409 S.W.3d 106
Tex. App.
2013

In re CC & M GARZA RANCHES LTD. PARTNERSHIP, Relator.

No. 01-13-00148-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

June 27, 2013.

407 S.W.3d 106

that the arbitrator “ignore[d] ... the rebuttable presumption of intoxication” finds no support in the record.4

We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award, and we overrule FCI‘s first issue.

Is Guzman entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest?

In its second issue, FCI argues the trial court erred in awarding post-judgment interest when the arbitrator made no such award. In his sole issue in his cross-appeal, Guzman contends the trial court erred in also failing to award prejudgment interest. We agree with FCI that Guzman is not entitled to either.

A trial court has limited powers to modify an arbitrator‘s award. See 9 U.S.C. § 11. This Court has held that neither the FAA nor the Texas Finance Code authorizes an award of pre- or post-judgment interest when the arbitrator made no such award. See Fogal v. Stature Const., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 708, 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (prevailing party in arbitration is not entitled to pre- or post-judgment interest under FAA or pre-judgment interest under Texas Finance Code; trial court did not err by failing to modify arbitrator‘s award to add pre-judgment interest); Thomas Petroleum, Inc. v. Morris, 355 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (trial court lacked authority to modify award by adding pre- or post-judgment interest).

Guzman acknowledges these authorities but urges us to reconsider them. We decline to do so, and we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to award post-judgment interest and correctly declined to award pre-judgment interest. See Fogal, 294 S.W.3d at 722; Thomas Petroleum, Inc., 355 S.W.3d at 98-99. Accordingly, we sustain FCI‘s second issue, overrule Guzman‘s sole cross-issue, and modify the trial court‘s judgment to exclude the award of post-judgment interest.

Conclusion

We modify the trial court‘s judgment to exclude the award of post-judgment interest and affirm as modified.

Alberto Tover Garcia III, Adrian R. Martinez, Garcia & Martinez, L.L.P., Edinburg, TX, for Appellant.

Matthew J. Kita, Dallas, TX, Jerry D. Patchen, Patchen & Harkins, Houston, TX, Francisco J. Rodriguez, Law Office of Francisco J. Rodriguez, McAllen, TX, Preston Henrichson, Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, P.C., Edinburg, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, BLAND, and MASSENGALE.

OPINION

JANE BLAND, Justice.

Relator, CC & M Garza Ranches Limited Partnership, seeks mandamus relief from the Harris County statutory probate court‘s February 12, 2013 order transferring relator‘s Hidalgo County lawsuit to a guardianship proceeding pending in the Harris County statutory probate court, claiming that the trial court erred in signing the transfer order.1 We deny the requested relief.

Background

The underlying dispute concerns a family trust established in 1981 by Maria Can-tu Garza‘s husband. The trust property consists mainly of a 2,598-acre ranch located in South Texas.2 Following her husband‘s death, Maria became the trustee and the primary beneficiary of the trust “during her lifetime.” The trust provides that if Maria became incapacitated, her son, Carmen Carlos Garza, Jr. and daughter, Maria Cimodocia “Cimo” Garcia, would serve as co-trustees.

In 2010, when Maria was 100 years old, Cimo assisted her mother in instituting a guardianship proceeding in Harris County Probate Court No. 3. The probate court found that Maria was incapacitated. Pending the guardian‘s appointment, Cimo intervened in the probate proceeding in the fall of 2011.3 She sued Carmen and his wife, Delfina Jauregui Garza, for mismanagement of the trust assets, asserting causes of action for fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The suit alleges, among other things, that Carmen and Delfina wrongfully transferred property from the trust into “a series of purported business entities,” including CC & M.

Carmen died in early 2012, leaving Cimo as sole trustee of the family trust. Carmen‘s will named Delfina as the executrix of his estate. Acting on behalf of CC & M and Carmen‘s estate, Delfina sued Maria‘s guardian in Hidalgo County, seeking a declaratory judgment that Maria had contributed the bulk of the trust‘s South Texas ranch property to CC & M pursuant to the partnership agreement and an order compelling Maria or her guardian to sign the corresponding deeds.

