249 F. 342 | 2d Cir. | 1918
(after stating the facts as above). This cause having been brought before us by petition to revise, our duties are limited to inquiring whether any error of law was committed below. There are but two points to be considered, viz. petitioner’s assertions (1) that it was error to admit in evidence the financial statement above referred to, and (2) that there was no evidence upon which the court could ground the order complained of.
Without expressing any opinion on the probative value of the testimony or affidavits of a man who even declined to recognize his signature to the schedules in bankruptcy (on the ground above stated), we find in the record evidence obtained upon examination under section 21a and largely from the sister bookkeeper, of the substantial correctness of said financial statement. At all events there was certainly some evidence, and its comparative value is not for us to decide. There was jurisdiction in the court to make the order. In re Schlesinger, 102 Fed. 117, 42 C. C. A. 207. The trustee lays a foundation when he shows by any competent evidence, including the claims or assertions of the bankrupts themselves, that they had unscheduled property a reasonable time before petition filed; the bankrupt must then account for said property, or otherwise rebut Jhe trustee’s prima facie case by credible testimony. In re Weinreb, 146 Fed. 243, 76 C. C. A. 609; In re D. Levy & Co., 142 Fed. 442, 73 C. C. A. 558; In re Graning, 229 Fed. 370, 143 C. C. A. 490, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1094.
It may be added that petitioners seem to think that this is a contempt proceeding, because in the same order which directed the payment of money to the trustee the bankrupts were called on to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt, if they did not make the required payment. Such, however, is not the case. There has been no punishment for contempt, and no order adjudging contempt. We have nothing before us but the legal propriety of the “turn-over” order.
Order-affirmed, with costs.