This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In re Carroll,
I. BASIC PACTS
Carroll was permanently disabled after he suffered a closed head injury in an automobile accident in 1982. In re Carroll,
In March 2009, May petitioned the probate court for an order compelling Auto Club — Carroll’s no-fault vehicle insurer — to pay him $6,816.70 in fees for services rendered. Id. Auto Club argued that it had no obligation to pay May’s fees because his fees were not allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). In re Carroll,
May then appealed in this Court.
On appeal, this Court did not examine the individual services that May performed for Carroll to determine whether the specific service was for Carroll’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Instead, we examined whether the appointment of a conservator to handle an injured person’s estate was generally the type of service that was reasonably necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Id. at 400. Relying on the expansive interpretation of the term “care” utilized by the Court in Heinz v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
We rejected Auto Club’s contention that the conservator’s services were not compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because the services were, in effect, replacement services under MCL 500.3107(1)(c). We recognized that the issue was complicated by the nature of the conservator’s services: a conservator manages the injured person’s property and business affairs, which the injured person would likely have performed on his or her own behalf but for the accident. In re Carroll,
Finally, we rejected Auto Club’s contention that our Supreme Court’s decision in Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co,
The conservator’s services here are more akin to attendant care provided by a nursing assistant who handles the injured person’s intimate hygiene needs; in that situation, although the injured person would normally have handled those needs on his or her own, as a result of the injury he or she is no longer able to do so. Because expenses incurred to have someone perform those hygiene services are reasonably incurred for the injured person’s care, recover, or rehabilitation, the nursing assistant’s services are compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Similarly, because the need for the conservator was causally connected to Carroll’s injury and the expense is reasonably necessary for his care, it too is compensable under MCL 500.3107(l)(a). [In re Carroll, 292 Mich App at 407 (citations omitted).]
We then held that May’s entire fee was related to Carroll’s care under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). For that reason, we reversed the probate court’s opinion and order and remanded for further proceedings. In re Carroll,
Auto Club then sought leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court initially held the application in abeyance pending its decisions in Johnson and Douglas. In re Carroll,
II. FIRST PARTY NO-FAULT BENEFITS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the proper interpretation of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Johnson,
B. NATURE OF THE BENEFITS
“A person injured in an automobile accident is entitled to a variety of personal protection insurance benefits — often referred to as PIP benefits — from his or her insurance carrier under MCL 500.3107.” In re Carroll,
The Legislature provided that allowable expenses consist “of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). That is, the Legislature required no-fault insurers to compensate injured persons for the expenses associated with “products, services and accommodations” that were reasonably necessary for the “injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation ....” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Notably, the Legislature provided that allowable expenses included expenses reasonably necessary for the care of the injured person; it did not limit this category to those expenses necessary to care for the injured person’s injury. In its broadest sense, the phrase “for an injured person’s care,” as used in MCL 500.3107(1)(a), can refer to any product, service, or accommodation that one might use to provide for another’s well-being. See The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed, 1991) (defining the substantive form of the word “care” to mean “oversight with a view to protection, preservation, or guidance”
The Legislature also provided that no-fault insurers must cover “[e]xpenses not exceeding $20.00 per day, reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those that, if he or she had not been injured, an injured person would have performed” for his or her own benefit or the benefit of his or her dependents. MCL 500.3107(1)(c). The Legislature did not define this benefit as the “replacement services” benefit. Nevertheless, courts commonly refer to this benefit as the “replacement services” PIP benefit. See, e.g., Johnson,
C. GRIFFITH
In Griffith, our Supreme Court examined whether the cost of a product — food—was compensable as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Douglas Griffith had been seriously and permanently injured in a car accident and required assistance to eat and bathe. Griffith,
In determining whether food constituted an allowable expense, our Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing the limited nature of no-fault benefits: “According to the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1), a no-fault insurer is only required to pay benefits ‘for accidental bodily injury’ arising out of an automobile accident.” Griffith,
The Court noted that it was undisputed that Douglas’s food expenses were not related to his recovery or rehabilitation: “Indeed, [Phyllis Griffith] does not allege that the food has special curative properties that might advance Griffith’s recovery or rehabilitation.” Id. at 532-533. The key issue, it explained, was whether food expenses were compensable as part of Douglas’s in-home “care.” Although the Court recognized that the ordinary meaning of the term “care” can be broadly understood to encompass anything that is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person’s protection or charge, it concluded that the Legislature did not intend to give the term its broadest meaning. Id. at 533. Instead, it determined that the word “care” must be understood in context and in light of the fact that the Legislature associated it with the words “recovery” and “rehabilitation.” Id. 533-534. Using the interpretive tool referred to as noscitur a sociis, the Court explained that it must give the word “care” a more limited meaning: “[W]e must neither read ‘care’ so broadly as to render nugatory ‘recovery and rehabilitation’ nor construe ‘care’ so narrowly that the term is mere surplusage.” Id. at 534.
