251 F. 927 | M.D. Tenn. | 1918
The referee has filed a certificate, stating that, in the administration of this estate, it became necessary
2. Under these provisions of the Act and General Orders, which are evidently intended to secure economjr in the administration • of bankrupt estates, I think it clear that the referee can only be reimbursed for such specific expenses as are' actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of the particular estate in which they are allowed; and upon due report of such specific expenses, under oath, as provided in Sec. 62 of the Act and the 26th General Order.
3. The cost of stationery used by the referee in the performance of his duties in a particular case, -as in sending to creditors prescribed notices of the bankrupt’s application for discharge, is such a necessary expense. Re Dixon (D. C.) 114 Fed. 674, 676. And so, where information is requested of the referee by creditors, requiring answers by mail, the cost of the stationery used in replying to such inquiries is an “actual and necessary expense” in the administration of such estate, for which the referee is entitled to reimbursement.
The 35th General Order (89 Red. xiii, 32 C. C. A. xiii) however, recognizes, impliedly at least, that it may sometimes be necessary for a referee to employ a “clerk” to assist him in the performance of his duties in a particular case which has been referred to him. And I think it clear that if, in the administration of a particular case, the exigency is such, due either to the volume or urgency of the duties to'be performed by the referee, as to render it necessary for him to employ stenographic or other clerical assistance in order that he may adequately and efficiently perform such duties, as where the volume of correspondence with creditors is such as to render it impossible for him to personally answer their letters, the expense so incurred should be allowed as an actual and necessary expense in the administration of such estate. Re Dixon (D. C.) 114 Fed. 676; Re Daniels (D. C.) 130 Fed. 600; Matter of McCubbin Co. (Sup. Ct. Dist. Col.) 33 Am. Bankr. Rep. 279. And see Re Elk Valley Mining Co. (D. C.) 213 Fed, 387, in which the referee’s claim for clerk and stenographer hire was-disallowed on the specific ground that “the record shows no state of fact which would support” such claim.
This conclusion, however, I should add, is limited to cases in which the necessity appears for the employment of stenographic or other clerical assistance in the administration of the particular estate involved; it not being intended to suggest any concurrence in the view expressed in Re Pierce (D. C.) 111 Fed. 516, 517, and apparently approved, obiter, in Matter of McCubbin Co. (Sup. Ct. Dist. Col.) 33 Am Bankr. Rep. 281, that a bankruptcy court may, by the adoption of a general rule, authorize the allowance to referees as part of the expense of administration in every estate, of a fixed sum for clerical assistance, regardless of the character or amount of the work involved in the particular case, and in the nature of a general commutation charge for such expenses; or in the doctrine of Re Tebo (D. C.) 101 Fed. 419, 421, in which a general allowance for clerk hire of the referee was made, without, apparently, any showing of the necessity therefor in the particular case.