In re Carl O.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Spallone
In these consolidated appeals the respondents, the mother and the father of the minor child, Carl 0., are appealing from the judgment of the
Carl O. was born to the respondents, Pamela V. and Merritt 0., on November 6, 1984. On November 15, 1984, DCYS filed a petition in the Superior Court pursuant to
The facts, as found by the trial court, are essentially as follows. Carl O. was the fourth child born to Pamela Y. Parental rights in her three other children had been terminated and the children placed in adoption because Pamela’s long standing mental illness prevented her from caring for her infant children.
After Carl’s birth, the attending physician asked the parents routine questions regarding preparations for the baby’s care upon his discharge from the hospital. This query was greeted by total silence from the mother and death threats to the physician from the father. The
While the mother was still in the hospital after the delivery of the child, she acted confused. At times, she interacted with the baby and at other times she failed to respond to the baby’s needs. Sometimes she would react to the doctor, but at other times she failed to make a verbal response or to maintain eye contact. On occasion, she seemed to be unaware of the baby’s distress. For example, on one occasion, the baby lay choking on her lap for as long as ten to twenty seconds but she did not respond until a staff member intervened. She appeared to hear the nurse’s instructions, but made no change in her behavior or attitude toward the child. According to the attending physician, the mother required “a lot more than average” supervision when the baby was entrusted to her care. This fact, according to the physician, was “a major concern to pediatricians and nurses,” leading the staff to fear that she might forget that the baby was there at all.
Before the birth of the child, Pamela had displayed aberrant behavior during her prenatal visits to the hospital. She would sit with her head bowed, refuse to wait long enough to take a prescribed blood test, and showed signs of nervousness, anxiety, incoherence and unresponsiveness. This pattern of behavior continued after the child’s birth and during DCYS’s attempt to establish parental ties through visitations. Pamela’s mental condition required that she be admitted to Con
The father acted in a detached manner towards the child. He did not seem to appreciate the limitations on Pamela’s ability to care for the child. Even before the child’s birth, he threatened a social worker with bodily harm, accusing her of wanting to take children away from parents. After the birth, when the social worker attempted to speak to both parents, Merritt became so violent and loud that other patients on the floor became alarmed. He also threatened to kill the social worker. When Pamela was committed to Connecticut Valley Hospital, he offered no plan to care for the baby but expressed a willingness to place the baby in foster care until the mother’s release. During the visitation sessions, Merritt displayed little interest in the child, concentrating his attention on the other adults present and frequently discussing astrology.
Two court appointed evaluators, a psychiatrist and a pediatrician, concluded in a joint report that “neither parent gave any indication of being capable of meeting the complex demands presented by child care” because of their minimizing “to an extreme degree” the problems entailed in the care of an infant. They also concluded that “their lack of insight and suspiciousness would make it extremely difficult for them to profit from even an intense remediation program.” Merritt was found to be disorganized, guarded, suspicious and lacking insight into the realities of his own life or the needs of the baby. Pamela fared no better. She too, like Merritt, was disorganized and suspicious, but was, in addition, withdrawn, preoccupied and confused.
The pediatrician found the baby, Carl, to be more than ordinarily sensitive, needing a caretaker with more than normal child care skills, one able to ascer
In a well reasoned, legally sound and meticulously detailed memorandum of decision the trial court expressly found the following facts. Pamela suffers from chronic mental illness with a long history of repeated hospitalizations followed by an established pattern of discontinued medication and outpatient therapy after each discharge. Merritt, while not psychotic, has a history of institutionalizations, economic dependency, and disorganized thinking. The relationship between the parents is stormy. While Pamela passively permitted Merritt to take charge of their lives, she resisted his efforts to see that she received psychiatric treatment and several times accused him of physically abusing her. Both parents lack insight, evidence minimal judgment, are guarded, suspicious, resistant to instruction in child care, and have unreal expectations of a baby. These characteristics render them incapable of either acquiring the necessary “knowledge base” normally acquired from experience of actually caring for a child, or benefiting from community resources. The child, since birth, has always received excellent child care from others than his biological parents, first in the hospital and later in foster care under an order of temporary custody. But for the intervention of the hospital and DCYS in preventing the parents from exercising custody, Carl would have been denied adequate care and would have been in danger of serious injury from the date of his birth.