The Court then went on to conclude that the term “care” referred to the “care” necessitated by the injuries sustained in an automobile accident:
As noted above, both “recovery” and “rehabilitation” refer to an underlying injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an “injured person.” It follows that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those products, services, or accommodations whose provision is necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident. “Care” is broader than “recovery” and “rehabilitation” because it may encompass expenses for products, services, and accommodations that are necessary because of the accident but that may not restore a person to his preinjury state. [Id. at 535 (emphasis added).]
Applying this understanding of the term “care,” the Court concluded that Douglas’s food expenses were not compensable. It did so, in part, because there was no evidence that “he now requires different food than he did before sustaining his injuries as part of his treatment plan.” Id. at 536. Although it acknowledged that food was necessary for Douglas’s survival, it emphasized that his need for food did not arise from his injuries:
Unlike prescription medications or nursing care, the food that [Douglas] Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance rather than a treatment for his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” In fact, if [Douglas] Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now. We conclude, therefore, that his food costs are completely unrelated to his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” and are not “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). [Griffith, 472 Mich at 536 .]
Thus, under the decision in Griffith, a no-fault insurer is only obligated to pay benefits for care — as that term is used in MCL 500.3107(l)(a) — when the product, service, or accommodation was necessitated by the injury; that is, if the product, service, or accommodation would not have been necessary but for the injuries sustained in the accident, then it is compensable as an allowable expense for the injured person’s care under MCL 500.3107(l)(a).
D. JOHNSON
Our Supreme Court again considered the nature and extent of allowable expenses in Johnson. In that case, John Recca struck Penny Johnson with his vehicle while she was walking. Johnson,
In deciding this issue, the Court first recognized that the Legislature had abolished tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, subject only to the exceptions stated under MCL 500.3135. Johnson,
After determining that the “clear and unambiguous” provisions in MCL 500.3135(3)(c) precluded recovery for replacement services, see Johnson,
As we noted in Griffith, “the statute does not require compensation for any item that is reasonably necessary to a person’s care in general.” Griffith,472 Mich at 534 (emphasis added). Rather, such care “must be related to the insured’s injuries.” Id. In Griffith, the plaintiffs food costs were not allowable expenses because “if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now.” Id. at 536. Accordingly, allowable expenses do not include expenses for products or services that are required after the injury in a manner indistinguishable from those required before the injury. Those services are not properly characterized as “related to the insured’s injuries.”
Services that were required both before and after the injury, but after the injury can no longer be provided by the injured person himself or herself because of the injury, are “replacement services,” not “allowable expenses.” They are services “in lieu of those that, if he or she had not been injured, an injured person would have performed.. . for the benefit of himself or herself....” MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Griffith’s definition of “care,” replacement services is not “merely one category of allowable expenses”; rather, allowable expenses and replacement services are separate and distinct categories of PIP benefits. [Johnson,492 Mich at 179-180 .]
Accordingly, Griffith established that a product, service, or accommodation will not be for an injured person’s “care,” as that term is used in MCL 500.3107(1)(a), unless the need for the product, service, or accommodation was necessitated by the injured person’s injuries. Griffith,
Finally, in Douglas, our Supreme Court further refined its understanding of the term “care” to provide guidance on the types of services that will constitute an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(l)(a). In that case, an unidentified driver struck James Douglas while he was riding his bicycle. Douglas,
On appeal, our Supreme Court had to consider whether and to what extent Douglas was entitled to compensation for the attendant care services that his wife performed, and, specifically, whether his wife’s services were allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) or, in the alternative, replacement services under MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Douglas,
Turning to what constitutes “care” for purposes of MCL 500.3107(1)(a), the Douglas Court reaffirmed that “care” has a limited meaning: “although services for an insured’s care need not restore a person to his preinjury state, the services must be related to the insured’s injuries to be considered allowable expenses.” Douglas,
A subsequent Court of Appeals panel applied Visconti and allowed the plaintiff to recover no-fault benefits when a family member was “required to serve his meals in bed, bathe him, escort him to the doctor’s office, exercise him in conformity with his doctor’s instructions, assist in formulating his diet, administer medication, and assist him with speech and associational therapy.” The Court also held that, even though the family member who provided these serviceswas not a licensed medical care provider, “[t]he statute does not require that these services be supplied by ‘trained medical personnel’.” In other words, while the no-fault act specifies and limits what types of expenses are compensable, it places no limitation on who may perform what is otherwise an allowable expense. [Douglas, 492 Mich at 261 , quoting Van Marter,114 Mich App at 180 .]
