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In Re Care and Treatment of Coffman
225 S.W.3d 439
Mo.
2007
Check Treatment

*1 liability may be an inability conducive to taxes,

pay reasonable In not that the two the Matter of the AND CARE conditions are one and the same. Larry Centene TREATMENT OF L. identify separate social COFFMAN, Appellant. liability conjunction that in with eco- No. SC 87803. liability nomic inability pay led to an Otherwise, reasonable taxes. para- Missouri, Supreme Court phrase principal opinion, “if evidence En Banc. to support finding [inability pay June 2007. reasonable could also constitute evi- taxes] support dence to a finding of social liabili-

ty, plain language of section 353.020

would be defeated.”

It be that the area ais social liabili-

ty and that evidence that it is could be

presented at some point. future It was presented record, on this however. reason,

For that I concur in principal

opinion’s determination to reverse the or-

der of condemnation because substantial

evidence support did not legislative

determination that the area constituted a liability.

social WHITE,

RONNIE L. Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully view, my dissent. Cen-

tene sufficient evidence from City

which the Clayton reasonably could

have determined that the redevelopment

area had become an “economic and social

liability.” This phrase demonstrates the

legislature’s recognition of the causal con-

nection between economics and social wel-

fare. A decline in inevitably the former latter,

undermines the and I would inter-

pret the statute as such. assuming Even

the two must separately, be evaluated I

would adopt Judge Stith’s definition of “so- liability”

cial but would that the conclude

City’s finding was supported by enough

evidence to withstand this Court’s review.

Therefore, I affirm would the order of

condemnation.

The statute is constitutional as written. two-part hearing procedure does not process equal violate due or the protection *3 clause. was not frivo- lous, and the trial court erred in denying hearing. without a The judgment is re- versed. The case is remanded. On re- mand, the court shall provide Coffman a hearing pursuant to section 632.498. History Fаcts and Procedural provides Missouri law that Coffman is to custody remain in the department mental health until such time as his “men- Queener, Emmett D. Office of the Public tal has so [he] Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant. large.” safe to be at Section 632.495.2.1 Nixon, Jeremiah (Jay) Gen., W. Atty. The law allows Coffman to for Charles Birmingham, Alana Barragan- release upon his own motion. Section Scott, Atty. Generals, Asst. City, Jefferson petitioned 632.498. Coffman for release MO, for Respondent. Mаrch 2006. The trial court denied his petition without a hearing. WOLFF, MICHAEL A. Chief Justice. In support release, of his Introduction Coffman reports of evalua- 2004, In January a St. Louis found experts. tions three Stephen Dr. Pe- Larry Coffman pedo- suffered from terson, psychiatrist, performed an initial philia and a personality disorder and de- examination and noted that Coffman’s termined that he was a violent medical “changed considerably” status had predator. Based on finding, Coffman sinсe his last assessment. Dr. Peterson was committed to a secure Missouri De- believed that Coffman suffered from car- partment of Mental facility. Health pulmonary diovascular and disorders and petitioned

Coffman for release based on recommended Coffman be evaluated his assertion that he was no sexu- by specialists in those two areas. ally violent predator because he was not performed Dr. Allen Soffer the cardio- more than not to commit a vascular examination. Dr. Soffer did not violent offense if released. The circuit any find suspected heart disease and court, division, probate denied his Coffman suffered from pulmonary prob- without a hearing. lems. Coffman challenges the pe- denial ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍of his tition and challenges also the constitution- Dr. performed pulmonary Mark Briete ality of the 2004 amendment to section examination. Dr. Briete found that Coff- 632.498, procedure which sets forth the for man had lung functioning restricted determining whether a pulmonary lung disease. Dr. Briete noted predator is entitled to release. that Coffman suffered from shortness of statutory Supp. 1. All references are to RSMo unless otherwise noted. upon probable preponder-

breath exertion and a burden from cause to oxygen. and supplemental wheelchair ance of the unconstitutional. All three recommended that doctors Standard Review stop smoking weight and lose Dr. through diet exercise. Neither interpretation of a statute is opinion Dr. an gave Softer nor Briete as to an and is issue of law therefore reviewed whether and to what extent Coffman’s Barker, de novo. Barker v.

