity therefor should be given. The order of the trial court here did not go beyond the bounds of reason. Certainly it cannot be said its order is so unreasonable that it abused its discretion.
The majority decision here is another, in a long line of decisions by this court, in which this petitioner has been denied his constitutional rights. (See People v. Chessman,
I would affirm the order here under review.
The application of respondent on appeal in Crim. No. 5591 and Real Party in Interest in S.F. No. 19158 for a rehearing was denied March 3, 1955. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the оpinion that the application should be granted.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Petitioner continued to represent himself in these proceedings until November 8, 1954, when Mr. Berwyn Rice was appointed to represent him. On November 24, at Chessman's request, the appointment of Mr. Rice was terminated. At oral argument Miss Rosalie Asher appeared for Chessman.
[2] "A person sentenced to death is deemed civilly dead during the existence of the death sentence." (Pen. Code, § 2602.) Also, because Chessman is under sentence to life imprisonment he is deemed civilly dead (Pen. Code, § 2601) and because he is under sentence to imprisonment for terms less than life his civil rights are suspended (Pen. Code, § 2600).