However, the Court clarified that allowable expenses “cannot be for ‘ordinary and necessary services’ because ordinary and necessary services are not ‘for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.’ ” Douglas,
Examining the facts applicable to its case, the Court held that Douglas was potentially entitled to compensation for his wife’s services:
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that Mrs. Douglas only provided replacement services and compared the claimed supervision with this state’s workers’ compensation caselaw that allows “on-call” supervision, even when the care provider is pursuing other tasks while on call. We affirm the result of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that defendant is not entitled to a verdict of no cause of action on the basis of its claim that Mrs. Douglas only provided replacement services because there was testimony given at trial that at least some of the services she said she had provided were consistent with the requirement of MCL 500.3107(l)(a) that allowable expenses be for an injured person’s care as necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident. For instance, even if Mrs. Douglas’s claimed supervision of plaintiff does not restore plaintiff to his preinjury state, testimony given at trial indicates that arguably at least some of this claimed supervision was for plaintiffs care as necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident and not for ordinary and necessary services that every Michigan household must undertake. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on the claim that none of Mrs. Douglas’s claimed services could be considered attendant care services within the meaning of MCL 500.3107(l)(a). {Douglas,492 Mich at 263-264 .][1 ]
The decision in Douglas clarified that an injured person may be entitled to compensation for services necessitated by his or her injury and performed for his or her care as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and that such services may be compensable even when performed by a family member; the Court, however, reiterated that the services provided by a family member must be carefully distinguished from the types of services that constitute a replacement service under MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Douglas,
F. SYNTHESIZING GRIFFITH, JOHNSON, AND DOUGLAS
Examining the decisions in Griffith, Johnson, and Douglas together, it is evident that there are several criteria that must be established before a particular product, service, or accommodation “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation” will be compensable as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
III. APPLYING THE LAW
In this case, it is undisputed that Carroll suffered a closed head injury in an automobile accident and that his head injury prevented him from handling his own estate. For that reason, May has established the requisite causal connections between his services and Carroll’s injuries: the probate court appointed May to serve as Carroll’s conservator because the head injury that Carroll suffered during an automobile accident so incapacitated him that he can no longer manage his estate. See Douglas,
Examining the evidence, we conclude that some of May’s services constituted replacement services under MCL 500.3107(1)(c) that were, accordingly, not compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). However, we also conclude that some of May’s services were not replacement services and were otherwise necessary for Carroll’s care within the meaning of MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
The average member of a Michigan household manages his or her own estate on a day-to-day basis; ordinary people pay bills, make deposits, buy and sell property, hire brokers, and otherwise plan for their future needs. Carroll’s need for ordinary household management existed before his accident and continued to exist after his accident. Therefore, to the extent that May performed those services for Carroll, they would be compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(c), rather than under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), because his need for ordinary household management is not specifically related to his injuries. See Johnson,
But Carroll also clearly had, and presumably continues to have, additional estate-management needs as a result of his head injury — needs that go far beyond those that he required before he was injured. Carroll requires someone to manage his medical bills, negotiate with medical providers and insurers, and marshal his assets and handle them in a way that will ensure that he can continue to receive the best possible physical and mental care.
Consequently, consistent with Griffith, Johnson, and Douglas, if an injured person — by reason of his or her injuries — requires a service in order to ensure his or her proper care, and that service does not amount to a replacement service under MCL 500.3107(1)(c), it will be compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). See Johnson,
The probate court correctly determined that some of May’s services as Carroll’s conservator were compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and some were not because they were for ordinary and necessary household services that were compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(c) and were incurred more than three years after Carroll’s accident. Moreover, May did not challenge the probate court’s findings concerning the specific services that were compensable and the amount due for those services. Consequently, May has not identified any error warranting relief.
IV CONCLUSION
The probate court did not err when it determined that Auto Club only had to compensate May for those services he performed as Carroll’s conservator that did not amount to replacement services under MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Because May did not challenge the probate court’s specific findings in this regard, we must affirm.
Affirmed. As the prevailing party, Auto Club may tax its costs. MCR 7.219(A).
Notes
The Court also examined the proofs necessary to establish that the expenses were reasonably necessary, actually incurred, and amounted to a reasonable charge. Douglas,