physical ability condition affect his would pre are Statutes to commit future violent offenses. constitutional, sumed and this Court to be *4 will read the statute a manner consis Dr. receiving of reports After Soffer possi tent with the constitution whenever Briete, completed and Dr. Dr. Peterson his State, 96, 102 ble. Murrell v. evaluation, that Coffman “se- concluding (Mo. 2007); Asbury banc v. 846 by Lombardi verely physically lung debilitated his 196, 199 disease,” becoming that he more medi- “is dangerous,” cally fragile and therefore less the circuit court Section 632.504 allows reversed,” damage that “cannot be hearing to dismiss a without eventually congestive that he would suffer “frivolous,” did and circuit court so failure, and he would require heart that can- here. The state that Coffman oxygen use supplemental the constant of challenge constitutionality not of sec- Dr. Peterson and a wheelchair. believed he a hear- tion 632.498because was denied that Coffman’s condition would ing that the circuit under statute in a home or nursing him to live similar court’s determination that his facility. care Dr. Peterson determined frivolous. Since Court concludes “[tjaken that, together, the clinical infor- and was not frivolous Larry that Mr. strongly mation indicates proper hearing, should have received longer likely as presents Coffman no more ap- procedures to that should address to commit acts of sexu- predatory than not ply hearing. physically al too violence because he is Certainly, thinking his debilitated. about Discussion much, changed has but he his offense not discharge procedure of 1. The two-trial physical will be unable alter his does section 632.498 not unconstitution- Therefore, any very much. victim out of ally com- proof shift the burden of to the immediate certainly reach is safe. He his unduly person mitted and is not burden- anyone and ex- cannot chase down cannot some feeling without ex- quickly ert himself hausted.” are to enact sex The states allowed ually provide statutes that peti-

