In Re Celine R.
VARTABEDIAN, J.
Dependent minors Crystal M., Celine R. and Angel R. appeal from February 2002 orders terminating parental rights (
We hold
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Kern County Superior Court adjudged the children juvenile dependents and removed them from parental custody in August 2000. Respondent Kern County Department of Human Services (the Department) initiated the underlying dependency proceedings after law enforcement discovered a methamphetamine lab in the family‘s home. By the beginning of September 2000, Crystal, then age seven, was placed with a maternal aunt in Delano while three-year-old Celine and one-yearold Angel were placed with a paternal uncle and his long-term girl friend in Bakersfield.
In April 2001, when the parents failed to reunify, the juvenile court ordered Crystal into long-term foster care because she was unadoptable and there was no one willing and appropriate to accept legal guardianship of her. Crystal continued to reside with her maternal aunt. With regard to Celine and Angel, the court set a
As of the originally scheduled
The court, in August 2001, found: termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to Celine and Angel and they had a strong probability for adoption. It in turn identified adoption as the children‘s permanent placement goal and continued the
In its supplemental report prepared four days before the continued
The day after the Department‘s social worker finished his report he received a phone call from the minors’ counsel. Counsel reported she had unsuccessfully tried to contact the uncle and his girlfriend in order to speak with Celine and Angel about “how things are going.” In the meantime, counsel learned from Crystal‘s aunt that visitation was not occurring between Crystal and her younger half-siblings. While the respective adult relatives had maintained a fairly good visiting relationship, the visits had stopped at some point. Counsel also learned from Crystal that she would be very hurt and saddened if Celine and Angel were adopted and she became totally separated from them.
The social worker in turn investigated the matter. While he too was unable to reach Celine‘s and Angel‘s caregivers, he spoke with Crystal‘s aunt who said the last visit between the children was two months earlier in December 2001. He also learned there had been some change in telephone numbers which possibly accounted for the visitation breakdown.
At the continued
“maybe the court should allow me to conflict out on Celine and Angel, then I could represent Crystal. [¶] I‘m not sure how—this presents a real problem when we are dividing up children and I attempt to represent all three because I know probably going to adoption, being secure, having permanency is really what‘s necessary for all of the kids, and we have a very permanent plan for two of the kids. And I don‘t know. They are all young. I don‘t know if there is that kind of bonding that would scar these little kids never seeing their sister again.”
The court in turn inquired of the social worker about sibling visits and the social worker confirmed what he had recently learned.
Thereafter, the court interpreted the recent statutory change to focus not on Crystal but rather on Celine and Angel. The court then refused to continue the matter and made the necessary findings to terminate parental rights.
Minors’ counsel filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Crystal, Celine and Angel.
DISCUSSION
I. Continuance To Consider Applicability Of Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(E)
Appellate counsel for the minors contends the juvenile court did not have all the necessary information to make a fullyinformed decision and therefore should have continued the
If there is clear and convincing proof of adoptability, a point which is uncontested here, the statutory presumption is that termination is in a dependent child‘s best interests and therefore not detrimental. (
The newly-enacted language, set forth in
We find nothing in the language of
With special regard to the Department, we add that its statutory duty to report for purposes of a
We agree instead with the apparent position of the minors’ trial counsel, namely that the minors had the burden of showing that termination would be detrimental because it would cause a substantial interference with their sibling relationship. This was precisely why counsel requested a bonding study to see if the new exception applied here.
The problem with trial counsel‘s argument for a bonding study was her near exclusive reliance on Crystal‘s concerns and the possible impact on Crystal. Crystal was not the subject of the termination hearing, however. The court had previously selected for her a permanent plan of long-term foster care.
Notably, however, counsel did not request a continuance in order to communicate with Celine who expressed a desire to be adopted and Angel who did not understand the concept of adoption. Nor did counsel offer any explanation for waiting until the date of the continued hearing in late February 2002 to request a bonding study and consequently another continuance. In this regard, we observe the statute providing for new exception was filed with the Secretary of State on October 12, 2001, and took effect January 1, 2002.5
The granting of a continuance as well as an order for a bonding study are discretionary matters with the juvenile court. (
II. Trial Counsel‘s Representation Of All Three Minors
Appellate counsel also urges us to reverse the termination order because the juvenile court did not take minors’ counsel up on her suggestion that she be relieved from representing Celine and Angel. In appellate counsel‘s estimation, Crystal‘s opposition to termination created a potential conflict of interest for the minors’ trial counsel and the Department‘s support of termination created an actual conflict of interest.
We need not decide whether there was a sufficient showing on the facts or the law to have required the trial court to relieve minors‘s counsel from representing all three children. Any possible error was harmless under any standard. Minors’ trial counsel argued in favor of a continued relationship between Crystal, Celine and Angel. Assuming, for the sake of argument, Celine and Angel favored termination thus giving rise to a conflict, then Celine and Angel were not prejudiced because the court entered an order terminating parental rights. If, on the other hand, Celine and Angel shared their half-sister‘s position, then in fact there was no conflict in counsel‘s representation of all three minors.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights herein are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DIBIASO, Acting P.J., and GOMES, J.
Notes
“If the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered under
“(E) There would be substantial interference with a child‘s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child‘s best interest, including the child‘s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”