In re Chaquill R.
Respondent is the mother of six children (born in 1993, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2004 and 2006). In December 2006, the youngest child, then 10 months old, suffered second and third degree burns on his buttocks and thighs from scalding hot water in a bathtub. The child was flown to a burn center and then hospitalized for two weeks. Based upon that incident, petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to
As relevant here, an abused child is a child under the age of 18 whose parent “creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health” (
The record reveals that respondent asserted that the injury occurred accidentally as a result of a defective water heater in her new apartment, relying on testimony from investigators and a plumber‘s report indicating that the water from the bathtub faucet became excessively hot within a very short time. Respondent testified that she placed the child, who was crying due to illness, in the bathtub and then turned her attention briefly to another child who was outside the tub. She indicated that the child did not begin crying any harder when she placed him in the tub, and that she discovered the burns only after she took him out of the tub.
Neither that testimony nor the plumber‘s report, however, suggests that the bathtub faucet was incapable of mixing in cold water or that the water heater caused the injury. Indeed, a plumber‘s report submitted by petitioner indicated that while the control on the water heater was set at a hot cycle, the tank was functional, and the record indicates that one of respondent‘s children was able to take a shower immediately prior to the incident without being burned. Moreover, respondent conceded that when she placed the child in the tub and turned on the faucet, she did not attempt to mix in any cold water; rather, she turned the faucet “[j]ust towards the hot.” In addition,
Contrary to respondent‘s argument, there is no indication that Family Court placed undue reliance on a prior indicated report of child neglect involving one of respondent‘s other children. According deference to the court‘s credibility assessments, we conclude that a sound and substantial basis exists for Family Court‘s determination that respondent failed to rebut petitioner‘s prima facie case, and the finding of abuse herein is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Randy V., 13 AD3d 920, 921-922 [2004]; Matter of Benjamin L., 9 AD3d 153, 155-159 [2004]; Matter of Damen M., 309 AD2d 569, 569 [2003]; see also Matter of Tanajhia A., 283 AD2d at 709).
Finally, we reject respondent‘s argument that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a claim in this context, respondent must “demonstrate—on the record before us—both that she was deprived of meaningful representation and that counsel‘s deficiencies caused her to suffer actual prejudice” (Matter of Nicholas GG., 285 AD2d 678, 679 [2001]; see Matter of James P., 17 AD3d 733, 734 [2005]; Matter of Matthew C., 227 AD2d 679, 682-683 [1996]). Respondent asserts that her counsel erred in stipulating to the admission at the fact-finding hearing of certain hearsay testimony given during the
Respondent‘s remaining arguments, to the extent not addressed herein, have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Carpinello and Kavanagh, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.