The guardian and trustee moved to transfer the Hidalgo County suit to the probate court. In its order granting the motion, the probate court found that the Hidalgo County suit:

  • is a claim brought against a guardianship estate proceeding pending before it;
  • is an action for the right and title to real property that is part of guardianship estate property;
  • relates to claims first filed in the probate court;
  • names the guardian as a party; and
  • Delfina, as executrix, had submitted to the probate court‘s venue.

Based on these findings, the probate court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Hidalgo County suit and ordered its transfer.

Discussion

I. Standard of review

Mandamus relief is an appropriate remedy to enforce a mandatory venue provision when the trial court has erroneously ruled on a motion to transfer venue. In re Cont‘l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (West 2002). “[T]he standard for reviewing mandatory venue under Section 15.0642 is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Cont‘l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 735. “[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion....” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding).

II. Analysis

CC & M contends that the probate court abused its discretion in granting the motion to transfer the Hidalgo County suit into the guardianship proceeding. CC & M relies on section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides:

Actions for the recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or a part of the property is located.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (West 2002). CC & M claims that, because the suit is a dispute about the ownership of property that lies, in part, in Hidalgo County, venue is mandatory in Hidalgo County.

The question of venue presupposes that more than one court could exercise jurisdiction over the case. See Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.2002) (explaining that jurisdictional statutes speak to the court‘s power to hear case). The probate court is a statutory probate court. See TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 25.1031(c)(3) (West 2001). Section 607D of the Probate Code confers on a statutory probate court “exclusive jurisdiction of all guardianship proceedings.” TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 607D (West 2011). Thus, “[a] cause of action related to a guardianship proceeding of which the statutory probate court has exclusive jurisdiction ... must be brought in the statutory probate court....” Id.

Claims “related to” a guardianship proceeding include:

  • a suit, action, or application filed against or on behalf of a guardianship;
  • a cause of action in which a guardian in a guardianship pending in the statutory probate court is a party;
  • a claim brought by or against a guardianship estate;
  • an action for trial of title to real property that is guardianship estate property, including the enforcement of a lien against the property; and
  • an action for trial of the right of property that is guardianship estate property.

See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 606A(b). CC & M does not assail the trial court‘s findings that the Hidalgo County suit, as a claim brought against a guardianship estate and an action for trial of title to real property held by the guardianship estate, is related to the guardianship proceeding. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 606A(a)(3), (4), 606A(b). “[W]hen one court has ... exclusive jurisdiction over a matter, any order or judgment issued by another court pertaining to the same matter is void.” Celestine v. Dep‘t of Family & Protective Servs., 321 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). By giving the statutory probate court exclusive jurisdiction over all claims related to a guardianship proceeding, the Legislature necessarily deprived all other courts of the power to adjudicate those claims. As the only court with the power to decide the matter, the statutory probate court properly ordered the Hidalgo County case transferred into the guardianship proceeding.

Conclusion

We hold that the probate court did not err in granting the guardian‘s motion to transfer venue pursuant to section 607D of the Probate Code. Accordingly, we deny CC & M‘s petition for writ of mandamus.

Notes

1
The underlying case is In the Interest of Guardianship of Maria Cantu Garza, Ward, No. 398977, in Probate Court No. 3 of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Rory Olsen, presiding.
2
The ranch spans across parts of Hidalgo County, Willacy County, and Kenedy County.
3
The court later appointed Maria‘s grandson, Carlos Lino Garza, to serve as the guardian of her estate.
4
Moreover, vacatur would be inappropriate even if the arbitrator erroneously applied the law, as FCI contends. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 585, 128 S.Ct. at 1404 (rejecting notion that arbitrator‘s “manifest disregard of the law” expanded the grounds for vacatur beyond those enumerated in FAA); see also Allstyle Coil Co., 295 S.W.3d at 44. Because statutory grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under the FAA, FCI‘s argument that the arbitrator misapplied the presumption set forth in the Texas Labor Code, even if true, would not warrant vacatur. See Royce Homes, 315 S.W.3d at 90 (manifest disregard for the law is not a basis for vacatur of arbitration award); Allstyle Coil Co., 295 S.W.3d at 44 (“manifest disregard of the law as an independent, non-statutory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected“).