195 F. 322 | N.D.N.Y. | 1912
The bankrupt, Daniel Casey, is a carpenter and joiner, with a wife and three children. On the 13th day of September, 1910, he was duly adjudicated a bankrupt, and the matter was referred to C. D. Stone, Esq., one of the referees in bankruptcy. ' August’29, 1911, the referee in bankruptcy made an order fixing a time and place for the first meeting of creditors, and notice pursuant thereto was duly published and given. Pursuant to such notice, the first meeting of creditors was held 'on the 18th day of September, 1911. The bankrupt did not file a petition or an application for a discharge within the year succeeding such adjudication, but on a petition dated October 20, 1911, and presented to the judge on the 16th day of November, 1911, an order was made by the district judge permitting the bankrupt to file his application for his discharge from his debts mentioned in his petition on or before the 1st day of February, 1912. The bankrupt filed his petition for a discharge on the 22d day of November, 1911, about 14 months after he was adjudicated as aforesaid, and an order was duly made on that day and published and served requiring all creditors to show cause at a time and place fixed by the order why the bankrupt should not be discharged from his debts. This order was duly served upon “Thomas Ryan’s Consumers’ Brewing Company, Syracuse, N. Y.,” the creditor making this application to vacate the order extending the time of the bankrupt to file his application for a discharge.
On the 2d day of January, 1912, the day fixed for the hearing on the petition of the bankrupt for a discharge, the said Thomas Ryan’s Consumers’ Brewing Company appeared pursuant to the order and notice aforesaid, and applied for and obtained time in which to file specifications of objection to the discharge of the bankrupt. The specifications of objection were verified January 27, 1912, and duly
The affidavit of James K. Kennedy, filed in opposition to this motion, states that the Thomas Ryan’s Consumers’ Brewing Company was served with a copy of the order extending the time to file the application for a discharge on the 25th day of November, 1911. December 27, 1911, the referee made-the usual certificate of conformity, and filed same, which shows that the .bankrupt had fully complied with the provisions of the bankrupt act.
The specifications of objection to the discharge of the bankrupt allege as grounds for refusing a discharge that the application therefor was not made within one year of the adjudication; that the court did not have jurisdiction of said bankrupt for the reason said petition and application were not made and filed within one year from the date of such adjudication; that the bankrupt did not set forth facts in his petition for the order extending his time to file his application for a discharge sufficient to warrant such order; that, by reason of the fact that said petition and affidavit did not set forth facts sufficient, to justify the granting of the order extending the time in which to file said application, the court did not gain jurisdiction of tlie bankrupt or of this proceeding. Another specification of objection was that the bankrupt wrongfully, fraudulently, and knowingly made a false affidavit and oath in this proceeding on which the order extending the time in which to file his application for a final discharge was granted.
“is that your petitioner is a common laborer, and had no other means of support except that derived from his daily toil, and through sickness and the necessity of providing for the support of his family did not have sufficient means to pay for the expense of said proceeding, and, further, your petitioner was not informed of the necessity of filing said petition within said 12 months by his said attorney, and that he failed and neglected to notify him of said fa et.”
It is true that this petition does not set forth with particularity the sickness of the bankrupt and the amount of his earnings and the amount required for the support of his family. It may be said that the allegations of the petition are a conclusion, and that the judge might have required the bankrupt to, show that he was constantly sick during the 12 months' period, and that all his money was re
This motion to set aside and vacate the order made by the judge extending the time of the bankrupt in which to file his application for a discharge is, in fact, founded on the allegation that the judge had no jurisdiction to make such order on the evidence presented. The affidavit of Mr. Ward on information and belief challenges some of the allegations of the petition of the bankrupt, and presents the following objections to the sufficiency of the facts stated in such petition, viz.: (1) That the said- petition set forth that Casey was a common laborer, when, in fact, he was a carpenter and joiner; (2) that the sickness alleged was not sufficient to justify the order, in that “he (the petitioner) does not set up that such sickness was for such a period of time, or during all of the time, from the day of such adjudication until the period of one year had elapsed”; (3) “there is absolutely no good and sufficient reason set forth in said petition made by said Daniel Casey on which an order could be granted allowing said Daniel Casey to file his application for a discharge from his debts after more than one year had expired since the day of his adjudication as a bankrupt”; and (4) “that said petition did not set forth or state sufficient facts to give to the United States court or to Hon. George W. Ray, judge of'the District Court, jurisdiction of said proceeding after more than one year had expired, so that said order could be made, and that said bankrupt and his attorney were guilty of laches in not making such application within one year from the day of such adjudication.” If it was true as alleged in the petition for the order that sickness prevented the bankrupt from having sufficient means to pay the expenses, which would include attorney’s fees in preparing his petition, and he was not in fact informed of the necessity of applying within the year, there was some evidence before the judge on which he could act tending to establish that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing his application within the year. Therefore the judge was called upon to act in his judicial capacity in a matter before him, and of which he as sole district judge of the Northern District of New York had jurisdiction. The bankruptcy proceedings were before him, and he and he alone had jurisdiction of the proceedings for a discharge, and he and he alone could determine in the first instance whether the bankrupt had been unavoidably prevented from filing his application within
The motion must be denied.