The court concluded on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence, that Carl was “uncared for” as defined in
From the court’s judgment, the parents have each filed an appeal, which have been consolidated, and claim, essentially, that the trial court erred (1) in granting and confirming the order of temporary custody, (2) in holding that Carl O. was “homeless,” (3) in holding that Carl O. has “special needs,” (4) in denying Pamela’s motion to enforce rights, (5) in granting DCYS’s motion to amend, (6) in interpreting
The respondents’ first claim of error is that the court erred in granting and confirming the award of temporary custody. Any issues involving the order of temporary custody, however, are moot because that order expired when the child was later adjudicated an uncared for child and was committed to DCYS for the statutory period. The order of temporary custody is therefore academic. Appellate courts will not consider academic questions, particularly where no appropriate relief may be afforded. Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
In the second and third claims of error, the respondent father claims that the trial court erred in finding that the child was “homeless” and that the parents could not “provide the specialized care which his physical, emotional or mental condition requires.” The court made these findings when determining pursuant to
The respondent father claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that the child had “special needs” merely because he was an infant. This claim misconstrues the trial court’s memorandum of decision. The trial court found that the child required specialized care both because of his infancy and his particularly sensitive nature. The court further found that his parents were not capable of providing that care.
In a fourth claim of error, the respondent mother claims that the court erred in denying her motion to enforce rights. By this motion, the respondent claims that under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
A fifth claim of error is that the court improperly allowed DCYS to amend its petition. The respondent mother first asserts that the court abused its discretion by allowing the amendment on the eve of trial. We find no abuse of discretion in this instance. The trial court complied with the appropriate Practice Book section
In a sixth claim of error, the respondent mother claims that
In a seventh claim of error, the respondent mother claims that
In order to prevail on this claim, the respondent mother would, at a minimum, have to demonstrate (1) that the constitutional right against self-incrimination, a right in criminal prosecutions, extends as a matter of constitutional law to parents in juvenile proceedings, and (2) that if such a right exists, it would prohibit not only the compulsory testimony of a parent, but also the testimony of a doctor examining a parent. The respondent mother has cited no authority to support either of these propositions. Furthermore, there can be no question that the statute complies with procedural due process. “At their core, the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that one subject to a significant deprivation of liberty or property must be accorded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Council on Probate Judicial Conduct re: James H. Kinsella,
Finally, the respondents contend that the court’s disposition committing the child to DCYS for a period of eighteen months was not supported by a fair prepon
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The minor child, Carl 0., has been represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. On appeal, counsel for Carl O. has agreed with DCYS and has adopted its brief.
In granting temporary custody, the court found that the child “would have been imminently endangered in view of the uncontradicted evidence of parental incapacity.” Under the order of temporary custody, either respondent was allowed to seek an opening of the order at any time provided he or she filed an offer of proof of changed circumstances, such as an improvement in the condition of the mother or suitable child care proposals of the father. Between the date of the order and the date of the trial on the petition for commitment six months later, however, no such offer of proof was made.
The court found: “All babies have special needs that are not shared by older children capable of meeting many of their own needs. Babies are totally dependent upon adult caretakers for every detail of their existence, and a parent capable of caring adequately for a 10 year old, or even a five year old, might not be capable of caring for an infant. In addition, Carl at less than five months of age, was an extraordinarily sensitive baby, needing more than the usual degree of appropriate responsiveness from his adult caretaker. Neither Pamela nor Merritt was capable, as of the time of filing the amended petition, of providing this special care. Carl O. was, therefore, uncared-for in the sense of having parents incapable of providing the care required to meet his special needs.”
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
Section 671 of that Act provides in pertinent part: “In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which — (15) . . . provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home . . . . ”