188 F. 530 | M.D. Penn. | 1911
The proceedings in this case arose upon an application of the trustee to be allowed to have an examination of the bankrupt to ascertain whether he had made a full disclosure of his assets. It appears that the first meeting of creditors was held February 7, 1911, which the bankrupt did not attend. The hearing was adjourned to February 15th, and again to the 17th, and again to
“The bankrupt when present at the first meeting of his creditors, and at such other times as the court shall order, shall submit to an examination concerning the conducting of his business, the cause of his bankruptcy, his dealings with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of Ills property, and in addition all matters which may affect the administration and settlement of his estate.”
The intent of the subdivision seems to be that creditors may have an examination of the bankrupt at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. If it should be argued that the bankrupt, having been examined as provided, without adjournment, could not again be called for further examination under this provision, to which we by no means assent, the other and further provision of the act affords the remedy in section 21a, to wit:
“A court of bankruptcy may, upon application of any officer, bankrupt, or creditor, by order require any designated person, including the bankrupt and his -wife, to appear in court or before a referee or the judge of any state court, to l)e examined concerning ihe acts, conduct, or property of a bankrupt whose estate is in process of administration under this act.”
Collier says that:
“Where the first meetings are kept alive by continuances, as is customary, his examination can lie had or resumed so long as the meeting- lasts. If the meeting had been adjourned, an examination can, under section 7 (!)), still be bud at such times as the court shall order, or it can be required under section 2ia.”
That it is the intention of the law to require a bankrupt to submit freely to examination concerning his estate is very apparent. Applications may be granted at any time before final disposition of the es-:ate, in the exercise of a sound discretion of the judge or his referee.
It does not appear that the discretion vested in the referee has not (been soundly exercised in the granting of the order; hence the exceptions are overruled, and the order of the referee is affirmed.