In re C.A.P.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Steadman, King, Newman
Appellant seeks reversal of an adjudication of delinquency based on the trial judge‘s finding, after a bench trial, that he was guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (“UUV“).1 On appeal, he maintains both that the trial judge erred in denying the motion to suppress2 and that the conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.
I.
At the suppression hearing, a patrol officer with the United States Capitol Police testified that on December 5, 1990, at approximately 3:20 p.m., she observed a 1987 Buick Skylark traveling along a section of Washington Avenue, S.W., which is within the jurisdiction of the Capitol Police, attempt to make a left turn onto the blocked-off ramp to I-395 at the beginning of rush hour—a turn that was illegal at that time of day. The officer motioned to the driver to continue forward rather than make the turn. The driver complied and as the Buick passed her cruiser, the officer noticed that the right rear vent window was smashed. She thought it “strange” that the window was not covered since “in December it was kind of cool.” Further, the officer testified that in four or five of the six UUV arrests she had made, the stolen vehicle had a broken vent window. Suspecting that the Buick might be stolen, the officer called “communications” to determine whether there had been any reports regarding the vehicle. The officer then began following the Buick, and she activated the cruiser‘s emergency equipment while both vehicles were inside the Capitol grounds. The Buick proceeded for approximately one and a half blocks before it came to a stop at 3rd and C Streets, S.W., which is outside of the Capitol grounds. The officer received confirmation that the Buick was listed as stolen “[j]ust simultaneously to the same time the [Buick] was pulling to the curve [sic].” The vehicle was occupied by four individuals including appellant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat.
The officer exited her vehicle and approached the Buick on the passenger‘s side. She observed that a portion of the steering column had been taped over with duct tape. The officer also observed a bent key, one “that did not belong in the ignition,” protruding
The trial judge denied appellant‘s motion to suppress, finding that the officer possessed sufficient information to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop. Specifically, the trial judge found that: the officer observed the Buick as “[i]t passed by her at a short distance and as it did within the police—the Capitol Police grounds, right at that point she saw a broken rear vent window“; based on the officer‘s experience with intercepting stolen vehicles, the broken vent window “alerted her suspicions and she got behind the vehicle ... and tried to initiate a stop“; and, “[t]he Capitol Police have authority to complete [the traffic stop] as it was initiated ... inside the Capitol grounds....”
At trial, the officer repeated the testimony she had given at the suppression hearing, and the government introduced photographs of the car taken after the arrest. The Buick‘s owner, who resided at 107 14th Street, N.E., testified that he last saw the vehicle, which had been parked outside his residence, sometime between 11:00 a.m. and noon on the date appellant was arrested. The trial judge denied appellant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal and found appellant guilty, concluding that the evidence supported the inference that appellant had knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. This appeal followed.
II.
In reviewing the trial judge‘s denial of the motion to suppress, we must first determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to stop the vehicle. If we conclude that she did, then we must decide whether a Capitol Police officer is authorized to make such a stop outside of that police force‘s jurisdiction. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court gives deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact, and those findings will not be disturbed if they are supported by the record. Lawrence v. United States, 566 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). However, since the ultimate determination of the legality of the stop remains a question of law, we must independently review the trial judge‘s conclusion that the stop was valid. Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 1171 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); see Brown v. United States, 546 A.2d 390, 393 (D.C.1988).
In order to initiate an investigative stop an officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” justify the stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See also Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 393. The officer testified that she noticed that the right rear vent window was smashed and that she thought it “strange” that the window would not be covered in the December cold. Moreover, the officer also testified that in four or five of the six UUV arrests she had made, the stolen vehicle had a broken vent window. We agree with the trial judge‘s conclusion that the smashed rear vent window, taken together with the officer‘s experience with other UUV arrests, was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion in the officer‘s mind that the vehicle had been stolen. Smith v. United States, 295 A.2d 64, 66 (D.C.1972) (stop was justified where reasonable suspicion existed to believe, based on officer‘s experience and observations of appellant‘s highly suspicious conduct, that bag contained proceeds of larceny). Therefore, the officer could properly initiate whatever action was necessary to bring the vehicle to a stop. See id. at 67. By the time the Buick stopped, the officer‘s suspicion had ripened into probable cause since, by that point, she knew from communications that the vehicle had been reported stolen. Lewis v. United States, 379 A.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C.1977) (following lawful investigative stop, on-the-scene identification of appellants as robbers provided probable cause for their arrest).
