delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case arose out of a series of incidents which lead to appellant being adjudgеd a delinquent youth. From an order of commitment placing her in the custody of the Montana Dеpartment of Institutions, this appeal is taken.
On March 31, 1983, the Fergus County Attorney filed a petition оf a Youth Hearing in the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Montana, requesting that appellant be adjudged a delinquent youth. At the time, she was fifteen years of age. The pеtition alleged that during the month of March, 1983, appellant committed the offense of violation of privacy in communication, a misdemeanor as provided in Section 45-8-213, MCA. The facts underlying the offense were that on three separate occasions, appеllant and several minor friends made numerous telephone calls to a Lewistown, Montanа residence. The purpose and effect of these calls was to harass a womаn living there. On April 6,1983, an evidentiary hearing was held, at which the District Court found the allegations of the petition to be true.
The dispositional hearing was held on April 13, 1983, and appellant was ordered committed to the Department of Institutions until she reaches the age of twenty-one, unless the Department deems an earlier release appropriate. She was placed in the Mountain View School for Girls in Helena. A notice of appeal was filеd with this Court on May 17, 1983, however, jurisdiction was returned to the District Court to allow entry of findings. After the findings were рroperly entered, this Court resumed jurisdiction for the purpose of this appeal.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether appellant’s
The initial inquiry in any equal proteсtion analysis is whether the identified groups or classes are similarly situated with respect to the challenged statute, ruling or governmental action. Montana Land Title Association v. First American Title (1975),
First, as the State points оut, appellant was not convicted of a crime but committed after being found a delinquent youth under Section 41-5-403, MCA. While it is true that both commitment and sentencing are deprivations of physical liberty, the cause and desired result of each is different. A sentence of imprisonment following a criminal conviction is imposed because a particular crime was cоmmitted, and its purpose is both retributional and rehabilitational. Though a juvenile commitment is usually triggеred by a crime, the commitment is strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution. The purpose of the yоuth Court Act is to, <s. . . [P]rovide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physiсal development,” of youths falling under its jurisdiction, and “. . .[T]o remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of retribution and to substitute therefore a program of supervision, сare [and] rehabilitation. . . “ Section 41-5-102, MCA. There is more than an artificial distinction between commitment under the Youth Court Act and sentencing under the Montana
Second, the physical liberty interests of minors and adults are qualitatively different. The liberty interest of a minor is subject to reasonable rеgulation by the state, to an extent not permissible with adults. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976),
Finally, we have еxamined those cases cited from other jurisdictions which have addressed this question, and found рersuasive those which concluded that adults and juveniles are not similarly situated in these cirсumstances, cf. In Re Eric J. (Cal. 1980),
Affirmed.