The circuit court denied Coffman’s involuntary of for the civil commitment finding hearing, tion without who are determined to certain individuals petition was becаuse Coffman did frivolous confine society “if the dangerous demonstrating facts allege pursuant proper pro place ment takes changed or that his mental condition had evidentiary Kan standards.” cedures and abnormality existed. mental 346, 357, Hendricks, 521 117 sas v. U.S. appeals the trial court’s order Coffman (1997). 2072, 138L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Court, alleging that he entitled to this provided procedures has to Missouri the 2004 amendment designa- 632.498, evidentiary standards for the which increases his initial section invоluntary tion—and “probable civil commitment— cause” to a “pre- predators ponderance of the evidence.” ar- sections Coffman gues that unduly 632.480 to this raised burden is person 632.513. Once a has burdensome because it shifts the ultimate designated been a sexually preda- burden to the tor and committed to a mental health facil- released, show that he should be rather ity, department of mental health is than requiring the state to demonstrate required to еvaluate his mental condition why he should not Although be released. annually. Section 632.498. There are two his release was filed after the 2004 methods which a violent preda- effect, amendment took sought tor can obtain release after he has been release provisions under the of the 2000 First, committed. if the director of the statute, claiming that the 2004 amendment department of mental health determines was unconstitutional. person’s “that the mental has рerson so that the is not This Court considered a similar due commit released,” acts of sexual violence argument cess in In the Matter the Care then the director Schottel, must authorize per- and Treatment Wilbur *5 (Mo. petition 2005). son to the court for release. Sec- S.W.3d 836 banc That case tion 632.501. The circuit court then holds determined the 2000version of section a hearing constitutional, 632.498 was despite where the requir- state has the burden ing sexually to show that the violent petitioner predator the to make should not be the showing. initial released. Id. Schottel received a hearing judge before the trial on peti- Second, if department the of mental tion, judge but the determined at health does not conclude that sexually the hearing that provide prob- Schottel did not violent predator released, should be he is able cause to believe that he would not nevertheless free for his release and, therefore, reoffend denied Schottel a at any time. Section 632.498. Coffman second trial. at Id. 840. Schottel attempted to secure release under this argued that required the statute him to provision. Under the 2000 version of the prove that he “would not” reoffend and statute, the circuit court was higher this was a him burden on than hearing set a on the unless the required by the state to obtain his frivolous, and, is if the court deter- initial commitment. Id. 841. Schottel mined that probable there was сause to argued that the statute therefore violated person released, believe that the should be due process. rejected Id. This Court then a trial trial, was to be held. At this “hyper-technical” Schottel’s reading of the which by jury, be the state had the statute’s term to him prove burden prove beyond a reasonable absolutely that he not” “will reoffend. Id. doubt person the should not be re- Rather, at 841-42. this Court held that Thus, leased. the provided 2000 statute a statute, context,” the when “read first, two-part test: person the committed that, vides “at hearing, legis- the initial the must show probable why cause he should merely lature judge intends ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍the to act in a released; second, the state must show gatekeeper role. He or she not is asked to beyond why reasonable doubt should reach a final person’s decision as to the not. danger to the community or whether the Section 632.498 was amended in 2004. person sexually predator], is still viоlent [a The amendment showing raises the initial but to ‘probable determine whether cause ’” that must be made sexually the violent person exists to believe that the should (Emphasis origi- By changing be released. Id. at 842 release. the from standard nal). preponderance of the probable cause to evidence, ini the the legislature increased Schottel, the Under initial be- sexually preda tial on the burden the trial not the judge fore final control- tor. decision, ling requirement and the that the sexually predator proba- meet the the 2004 amend- unduly cause is not it ble burden unconstitutional. ment burdensome because takes the trial from one where the first case, therefore, question The in this judge merely triable determines whether sexually the in the vio- whether increase weighs exist to the judge issues one where burden, predator’s probable lent from and evaluates the evidence. preponderance cause the changes analysis. procedure unduly The bur- here not an in- important densome. The state has “probable terms cause” society in protecting terest “preponderance of evidence” are violent offenders. The defined has opportunity terms, however, statute. have well- Those any the court for release at time. When meanings. legal understood When statu in- considering important underlying tory legislature, term not defined terest, ability vio- оrdinary apply meaning courts review, frequent lent to obtain dictionary. term as found in the Cook unduly provide is not burdensome to Co., Revenue, Tractor Inc. v. Dir. only those “gatekeeper” to ensure that “Proba *6 make a a legitimate who claim can obtain ble cause” is defined as: “A reasonable sexually trial. the violent Requiring ground supposing for that a criminal claim by pre- to his a establish charge is well-founded.” Webster’s Third unduly ponderance of the evidеnce is not (1993). Dictionary New International burdensome, standard, and if he meets this defined, “Preponderance” in as part, is entitled to he is release unless the “superiority weight.” in also Id. See a prove can that he is not so entitled (1990) 6th Dictionary, Black’s Law Edition higher standard. evidence,” of defining “preponderance the Coffman also the amend- “greater weight or part, as of “creat- ment is unconstitutional because it con evidence which is more credible and a the must ed bench trial which individual the The vincing ‘prepon mind.... word in order another trial get win where something than derance’ means more discharge or will be continued commitment it ‘weight’; superiority weight, denotes a of However, finally decided.” the two-trial outweighing.” or Id. system the amendment existed before 2004 probable The main difference between a and was found to be constitutional preponderance a of the cause standard аnd Schottel; only change the the initial is probable cause evidence standard is Coffman must reach order burden weigh not the does fact-finder trial. to the proceed second v. conflicting evidence. See Jamison discharge procedure not vi- 2. The does Family Servs., State, Dept. Div. Social of of Equal the olate Protection Clause (Mo. ervs., 218 411 banc S.W.3d S States Constitu- Missouri and United 2007). The evidence preponderance of the tions standard, where weighing standard the fact-finder consider whether the The States Constitution must United deny to weight supports state shall ... greater provides “[n]o of the evidence

445 any person jurisdiction equal argument ignores per within This the fact that its Const, of protection sexually the laws.” U.S. as sons who are committed violent Similarly, amend. XIV. the Missouri Con are predators they because are committed provides, persons stitution “all are created society. Id. “distinctively dangеrous” to equal and are equal rights entitled Because the basis commitment of sexu Const, under law.” Mo. opportunity ally violent is different predators I, equal sec. 2. protection art. Missouri’s commitments, general there re civil is no provides protections clause the same as quirement predators United States Constitution. Bernat v. exactly as rights be afforded the same State, (Mo. 2006). banc 863 persons under general committed civil Bernat, standard. 194 See S.W.3d 868- The dеtermination whether a (discussing hearing procedures that are protection equal statute violates the clause different for civil commitments and sexual two-part analysis. the Matter of commitments). ly re The Norton, Care and Treatment quirement that a right demonstrate his initial to release step is a first determination of whether the preponderance of evidence is narrow operates classification to the disadvantage ly tailorеd to interest in keeping the state’s suspect impinges of a class or on a funda people if it committed is more than so, right. mental Id. If the classification not commit they will subject scrutiny strict and will if crimes released. The amended statute upheld necessary to a compelling the equal protection does not violate not, state interest. Id. If the classifica clause. upheld rationally tion it is related to a