Our conclusion that the officer had a reasonable basis to initiate an investigative stop
The trial court found, applying the doctrine of fresh pursuit, that the officer had authority to stop appellant outside the Capitol grounds because the stop was lawfully initiated inside the grounds. We begin our analysis by noting that, when this case arose, the Capitol Police were generally not authorized3 to make arrests outside the Capitol grounds. Thus, the stop and arrest here, if lawful, can be justified only if permitted by the doctrine of fresh pursuit. There are no common law4 fresh pursuit cases in this jurisdiction; therefore, we turn to Maryland law, the most authoritative body of law other than our own precedent. See United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1215 (D.C.1987) (District common law consists of common law in force in Maryland in 1801) (citations omitted); see also Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F.Supp. 602, 603 (D.D.C.1956) (District derives its common law from Maryland and decisions of Maryland courts on questions of common law are authoritative in the absence of District authority);
Under the common law doctrine of fresh pursuit, an officer in lawful pursuit could chase an individual, suspected of having committed a felony, into another jurisdiction and effectuate an arrest therein. Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661, 666 (1954) (citations omitted). In Gattus, a search warrant, authorizing the search of an automobile for bookmaking paraphernalia, was executed by police officers following the chase of appellant outside the jurisdiction of the judicial officer who authorized the warrant. Id. at 663. Since the search warrant was actually executed (in Baltimore County)
Applying that doctrine to the Capitol Police officer‘s pursuit of the Buick, we conclude that the officer was authorized to stop the vehicle outside the grounds because she had reason to believe that the Buick had been stolen and the basis for the officer‘s belief was the observation made by her while both vehicles were inside the grounds. The officer was entitled, therefore, under the common law doctrine of fresh pursuit to complete that stop outside the Capitol grounds.6
Appellant, however, relies on United States v. Foster, 566 F.Supp. 1403 (D.D.C. 1983), and Andersen v. United States, 132 A.2d 155 (D.C.), aff‘d, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 253 F.2d 335 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930, 78 S.Ct. 1375, 2 L.Ed.2d 1372 (1958), for the proposition that the officer was without authority to effect a stop of the Buick. In Foster, a Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (“WMATA“) officer made a Terry stop of a vehicle on a District street based on information gained while both he and the vehicle were outside of WMATA jurisdiction. Foster, supra, 566 F.Supp. at 1411-12. A sawed-off shotgun, which Foster had concealed, was recovered near the vehicle. Id. at 1408. The court held that the officer exceeded his jurisdiction when he made the stop since he had no police power anywhere other than inside WMATA facilities. Id. at 1412. Unlike the instant case, however, all the events in Foster occurred outside the officer‘s jurisdiction and there was, therefore, no issue of fresh pursuit.
Appellant‘s reliance on Andersen is also misplaced. In Andersen, the defendant loudly protested a Capitol Police officer‘s authority to issue a traffic citation to a third person on a street bordering, but just outside, the Capitol grounds. Andersen, supra, 132 A.2d at 156. Andersen was convicted of assaulting the officer, an offense committed after he was placed under arrest for disorderly conduct. Id. The arrest took place on the same boundary street outside the Capitol grounds. Id. In holding that the arrest was lawful, we observed that the Capitol Police are required to police the Capitol grounds, and in order to effectuate that purpose “it was just as necessary to patrol the boundary streets as the areas entirely within the Grounds.” Id. Since movement of traffic through the grounds was affected by the traffic congestion on the boundary street, the Capitol Police officer had authority to arrest Andersen in that location for conduct that interfered with the exercise of those duties. Id. at 157.
In sum, we hold that the officer had a sufficient basis for stopping the vehicle and that, under the doctrine of fresh pursuit in the circumstances presented here, she was empowered to effect the stop outside of her jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
III.
In order to convict a passenger of UUV, the government must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the passenger was present in the vehicle with knowledge that the vehicle was being operated without the owner‘s consent. In re T.T.B., 333 A.2d 671, 673 (D.C.1975). The government established that appellant was riding in a vehicle that was recovered some three to four hours after it had been stolen. Moreover, the officer testified, without contradiction, that the steering column had been broken open and roughly bound with duct tape, a bent ignition key that did not properly fit was protruding half-way out of the ignition, the rear vent window was smashed, and broken glass was visible on the back seat and floorboard. Those observations by the officer were made while she was standing outside of the vehicle on the passenger‘s side. Based on that testimony, the trial court could readily infer that appellant, who was seated in the front passenger‘s seat, could see everything the officer could. We are satisfied that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to warrant the inference that the vehicle was being operated without the consent of its owner and that appellant would know that to be the case. In re D.M.L., 293 A.2d 277, 278 (D.C.1972) (evidence that ignition system had been tampered with and was clearly visible to passenger in rear seat of automobile was sufficient to sustain delinquency adjudication). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support an adjudication of the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Affirmed.
Notes
In 1992, Congress expanded the arrest power of the Capitol Police by authorizing them:
to make arrests and otherwise enforce the laws of the United States, including the laws of the District of Columbia—
(1) within the District of Columbia, with respect to any crime of violence committed within the United States Capitol Grounds;
(2) within the District of Columbia, with respect to any crime of violence committed in the presence of the member, if the member is in the performance of official duties when the crime is committed;
(3) within the District of Columbia, to prevent imminent loss of life or injury to person or property, if the officer is in the performance of official duties when the authority is exercised; and
(4) within the area described in subsection (b) of this section.