*1 conclude that the trial was not clearly court finding ambiguous
erroneous in from doc- $203,-
uments that total due debt was
291.40.
Finally, Scarlett contends that the suit deficiency judgment “brought was not ninety days
within after the sale of the
mortgaged premises” as limited NDCC points
32-19-06. Scarlett fact that accepted
Brunsoman received and the offer purchase on June but that begin
Brunsoman did not his action for the 3, 1988,
deficiency until November more However,
than days later.
court the property found sale of
was when agreed
Brunsoman and Scarlett to the sale. then,
Until acceptance the offer and
contingent. Therefore, I would affirm the finding
trial court’s and conclusion that
Brunsoman’s action was not barred
limitation in sepa- NDCC 32-19-06 that a
rate deficiency action for a judgment must within days commenced the sale after property.
Because I would affirm the deficiency $56,825.56
judgment determined
jury, respectfully dissent. Ayers, Atty.
Elaine Asst. (argued), Gen. Atty. Office, Bismarck, General’s amicus. Mees, Bismarck, (no Dennis H.F. appear- ance), pro se. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
In the Matter of the Petition for appeals Dennis H.F. Mees from an order Change of Name of Dennis H.F. of the District Court for the South Central MEES, Appellant. Petitioner Judicial District which his denied Civ. No. 900309. for a of name. We reverse and remand with Supreme Court of North Dakota. instructions. July published intent to his name in the Bismarck July
Tribune. On Mees filed a Change accompanied of Name by an in Support Affidavit of the for Change of Name Affidavit of appears Publication.1 It that Mees has pertinent part of Mees's affidavit he reads as is the Petitioner In the Matter follows: the Petition For of Name of: Den- nis H.F. Mees. *2 173 complied procedural require- with all of the cretion afforded to the trial court is abso- statutory change. ments of a name See lute. In Dengler, we noted that the Su- 32-28-02, N.D.C.C.2 preme Dakota, interpret- Court of South in ing change of name statute similar to our request No was made for a own, change held that the denial of a of apparently none was held. The court made requires name that some substantial reason its determination based on the materials .10, exist to the by to it Mees. refusal the petition. petition (citing the district court denied the 246 N.W.2d at Ogle 764 change for of name these Court, with words: District, Circuit Tenth Judicial (S.D.1975)). 227 petition
“The for N.W.2d 621 is While we denied. approval rule, The of court is have declined to such a we are prevent just thing the kind of the convinced a of name cannot be arbi- petitioner accomplish.” seeks to trarily denied. previously We have the discussed 32-28-02, N.D.C.C., Section does
application
32-28-02, N.D.C.C.,
of section
require
evidentiary
not
hearing in con
Dengler,
exists
reasonable cause
proper
there exists
and reasonable cause
changing
clearly
the name’
vests the trial
changing
petitioner,
the name of the
great degree
judicial
court with a
of
dis-
thirty days’ previous
and that
notice of
cretion.”
application
the intended
given
has been
district,
newspaper printed
arbitrary, ically presented unconscionable. state the evidence E.g., Routledge Routledge, 377 N.W.2d disqualification. reasons for A (N.D.1985). generally, Peti See copy disqualification of such shall be Alexander, Pa.Super. tion applicant by sent to the certified mail.” (the (1978) A.2d 597 of a convict *3 light, requiring In this written de- initially denied but remanded for fur reason(s) lineating denying a findings concerning ther the detrimental is consistent with change might effect that the have on law legislation expanded rights which has civil public). enforcement records and the retained convicts. ap- Because determination of this Reversed and remanded with instruc- peal requires consideration of the order of tions. appeal. No costs are allowed on the district court and of the dis- trict we remand this case for defini- MESCHKE, and VANDE GIERKE findings, tive and a if the district JJ., WALLE, concur. necessary. court deems it LEVINE, Justice, concurring specially. today Our decision is consistent legislation affording with recent certain (N.D.1976), this Court held that 12.1-33-02, rights to convicts. Section denying court did not abuse its discretion in rights outlines those which are Dengler’s application to to his name retained convicts as follows: “1069.” We declined to the rule that “Rights person. retained convicted there should abe substantial reason to law, provided by Except as otherwise a justify grant change, a refusal to a name a convicted of crime does not because of name was to a num- corruption suffer death or civil of blood agree I excep- ber. do not with the Court’s rights of civil or or sustain loss forfei- point tion in Dengler but that is beside the property, ture of estate or but retains all us, because in the case before Mees is civil, rights, political, personal, of his seeking to his name to a number otherwise, including right to hold and so the rule of substantial reason vote; public employment; office or to to apply. should hold, receive, property; and transfer contracts; sued; enter into to sue and be Dengler, supra, we said private offices of trust to hold name-change that our statute is not exclu- the law.” accordance with supplements sive but instead the common rights law, Included within those retained civil gener- law. Id. At common one has a right is the one’s name. How- right al one’s absent a ever, we do note section 12.1-33-02.1 purpose: nothing fraudulent “There is that: requiring showing the common law a of a compelling need to person may
“1.
li-
...
be denied a
[a]
cense,
certificate,
any
requirement
name and
permit,
registra-
or
such
is incon-
principle
sistent with the common-law
tion because
conviction of
changed
if
offense
it is determined that such names
in the absence of a
sufficiently
purpose.”
has not been
reha-
fraudulent
57 Am.Jur.2d Name
bilitated,
Thus,
or that the offense
although
has a di-
17 at 665.
it is discre-
bearing upon person’s ability
deny
rect
to tionary with the trial court to
or
public
specific occupa-
serve
change,
a name
there must be a fraudulent
tion, trade,
profession.”
justify denying
equally
substantial reason. See Re
12.1-33-02.1, N.D.C.C.,
pro-
also
Dengler,
If it determined as a matter of fact that purpose, had a fraudulent I would Therefore, I why.
like to know concur
remanding explication and if the for an appropriate,
trial court deems it for a hear-
ing. COMPANY,
REIMERS SEED *4 Appellee, Plaintiff and STEDMAN, Gary individually, N. Trust, as co-trustee of River Hills Appellant, Defendant and In the Matter for DIS- CIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Che- Stedman, individually, D. June and as ELLIS, ryl L. a Member of the Bar of Trust, Gregory co-trustee of River Hills Dakota. State of North Stedman, individually, A. and as co- DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF the SU- Trust, Bradley trustee of River Hills L.
PREME COURT OF STATE Stedman, individually, and as co-trust- DAKOTA, Petitioner, OF NORTH Trust, Mitchell L. ee of River Hills Stedman, individually, and as co-trust- Trust, ee of River Hills and River Hills ELLIS, Cheryl Respondent. L. Trust, Ludwig, and Robert Lud- d/b/a No. 870201. Plumbing Excavating, wig & Defen- dants. Supreme of North Dakota. Court No. 900333CA. Civ. 6,
Feb. 1991. Appeals Court of of North Dakota. By Order of the Court dated 30, Cheryl L. Ellis sus- December 1991.
pended practice from the of law for failure respond an order to show cause 27, 1990, why
November she had failed to Disciplinary
contact Board Counsel Vivian
Berg arrange payment a new schedule why practice her license to law in this suspended.
state should This Order respond failure to would result
suspension practice from the of law. On
December letters dated October and December were
received from Ms. Ellis. to this Pursuant request, Disciplinary Counsel Vivi-
Court’s Berg response January E. filed a matter, considered the
ORDERED, suspension of Che-
ryl L. Ellis continue effect until rein-