legitimate state Id. interest. 3. Coffman’s was nоt frivolous grant- and the circuit erred in This previously Court has deter ing Coffman a on his release mined that violent predator subject scrutiny law is to strict right liberty. affects fundamental *7 The trial court found that Coff- Id.; Bernat, 194 868. Strict man’s for release was frivolous scrutiny applies, therefore and the statute allege because he did not that his mental only upheld will be is necessary to a changed. urges condition had The state compelling state and narrowly interest that this result correct because section is Norton, protect drawn to that interest. provides involuntary 632.495 that commit sexually 123 S.W.3d at 173. The violent ment until “men shall continue Coffman’s the compelling statute serves abnormality changed tal so that is has [he] society state interest of protecting from large.” safe to be at Since the evidence persons likely who are to commit future that was that physi Coffman sexually violent if not crimes committed. point cal condition hаd to the ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍deteriorated at 174. Id. any where he would not be able to abuse argues requirement Coffman that one in the future —not that his mental he that demonstrate his entitlement to re ar had —the preponderance lease evidence gues that not entitled to he is release. equal protection because “[n]o violates oth person civilly allowing indefinite involuntarily

er committed basis preliminary showing predators must make a to a commitment оf violent trial ‘warranting’ society of facts protect dangerous per- second trial[.]” define petitions, this is a on the does not “frivolous.” sons. Because restriction defined, part, “Frivolous” is in as “of little right liberty, may fundamental of the state importance: having weight or no basis only commit who meet certain cri- persons Third or fact.” New Inter- recognized— law Webster’s generally teria. Courts have (1993). Dictionary national See also both con- (1990), Dictionary, Law 6th Editiоn Black’s general text and in the commitment con- clearly pleading “a is ‘frivolous’when it is may person only text —that a be involun- ” pe- on face.... insufficient its tarily dangerous if committed he both allege tition was sufficient to a basis has some mental illness or abnormali- longer that no dangerous; believe he is Louisiana, 71, 77, ty. Foucha v. 504 U.S. therefore, a hearing he is entitled to before (1992); 1780, 112 S.Ct. 118 L.Ed.2d 437 court, pursuant the circuit to section Hendricks, 346, 358, Kansas v. 521 U.S. hearing Coffman will have 632.498. 2072, (1997); In 117 S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d 501 by a рrove, preponderance the burden to Matter the Care and Treatment of of longer that he no meets of Murrell, 96, involuntary the standard for commitment 2007). It process violates due to continue If the cir- predator. as a mentally ill but person to confíne a who that has cuit court determines dangerous or others. himself burden, met his then the case shall Donaldson, O’Connor v. 422 U.S. to a where State will ceed trial (1975). 2486, 45 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 396 prove, by clear and have the burden Therefore, “even confine- [Coffman’s] evidence,2 convincing he is not entitled initially permissible, it could not ment to release.3 that basis no constitutionally continue after longer existed.” Id. The state presumed to be consti- Section 632.498is abnor- statute covers mental tutional, rejects and this Court the state’s dichotomy though there malities —as limiting interpretation of the statute as clearly from the divides mental persons release to whose mental abnormal- рerson’s of a life. If Coff- physical aspects ity changed, regardless dangerous- has can longer man demonstrate he is no an violate interpretation ness. Such would offenses, likely commit process the due clauses the United he is to release he is entitled and Missouri Constitutions. States regardless of whether dangerous, points to evi- The state considerable longer dangerous the reason is no indicating dence the record Coff- physical. primarily mental or commit sexu- man future (1) 632.504, offenses, including: many which the trial grants ally Section *8 pres- frivolous authority to dismiss his current medical conditions were amended, again a when he 2. Section effec- he was 632.498 5, 2006, change June burden petition. tive the state's filed his Id. at 892-93. "beyond a reasonable doubt” to "clear convincing his and evidence.” Coffman filed have 3. While the state would the burden March for release in 2006—before trial, proof at the statute does not This effective date of the 2006 amendment. disagree with trial the state to the initial held, however, the version recently Court finding person no court’s that a confined in time of section that is effect at the 632.498 involuntary longer meets the standard for controlling ex of the trial version. State Presumably, if the state does commitment. Harman, 889, rel. Schottel v. conclusion, per- challenge the court's the issue is This because jury trial. can be released without son petitioner is a whеther the trial, not whether at the time (2) offenses, prior ent the time of his his The standard of review dictates that the participate refusal in treatment trial court’s dismissal should be reviewed (8) grams, his stated desire to discretion; ie., move to a for abuse of its decision registration, without sex offender only be clearly against reversed (4) engaging in inappro- logic of the circumstances and is so priate behavior during his commitment. arbitrary and unreasonable that it shоcks holding suffi- justice the sense of and indicates a lack of cient evidence to hearing, receive a this See, e.g., careful consideration. Romero v. Court does not consider whether Coff- City Corp., Kansas Station man’s evidence outweighs this evidence 137 (Mo.App.2003). Rather, that he should not be released. being by After denied release the de- Court holds peti- that Coffman’s partment of mental health in annual re- tion was not weigh- frivolous and that the in views 2005 аnd Coffman filed this ing of the performed evidence should be petition for release without the director’s and, the circuit court appropriate, by if approval, as authorized section 632.504. in a second trial. The trial court is instructed the statute judgment The of the circuit court to dismiss Coffman’s without con- reversed, and the case is remanded. On ducting a if it finds the remand the court shall hold a hearing pur- majority opinion “frivolous.” The defines suant to current section 632.498. “frivоlous” as a test of whether Coffman’s petition had no basis law or fact or STITH, PRICE, LIMBAUGH and it “clearly whether was insufficient” on its WHITE, JJ., concur. face. majority finds that Coffman’s RUSSELL, J., in part concurs and dis- petition was not frivolous suffi- in part sents in separate opinion filed. ciently alleges a basis to believe he is no longer dangerous, regardless of the status TEITELMAN, J., concurs in opinion of of his mental I disagree condition. RUSSELL, J. would affirm the dismissal. RUSSELL, MARY R. Judge, majority discusses, As the the trial concurring and dissenting. court’s ultimate role was to determine I concur with the majority that section Coffman could show that he should no 632.4981 is constitutional. I respectfully longer confined as a sexual dissent, however, from majority’s con- because his mental changed condition had clusion that the trial court erred dis- longer posed danger or because he no missing Coffman’s as frivolous. society. The trial court did not abuse its Pursuant to this Court’s standard of re- determining discretion in that Coffman’s view, I would аffirm the trial court’s deci- petition allege failed to facts to show that sion. his mental condition had or that his mental existed. majority properly

While states and The record demonstrated follows the de novo standard of review for mental ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍condition statutory changed: had not he had interpretation in finding that sec- *9 treatment; constitutional, completed tion 632.498 is he had confine- it fails to ment violations that apply appropriate pornographic consider or included standard materials; for weighing engaged inap- review the trial court’s he was seen petition. dismissal of Coffman’s propriate sexual rubbing his behavior — statutory Supp. 1. All references are to RSMo unless otherwise indicated. resident; leg hand on the of another he stated, “I

had want to change;” don’t planned

he to leave Missouri for a state a sexually

without law.

Further, had the trial court even consid- dangerousness required

ered as Coffman’s majority, Coffman’s failed longer posed danger

to show that no he society. cardiologist pulmo-

nary specialists on commented condition,

continuing physical but made no physical

assessments of how his limitations acting him on

prevented his mental

abnormality to future acts of sexu- prevent condition, Despite physical

al violence. plans job to return to his

Coffman stated driving

truck released. Coffman’s when

expert’s attestation that Coffman was no

longer dangerous could persons

harm in “his immediate reach” past

failed consider that Coffman’s sex-

ual acts chase: he molested 2-year old old.

10-month and a

The trial should not be convicted abusing denying ‍​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‍its discretion Coff- frivolous under

man’s as section

632.504. PROPERTIES, INC.,

PETROL

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COMPANY,

STEWART TITLE d/b/a Guaranty Company, and

Stewart Title Company, Defen-

Lincoln Land Title

dants-Respondents.

No. 27661. Appeals,

Missouri Court District,

Southern

Division Two.

May 2007.

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Care and Treatment of Coffman
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Jun 12, 2007
Citation: 225 S.W.3d 439
Docket Number: SC 87803
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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